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ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION
THE TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL BY RAIL
DO WE NEED MORE PROTECTION?
AUGUST 15, 1991
Los Angeles, California

CHAIRMAN RICHARD KATZ:

I'm Assemblyman Richard Katz.

On

my left, I am pleased to be joined by Assemblyman Jack O'Connell,
in whose district one of the incidents occurred, and who convened

an earlier meeting, as well as an on-site inspection that he and I
did several weeks ago.

On my right is John Stevens, Senior

Consultant to the Transportation Committee.
Mr. Hou, representing Senator Hart.

Also in the audience,

Mr. Hou, if you want to join

us up here you're more than welcome on behalf of Senator Hart.
In a two week period there were two derailments.

One

sterilized the river and the other shut down Highway 101 for a
week.

Both endangered lives.

The volume of hazardous material

shipped by rail is increasing, as is the risk to Californians.
It's clear that toxic time bombs are on trains rolling along track
located near our homes, schools and work places.

While rail

transportation continues to be safer than trucks; that's not much
comfort to the folks who lives near Dunsmuir, or live in Ventura
County.

Our confidence has been shaken by these accidents.

But

recently even more disturbing information has come to light.
Information that I'd like to focus on during this hearing.
- 1 -

We have

reports that over 90 percent of Southern Pacific locomotives failed
safety inspections conducted by teams of state and federal
inspectors at SP's Roseville and Tucson's maintenance facilities
earlier this year.
In addition, very serious allegations have been made that
in June, just weeks before the Dunsmuir and Sea Cliff derailments,
a team inspection of Southern Pacific locomotives in Southern
California was called off by Federal Railway Administration
officials and that any major assessment of the safety of Southern
Pacific trains and operations were suspended for a six week period,
purportedly to give the railroad a chance to get back on their
feet.

During that period, both Dunsmuir and the Ventura

derailments occurred.
What we want to know and we are trying to get to the
bottom of today, and let me make it clear to the people who are
testifying today, that while you are not under oath today, if
necessary I will put you under oath.
documents and witnesses.
and will use it.

If necessary, I will subpoena

This committee has the power to do that

We will do it today; we will do it at our hearing

next Monday in Sacramento, if that is what is necessary to get the
documentation and the truth out about some very serious
allegations.

We want to know if these allegations are true.

want to know if, in fact, inspections were called off.
Who ordered it?
from where?

We

If so, why?

What pressure were they put under, if any, and

And what impact these actions had on the derailments

that would have generally been attributed to equipment failure.
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Those are very serious concerns, and will be the major
focus of what we are doing here today.

In addition to answering

those questions, we need to make sure that the state is doing every
thing possible to protect the public.

In addition to those

questions, we want to look at what the state is now doing to
regulate rail transportation of hazardous material, and what should
the state be doing.
What needs to be done in addition to ensure that
hazardous substances are not released into our air and water?

What

information is available to those who are first at the scene of a
derailment?

What additional information needs to be available so

that good decisions can be made in dealing with hazardous spills?
I'm working on legislation along with Assemblyman O'Connell and
Senator Killea that will address some of these issues.

That

legislation will be introduced next week.
We are hoping that this hearing will give us some answers
and some additional information as we craft legislation to correct
the problems designed and protect people.

One thing that is very

frightening to me, and one thing that I hope to understand better
today is what role the agencies who are responsible for
implementing these rules and regulations and law have played in the
last several years, as far as oversight for the railroad.

We can

write great law and we can have great regulations, but if the
enforcers are not enforcing, and the regulators are not regulating,
and the bureaucrats aren't doing their job, none of it means
anything and the public is at risk, and that's something that none
of us will stand for.
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So, we are looking for some answers today.
to remind people, if necessary we'll go to
subpoenas.

Again, I want

and we'll go to

But I'm hoping we can get the answers without having to

resort to that.

Jack, do you want to make some comments?

ASSEMBLYMAN JACK O'CONNELL:
Assemblyman Katz.

Thank you very much

I first, of all want, to thank you not only for

this hearing today to help try to answer many of the questions and
the points that you raised, but also for coming to the Sea Cliff
area two and a half weeks ago and staying on site as long as you
did.

Your staff's interest in this issue, not just for the last

couple of weeks, but for a several years have really been in the
forefront.

I'm most appreciative of your sincere efforts in this

area.
I did have an opportunity to go to the site in the Sea
Cliff area on two separate occasions.

I put in a total of about

eight hours trying to learn first hand, as did Assemblyman Katz, by
working and looking at the command center, talking to the folks
that had been involved, and trying to learn as much as possible to
get better educated.
Since that time, I also conducted a meeting with many of
the individuals that were responsible for the cleanup
operation--representatives from industry, from both local
government, state government and the federal government-- who
attended the meeting that I had a couple days ago.

It's rather

clear to me that the adequacy of the information for the mitigation
and for remediation

is not complete.

Although on a

1 of

or the manifest there appears to be adequate information for the
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first response units, that we are lacking in terms of a particular
information to help us begin an immediate cleanup of that
particular area.
It's also rather apparent to me that the railroads need
to do more to work with local government in the event of a spill.
They are inadequately involved in the planning in the event of an
emergency.

We need to do more to help local government work and

integrate with the emergency response units that local government
has responsibility for.

Also the inability to identify containers

which have been separated from rail cars and the potential
co-mingling of incompatible materials continues to be a major
concern to me.
It's also apparent that the federal government, while
they do have a lion's share of the responsibility, at least
historically, is not doing an adequate job of regulating the
transportation of these materials.
It's clear that public confidence in the area of rail
transportation of these hazardous materials has been shaken.

Many

of us are greatly concerned due to the fact that we have an aging
rail transportation corridor.

It's a major concern as these rails

go through many of our bedroom communities.
I'm pleased that the Public Utilities Commission took a
modest step about a week ago, the unanimous vote of general order
161, which does require some very basic and modest guidelines for
the transportation of many of these materials.
I'm here today to learn first hand, (1) how can we
prevent the spills from occurring, such as that which we
- 5 -

experienced a month ago at Dunsmuir, and a couple of weeks ago at
Sea Cliff in Ventura County?

(2) In the event of a spill, how we

can improve the cleanup operation of the material?

I want to know

what works, what doesn't work, how we can improve it and I look
forward to working with Assemblyman Katz and his leadership role in
trying to pass legislation.

As he pointed out, even more

importantly, how we can follow through the implementation of that
legislation.

So, thanks again Richard, for being here.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Jack, thank you.

I'd like to ask from

the Federal Railroad Administration, Tom Paton, the Regional
Director of Safety to come forward.

Also at the same time from

the Public Utilities Commission, we had confirmation that Patricia
Eckert, President of the Commission, was going to be here.
here?

Is she

We had some stories yesterday that she was going to duck out

of this hearing.

Mr. Oliver?

Mr. Oliver, why don't you join us

then, as head of the Safety Division for the PUC?
Let me start.

Do you want to make brief statements or

just respond to questions?

Lets do it this way.

How about, Mr.

Paton, if you'd describe for us your job and your responsibilities
as the Western Regional Director of Safety for FRA.
MR. H.T."TOM" PATON:
inspection programs.

I'm responsible for safety

I manage the safety inspection program to

assure compliance with the federal laws and regulations applicable
to railroad safety.

In additional to that we make special

investigations for compliance, waivers, and accident
investigations.
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CHAIRMAN KATZ:

And how many people do you have working

for you doing that?
MR. PATON:

Roughly twenty-seven Federal Inspectors and

it's supplemented by about fifteen State Inspectors.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. PATON:

No.

Nevada, and California.

And that's in California?
That's in four states--Arizona, Utah,
The bulk of those are located in

California.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Was there an inspection of the Southern

Pacific locomotive at the Roseville Maintain Yard?
MR. PATON:
of locomotives.

We continued to make inspections at Roseville

We made a very special

ins~ection

of the

locomotives involved in the Dunsmuir accident at Eugene, Oregon.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
since January 1st.
a date off here.

I'm interested in some time, lets say,

I don't want to lose information because I have
Was there a team inspection done out at

Roseville?
MR. PATON:

During the month of June we made four team

inspections on the Southern Pacific; one of those included
Roseville.

The other three locations were in Tucson, Arizona,

Bakersfield, and Sparks, Nevada.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. PATON:

And that was in June?

Yes, that's during the month of June. All

four of them were team inspections.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

What were the results of the June

inspection in Roseville?
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MR. PATON:

We inspected 61 locomotives, and found 48

defective.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

48 out of 61 defective.

question here, so that I understand the process.

Let me ask a
I'm familiar with

how the Highway Patrol does it with school buses, because we've
been through that with them.

But I just want to understand.

When

we're talking about inspections like this, are we talking about
some surprises?

Knock, knock, guess who's here kind of thing?

MR. PATON:
inspections.

No, no they are almost all surprise

We do not announce our coming.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

When you show up, and I understand by the

intensity of this kind of inspection, its a 48-hour procedure,
roughly?
MR. PATON:
have there.

No, it depends on the number of people we

We generally work two-eight hour shifts as a routine.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Your first intent is the equipment that

is about to go out of the yard.
MR. PATON:

Routinely on a team inspection, we only

inspect those locomotives that have been prior inspected by the
Southern Pacific.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

You only inspect those that have been

prior inspected by the Southern Pacific.

What I'm hearing is we

have a 48 at a 61 failure rate of locomotives that SP has already
cleared as being worthy of going on the track.
MR. PATON:

They have offered them for service.

correct.
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That is

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. PATON:

It's far too high to satisfy me, yes.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
locomotives.

Is that a high number?

Okay, so you found 48 out of 61

The rest of the rolling stock, was that inspected

also?
MR. PATON:

No, in that one it was only locomotives we

inspected.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Okay, how about Tucson --

ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:

Mr. Katz, before you leave that

location, how many other locomotives were there?

Like are these 61

that obviously Southern Pacific thought would pass, and then of
those 48 in your judgment did not pass, how many of the locomotives
were there?
MR. PATON:

We don't count that, quite a number.

ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:

Can they roll out of the yard the

day after you leave without inspection of your agency?
MR. PATON:

Very possibly, yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:

So, these are their 61 that they

think would pass muster and 48 of those.
MR. PATON:

That's correct.

ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:
been in a railroad yard.

I'm going to confess I've never

How many other locomotives were there

which potentially roll out the next day?
MR. PATON:

We don't count those, but usually in

Roseville they have quite a number of locomotives, some of them are
standing and waiting for repair, waiting for parts, that type of
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thing.

Others are locomotives waiting to service and inspect and

offer them for service.

We routinely don't inspect those.

ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:
tell one quick story.

This sounds like-- I'm going to

My folks use to own a motel.

When we heard

that AAA rating services were coming, we had one room that was
spotless.

When the AAA folks came to see our motel, my folks used

to say that every room was full except for one, we'll show you the
one.

Guess which one room we used to always show?

always got a AAA rating?
MR. PATON:
locomotive inspection.

And guess who

And the place was a dump.

That's not entirely different than the
Usually, when we first arrive on the

property, they don't know we're coming, and we have a few
locomotives that they've offered for service.

That's a realistic

monitoring of the condition of the locomotives.

Then we stay for a

day, or two or three days after that, and they know we're going to
be there, or they presume we're going to be there, and it's a
different world the longer we stay.
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:

So, has it always been your

policy that you just inspect

that have

to you?

Wouldn't it be a little better policy that if they have 200 trains
and you're only going to inspect 60, maybe you'd

to inspect

every third one?
MR. PATON:

Well, we don't want to perform the inspection

for the Southern Pacific.

The basic respons

inspection rests with the railroad.

And we're there to monitor,

how good of a job they do on that inspection.
of 61 is unacceptable.
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lity for that

And obvious

48 out

ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:
Okay.

That's not very good, at all.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

numbers.

Frankly, I'm a little taken aback by the

We're talking about 78 percent failure rate of stuff that

the railroad has said is okay to go on the track.

We're not

talking about doorknobs being out of whack here.
MR. PATON:

It can be a variety of things, Mr. Chairman.

Generally, we don't defect a locomotive for one light bulb out, or
that type of thing.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

You might do it if the governor on the

locomotive is not working properly?
MR. PATON:

Absolutely.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

The sort of things that SP has said

caused the Dunsmuir or could have contributed to the Dunsmuir
incident.

Those kind of conditions would have been the kinds of

things you would have tagged a locomotive for?
MR. PATON:

we take it for personal injury hazards,

particularly safety hazards on the locomotive itself.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

This was a June inspection in Roseville?

Were there any other team inspections, or team assessments, I guess
the kinds that show up on the so-called Motive Power Equipment
Forms 59, the box type that come out as fives.

Were there any

fives done this year?
MR. PATON:

I don't follow the question?

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. PATON:

You're familiar with the MPE forms?

Yes.

-
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CHAIRMAN KATZ:

a

Equipment Form,

Mot

On an MPE 59 1
indicate

Power

0

that was done.
designated by a 2 ...
MR. PATON:
a team assessment 1

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

h

designated by a 5
MR. PATON:

inspection is 5.

Any spec

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Were

assessments

any other

done at Roseville this year?
MR. PATON:

None that I have

I

made a list

on those I

of these team inspections,

method of
and what we

memorandum to Washington, telling them what we
had found.

From that record, I assembled a list

have been more than what I

There

to go

t

I

through our volume of 59

be

to

1 out.

It

have been a manual job.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
I

assume

team assessment?

How

Just rout

were?

MR. PATON
a daily bas

on

's one

to

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
results of Tuc
MR. PATON:

Tucson

Let's move to Tucson

Te

so

June.
June.

was

we

We inspected 92
12 -

79

255

defects.

This inspection, Mr. Chairman, was a bit different than

what we would have conducted as Roseville because Tucson is not a
major locomotive repair point.

Our purpose at Tucson was to

monitor locomotives that were coming out of West Colton, out of Los
Angeles, and from El Paso.

We were looking at inbound locomotives,

not prior inspected by the railroad.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

In that case, you found 79 out of 92?

Does the FRA have the authority to take equipment out of service?
MR. PATON:

Yes .

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

What does it take for you to take

equipment out of service?
MR. PATON:

We fill out a form called a 6180.8.

special notice of repairs.

That's a

The locomotive is no longer permitted

use until it's repaired.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Was that done either in Roseville or in

Tucson?
MR. PATON:

I know it was done in Tucson.

I don't have

with me the documentation on Roseville.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

How many locomotives in Tucson was it

done on?
MR. PATON:

I'd be guessing 4.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

We're averaging here somewhere 80 percent

failure rate in the two yards.

I would assume somebody at FRA is

starting to get concerned about SP's operating ability at this
point?
MR. PATON:

Yes.

Let me give you a little background on

these team inspections, if I may?

It might give you a little
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better insight.

Our f

team

was in

f

which is in Reno.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

were

f

?

were 43

MR. PATON:

so.

's 86

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. PATON:

out

Because I was unhappy

basically at that location, we're

out

of Roseville and Salt Lake City, I arranged a team inspection at
Bakersfield the following week, in addition, at Roseville that
following week.

That was, again, unacceptable.

organized a team inspection for Tucson.
choke-off point for

Tucson,

'S why I

ically, is a

Southern Pacif

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Give me the numbers out of Bakersfield,

just to complete the picture.
MR. PATON:

f

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

1

seeing a pattern

Pacific

f

Chief Mechanical

we had 36 out

to

'S

the choke-point, as
MR.

I

's

you're

You

to Tucson, as

to it?

..
our

Tuc

f

operation we conduc
than $1 million

at Tuc

Interruption of traf

more

s

f

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

less than Dunsmuir

45.

I

You
h

cost
Sea

extent do you care how much

iff
cost SP, at
- 14 -

to cost

a

To
?

etc.

MR. PATON:

I didn't care.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Okay.

That's why I went to Tucson.

That was my question.

to figure out how things weigh here.

I'm trying

It would seem to me from a

safety standpoint, what it costs the railroad is irrelevant.
The question is, if they can't afford to put safe
equipment on the track, they ought to be in a different business.
As my understanding that's where FRA comes from on this.
MR. PATON:
compliance.

We have two basic methods of achieving

one is filing violations on defective units.

The

second, is going to Bakersfield or a Tucson for a choke-off point.
When we interrupt traffic because they have dispatched defective
locomotives, that information goes to the General Manager and the
Vice-President of Operations immediately.

Violation process

sometimes takes a year for them to receive official notification on
it, to actually pay the fine.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
can do that on site.

In terms of putting the equipment, you

Why only four locomotives in Tucson out of 79

with 255 defects were put out of service?
MR. PATON:
out of service.

It's a judgment item, on taking a locomotive

If we feel it's unsafe to continue service, then

we issue a Form 8.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. PATON:

That was done on only four locomotives?

As I recall, it was four; I didn't bring that

with me.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

You can produce for me the 79 locomotives

in Tucson, or the 48 out of Roseville, are on what is referred to
as MPE 59 Forms?
- 15 -

MR. PATON:

That's right.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. PATON:

You can produce that?

I can, through our

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

All right.

's

f

four

I'd like them for

facilities.

Let me shift for a minute to the

ic

ities

Commission.

Before I do, let me ask a question.

Are you familiar

with an internal document from Southern Pacific Railroad, that I
believe is about two-and-a-half years old.

I think it was in

response to an inspection done at Roseville about two-and-a-half
years ago.

I believe it was sent to you with a cover letter from

Ken Moore and Ron Barry of the railroad, that was promising to make
significant improvements in their compliance rate of locomotive
maintenance.
MR. PATON:

Dated March 1990, and they developed that

Locomotive Compliance Plan based on a previous trip to Tucson,
where we did a similar exercise.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I have a copy here.

It took two-and-a-half years to develop a

document?
MR. PATON:

No.

We

conducted

inspection

Tucson before where we seriously interrupted

traffic in

February of 1990, and they produced their Locomotive Compliance
Plan in March of 1990.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I'm under the impression that there is

one previous to that also.
MR. PATON:

I'm not aware of that.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Going back to '89 or '88.
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MR. PATON:

I'm not aware of that.

one you're talking about.

I think this is the

I'd be happy to give you a copy if you

want.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I'd appreciate that.

What were the

recommendations for improving the compliance step.
this question?

Let me ask you

That was based on a Tucson inspection.

What were

the results of that Tucson inspection that triggered that report
from SP?
MR. PATON:
period.

There were two inspections during that

They were just of short duration.

locomotives at Phoenix, again at Tucson.
as I recall.

We inspected
We defected 53 out of 53,

One hundred percent.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

100 percent in the toilet at this time.

What is it that SP said they were going to do try and get at least
one locomotive that met your standards?
MR. PATON:

Basically, in their compliance plan, they

were going to take specific action, by July, 1990, to reduce their
defect ratio by 50 percent.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. PATON:

They have not achieved it.

They haven't come close?

I would agree.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

From SP's standpoint, they went from 0

out of 50 to 13 out of 92, making it.
second, then come back.

Let's shift to the PUC for a

Mr. Oliver, describe for me your

responsibilities and authority.
MR. BILL OLIVER:
rail safety.

I'll zero in on what we do as far as

The Safety Division has other responsibilities before

and in addition to rail safety.

We are the authority from the
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constitution of the Public Utilities Code, the Vehicle Code, and
the Labor Codes.
corr~ission,

From these, the commission issues orders from the

or we have about twenty general orders that count our

specifications that deal with rail safety.

We're pre-empted by the

federal rules of the federal government through the FRA,
establishes rules.

We are pre-empted from that area of safety.

However, there are some areas--track, equipment and operating
practices where states can become certified.
certified in those three areas.

We have become

We have three track inspectors,

two equipment inspectors and three operating practice inspectors.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

Three track inspectors.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

Three track inspectors?

Two equipment inspectors.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLVIER:

Give me the numbers, again?

Two equipment inspectors?

Three operating practice inspectors that

enforce the federal rules.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Three operating practices.

We've got

7,000 miles of track in California?
MR. OLVIER:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

And we've got two track inspectors.
One in Los Angeles and one in ...

How're they doing?

They're busy.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I've never inspected track before, but it

seems to me that the ratio is off a little bit.
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MR. OLIVER:

We work with the Federal Railroad

Administration, and our two track inspectors aren't the only track
inspectors in California.

What they try to do is work through a

priority, looking at the high speed lines, lines that have
passenger trains, and lines that have hazardous materials on them
as a priority.

Also, they have other duties that come about,

accident investigations, and so forth.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Mr. Oliver, specifically, what are you

responsible for?
MR. OLIVER:

As far as track inspection equipment, and

operating practices, that's to carry out and enforce the federal
rules with FRA.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
just named?

That's your direct responsibility?

Who else?

Working for you are the inspectors you
I'm just trying to get an idea of what your

scope and authority and responsibility is?
MR. OLIVER:

We deal in a lot of other areas.

We have

rail safety authority and we have people working in that area.

We

have rail transit authority; we have people working in that area.
Besides just the federal inspectors, we have people that look at
other things, and enforce our general orders.

For example,

clearances on rail, and the other general orders that we have to
enforce.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

What was the PUC's involvement in the

inspections that Mr. Paton mentioned that took place in California?
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Obviously, you're not going to be in Tucson, but I would assume
that in Roseville, Bakersfield, there was PUC involvement?
MR. OLIVER:

Yes.

We had at least one there.

I'm not

sure whether they were both there or not.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

At which inspection?

At Roseville and Bakersfield.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Who are your inspectors in Roseville?

Who was there in Bakersfield?
MR. OLIVER:

Jim McCall was at Roseville and Bakersfield,

I'm not sure whether Jim McCall Jr. was at both of those, too.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

Jim McCall Jr. or Randy McCall?

Randy McCall is Jim McCall Jr.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Okay.

You use the same MPE 59s--you use

the federal forms for your inspections?
MR. OLIVER:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

Those forms are kept at the PUC, also?

Yes, we keep copies.

We submit them to FRA,

but we keep a copy.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
inspections.

Okay.

I would like your MPE 59s for both

In fact, what I'd like from both of you

gentlemen--and I'd like it in a very expeditious manner which in my
mind means before my hearing on Monday--is your MPE59s for the six
months of this year, the time of this year leading up to the
accidents having to do with Southern Pacific.

Actually, what I'd

like to see are your 59s, your 58s, and your 65s.

As I understand

it, your 58s are your track reports, and your 65s are your
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operating practice inspections.

As I understand, operating and

practice inspections have to do with such things as how you
operate, maybe whether you use helper cars or not, how you load
hazardous materials or how you load the weight distribution in a
train.

Those are the things I think of when I think of operating

practices.

Is that not what's covered in your MPE 65s?

What's

covered in your 65s?
MR. PATON:

That can be covered by any the federal

operating rules deficiency.

Also, it can cover, in some cases rare

and operating rule deficiencies.
deficiencies.

It can cover hazardous materials

It can cover hours of service, blue signal.

A

variety of things.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. PATON:

Okay, I'm interested in them.

For six months?

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Yes.

For 1991.

Mr. Oliver, we've heard

discussion of four inspections that were done in June half in and
half out of California.

Do you have any information on an

additional inspection done sometime in that same period, and again
I'm being general specifically, having to do with either the Tailor
Yards or the West Colton Yards?
MR. OLIVER:
get it for you.

I don't have information.

However, I could

I don't have personal information of when they

were done or what the result was.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
how about you?

Well, it's very important.

West Colton or Tailor Yard inspection.

necessarily completed but started.
MR. PATON:

Could you repeat the question.
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Mr. Paton,
Not

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

if there was an

I'm interested in

inspection that was begun at the Tailor Yards or the West Colton
Yards sometime in the same time frame.
MR. PATON:

Yes.

I can answer that question.

Following

our exercise at Sparks, Bakersfield, Roseville, and Tucson, and
prior to arranging all of those team inspections, we had organized
a team inspection for freight cars at West Colton.

The serious

disruption of traffic through these other four team inspections
caused me to change that team inspection at West Colton.

It would

have been the week of the 23rd I believe.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. PATON:

Of June?

Of June.

It caused me to change that team to

go to the Santa Fe at Barstow.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Okay.

Explain to me why you pulled out

of Colton and went to Barstow.
MR. PATON:

I felt that I had pushed the Southern Pacific

as about as far as I could and still maintain effective enforcement
relationship.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

You're going to

Wait a

to

help me here because we're getting in an area that sounds real
bizarre to me.

I'm thinking back to how we do school buses.

If we

see a pattern of problems, the highway patrol sees a
problems what they do is they come down hard.
continues, they come down harder.
viability of the company.

And if the pattern

Our interest

not

It is not that it costs the company a

million dollars a day or it make live difficult for
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shippers.

Our concern is the public protection which is, as you mentioned
earlier, the role of FRA.

What it sounds like you're telling me is

in the wake of four inspections that scare the hell out of me
hearing about now.

Your decision was to pull out of the Colton

Yard because it was causing too great a burden on the railroad?
MR. PATON:

Basically, that's what I'm saying.

maintain some degree of credibility.

I have to

Let me give you an example.

The Vice Chairman of Southern Pacific, Bill Holtman, was advised by
the chief mechanical officer that he did not feel that it was the
intent of Congress for FRA to have the ability to bring a railroad
to their knees, which basically is what I had done in Tucson.

I

felt under those conditions I would be better off to postpone the
West Colton car inspection.

Let me remind you, we're talking

freight cars again rather than locomotives which the other four
team inspections were ...
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I understand.

I'd also point out that it

was at Seacliff that a freight car failed.
locomotive.

At Dunsmuir, it was a

So let's keep it in context.

MR. PATON:

The freight car problem that we were

addressing at West Colton was not nearly as serious as the
locomotive compliance problem that we are addressing at ...
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I understand.

I'm smiling because there

was whole lot of room between not as serious and the problem we got
with these other our inspections.
rates over here.

We're talking 80 percent failure

There's a lot of room for serious problems before

you hit 80 percent.

Your decision is that because of the economics
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of operating a railroad which

't your concern.

What I'm

trouble with is why should you give a damn about
condition of the railroad when your job

al

f

the safety of the

public?
MR. PATON:

To achieve improved compliance, I have to

maintain some degree of credibility with whatever railroad I'm
dealing with.

It was felt, in my opinion, I would be better to

postpone West Colton rather than to bring them to their knees again
for the fifth week in a row.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
Credibility.

Let me ask you a question though.

Explain to me why you need credibility with the

railroad if you've got the authority and a bunch of forms that say
if you can't do your job I'm putting you out of business?

It seems

to me that the hammer you have with the railroad is the threat to
shut them down.

If they don't do their job, you shut them down

until they're doing it right.

That seems to me as a public

employee whose role is to protect the public and somebody else can
worry about the financial viability of the railroad.
holders or whoever.

The bond

But isn't it your job to protect the public?

If you're worried about credibility with the railroad, who's
protecting the public?
MR. PATON:
to have postponed it.

Well maybe it was bad judgment, Mr. Chairman,
Nevertheless, I elected to do that and I

take full responsibility for it.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Did anyone from headquarters, or

Washington, or DOT talk to you about postponing that?
MR. PATON:

No, but I discussed it with them.
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CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Who is Washington did you discuss it

with?
MR. PATON:
Enforcement.

Mr. English our Director of Safety

I told him it was my feeling actually to postpone it,

that I had pushed the SP about as far as

I

could, and I told him

that I was going to postpone that inspection.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Your conversation with Mr. English was at

your initiation or in response to an initiation from him?
MR. PATON:

It was my initiation.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I see.

Anybody else?

Carmichael,

Skinner--anybody else have impact on that decision?
MR. PATON:

No.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. PATON:

No.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. PATON:

Input to the decision?

Totally your decision?

Yes.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Am I correct in characterizing the

decision as something you decided.

I

think at some point,

you used the phrase, give them a six-week window of breathing
opportunity in order to allow the railroad to get back on their
feet.

Let me rephrase that.

was there a time during which you

didn't want them inspected again?
MR. PATON:

No.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

But you called off the inspection on June

23rd.
MR. PATON:

The team inspection.
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CHAIRMAN KATZ:

at the

The team inspection on June 2

Colton Yard.
MR. PATON:

That's correct.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

And then within two months, we have two

major derailments most of which apparently is attributed to
equipment failure of some sort?
MR. PATON:

That's correct.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

The kind of equipment particularly with

the locomotive that had inspections continued would have forced
those locomotives out of service?
MR. PATON:

At this point, we haven't been able to

determine where the second and third locomotive failed.
trying to determine that.
employee interviews.

I'm still

We can only do it by documentation and

I've not been successful so far.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Explain to me what you mean by not being

successful.
MR. PATON:

We found, following the Dunsmuir accident,

during a simulation run that the second and third locomotives were
emitting excessive exhaust

, smoke

would indicate that

the locomotive was loading and unloading.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Explain.

My experience with

real small ones you know, little Lionel things.

are

So what's loading

and unloading?
MR. PATON:

You've got a diesel engine in the locomotive.

The diesel engine drives the main generator which converts to
fraction motor electrically which converts back to mechanically to
drive the locomotive.

They had electrical
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on both

locomotives that caused the locomotive to load and unload.

It

would load up to its maximum kick off and unload.

It would equate

to driving down the highway with your automobile.

You step on gas

and let off, step on the gas and let off, step on the gas and let
off.

We confirmed that through our tests when the locomotives

arrived at Eugene.

We spent ten days basically taking one apart

and putting it back together with the Southern Pacific, and this is
what we found.

At this point, we don't know where they failed.

Whether they were defective prior to being dispatched out of West
Colton or whether they failed in route.

We have not been able to

determine that yet.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

If you had done the inspection at West

Colton, you might know that.
MR. PATON:
Colton.

We weren't looking at locomotives in West

That was just a freight car inspection.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I see.

Mr. Oliver, you had PUC

inspectors on site at west Colton?.
MR. OLIVER:

I'm not sure.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
telling me you did.

Let me see.

They work for you but he's

How come you don't know that?

MR. OLIVER:

Yes.

we work as a team with them.

I can't say exactly who was there, but
If there's an inspection, we usually

send a person from either LA or San Francisco, or if needed,
we can send them both.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I can't say exactly who was there.
With all due respect, explain to me why

the FRA knows where your guys are and you don't.
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MR. OLIVER:

the one that plans these

Well, the FRA

inspections .•.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I understand that.

something that took place in June.

We're talking about

We're talking about

that's scheduled today that you knew about.

hearing

You know we're going

to talk about railroads and inspections, and Southern Pacific.
We're not talking about the universe here.

I want to know why you

don't where your people are and they do.
MR. OLIVER:

I just don't know.

I don't keep track of

everyone on my staff that closely.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Apparently.

Did you or anyone at the PUC

in the last, say, 72 hours, I'll keep the time frame short,
instruct PUC personnel not to talk to members of the Legislature
about any of these incidents?
MR. OLIVER:

I instructed my staff that they should work

through our legislative people.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Okay.

How about a yes or no answer to my

question?
MR. OLIVER:

That's what I instructed them to do.

To

work through our legislative people, Les Johnson.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Did you instruct them through your

computer net in the last 72 hours to work through your legislative
people and not on their own to talk to members of the Legislature?
If you want, I'll subpoena your computer records because they are
there.

So we can do it easy; we can do now or we can do it hard.
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MR. OLIVER:
the last 72 hours.

Well, I was trying to figure where I was in

No, the answer is no.

Not in the last 72

hours.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

Okay, in the last four weeks?

I sent a note out saying that when they're

contacted by the legislative people, whether it is a legislator or
their staff, they should work through Les Johnson, our legislative
person.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
HR. OLIVER:

Les Johnson.

Is he an inspector?

No, he's in our Office of Governmental

Affairs in Sacramento.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
an inspector.

So he's not a safety personnel.

He's not

Does he have any expertise whatsoever in railroads

or in PR?
HR. OLIVER:

I doubt he has much in railroad, but he's

our legislative contact person.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Why would I want, hypothetically, to talk

to him about what we're talking about today as opposed to people
who understand and know where they are and know the questions to
answers?
MR. OLIVER:
work through Les.

Well, the instruction was that they should

So he's aware what's going on.

If he wants to

refer them to somebody else, he can do that.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

As I understand it, -- I'll tell you what

I'd like you to provide me with.

I'd like to have the travel

vouchers for all your rail safety personnel since January of this
year.

Since you don't remember where they are, I'll go through
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your travel vouchers and I'll let you know where they were.

If we

have to do this brick by brick, we will do it brick by brick.
I'm trying to understand is where the hell the PUC's been.

But

I'm

beginning to get an impression about what's happened at the FRA.
It's not very good.
to the FRA.

I don't like it at all.

I can write to my Congressman.

I can't do anything
I will talk to my

Senators and Jack and I will talk to a number of Congressmen about
the FRA and their role.

But I can do something about the PUC.

What I want to know is, does the PUC, since your
inspectors I believe are federally- certified.
as these teams together.

The PUC has the authority to put

equipment out of service.
MR. OLIVER:

That's how you work

Is that correct?

Through the federal regulations just like

the FRA does.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

In other words, when an inspector goes

into that yard, whether they're PUC or FRA and they're going down
their MPE 59s and they're finding governor's or whatever out of
whack.

Either one of those people, as long as they are using the

same guidelines, can put that equipment out of service.
MR. OLIVER:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

When the FRA pulled out of Colton, did

the PUC?
MR. OLIVER:

I imagine we did.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

We're part of the team.

Can you stay on your own?

I am not aware whether they did or did not.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I didn't ask that.

I said do you have

the authority to stay and inspect on your own without the FRA?
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HR. OLIVER:

Yes.

CHAIRHAR KATZ:

Okay.

ASSEMBLYMAN JIM CQSTA:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

Have they ever?

Mr. Costa asks have you ever?

We do inspections on our own without the FRA

all the time.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

What inspections have you done in the

last six months of Southern Pacific yards on your own?
MR. OLIVER:

I don't know specifically.

I can get you a

list.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Okay.

What did you think we were going

to talk about today, just out of curiosity?
MR. OLIVER:

What?

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

What did you think we were going to talk

about today?
MR. OLIVER:

I understood an issue we were going to talk

about was the Seacliff accident.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

I got your agenda last night at 5 o'clock.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
before then

beca~se

Okay.

Well, I think your chairperson had it

she had been scheduled to testify.

Can you

tell me, in your memory, has a Public Utilities Commission
inspector ever put

a piece of equipment out of service?

MR. OLIVER:

Yes.

CHAIRHAR IQ.TZ :
MR. OLIVER:

When?

Numerous times.

CHAIRMAN IQ.TZ:

Give me an example.
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MR. OLIVER:

Well, I can't give you the time, date, and

place but ...
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
give you some leeway.

I mean and I'll

I mean I'm not going to hold you to the

time, date, and place.
MR. OLIVER:

Just give me an example.

Just give me some examples.
Well, (inaudible) used to work independently

and go into Roseville and taken the pieces of equipment out of
service by himself without a federal inspector there.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

This year?

I can't say exactly when or where, but

I'm

sure he has.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Can you -- in view of the staggering

reports coming out of Roseville and Bakersfield, assuming for a
second you didn't know about Sparks and Tucson, so you're doing
Roseville and Bakersfield.

What action did the PUC initiate based

on that horrendous failure rate?
MR. OLIVER:

We just work with the FRA.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

In other words, nothing.

You did nothing

on your own.
MR. OLIVER:

We didn't do anything independent of the

FRA.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

Why not?

Because they are the ones that set up the

inspections and we work as a team.

I'm not sure if we did anything

additional.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Under the situation you're describing, do

you need the PUC or should we just have the FRA?
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MR. OLIVER:

If you want more inspectors in California,

you need the PUC.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

But if they're not going to do anything

unless the FRA is doing it, what's the point.
here telling me is you've got--MR. OLIVER:

What you're sitting

You're head of safety, right?

Yes.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Okay.

You're head of safety.

Your guys

come in and they say, listen, we've got this minor little problem
here with Southern Pacific.

We've got 36 out of 45 engines going

down the tubes in Bakersfield.

We've 40 out of 61 going down the

tubes in Roseville.

Gee boss, do you think we ought to do

something about it?

And your response is, wait for Uncle Sam to

call?

You're head of safety, not public relations, not railroad

solvency, not protecting the stockholders at Southern Pacific.

I

mean, head of safety means, in my mind and please tell me if I'm
wrong, that you're concerned about safety.
MR. OLIVER:

That's true.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

So how do you sit there and tell me that

when someone comes in and says, I've got a ton of locomotives that
aren't worth crap, you don't do anything.
HR. OLIVER:
anything.

I don't get it.

Well, I don't see where we didn't do

As I said, we work with the FRA and we also make

independent inspections.

We certify their rules and enforce their

rules.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

What is keeping you from showing some

backbone on your own and going out there and protecting the public?
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Tell Mr. O'Connell and his constituents, tell the folks in Dunsmuir
what you did as the Public Utilities Commission because you didn't
think the FRA was doing enough.
MR. OLIVER:

I don't know what we did.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

Did you do anything?

Can you point to anything concrete?

We make our own inspections.

team in investigating these accidents.

We work as a

We've been highly involved

in trying to figure out what can be done as a result to them.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
here.

Let me tell you why I'm having a problem

We're looking at legislation designed to toughen the rules

and regulations to put more heat on the railroads--all the
railroads--to operate more safely.

What good does it do me, or

Jack, or our constituents to pass that legislation that tells the
PUC we think you ought to be doing all this stuff in addition to
what you're supposed to be doing already, if your response to
everything is "Oh we're partners with the feds and when they get
around to doing it we'll do it, but we're not initiating anything
on our own".
MR. OLIVER:
regulations.

Well, I say we're enforcing the federal

We can do more.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

Why haven't you done more?

We only have two equipment inspectors in the

whole state.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

Have you asked for more?

Who'd you ask?

We asked the budget people for more.
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CHAIRMAN KATZ:
the Governor's office.
MR. OLIVER:

The budget people at the Commission in
Budget people Where?

Which budget people?

Department of Finance through the budget

process.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

We got some.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
two?

And what was their response?

You've got two.

You went from one to

did you get?

Wh~t

HR. OLIVER:

A couple of years ago, we only had three

inspectors in the state.

Now we have eight.

We got two or three

through the budget process in the last couple of years.

We asked

for two more in the next budget.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

We're talking current year budget or a

couple of years ago?
HR. OLIVER:

Current year meaning this budget.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
HR. OLIVER:

'92 we did not get any inspectors.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
HR. OLIVER:

Fiscal '91-'92?

You requested but were turned down?

I'm trying to remember.

request inspectors, we requested other ones.

No, we didn't
We requested two more

in '92-'93.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Okay, but you didn't think you needed

more for this year?
MR. OLIVER:

This year, no.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

The Public Utilities Commission has

authority granted to it by the feds to order additional safety
equipment on tracks where have been, I don't remember the exact
- 35 -

phrasing I guess, local problems over the years.

Am I phrasing

that correctly?
MR. OLIVER:

We have authority to address local safety

issues independent of the federal government.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

The Dunsmuir track, I'm told by your

staff, is among the most dangerous or hard to navigate or
transverse in the western states.
MR. OLIVER:

It's one of the most difficult.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

And there have been how many derailments

there in the last ten years?
MR. OLIVER:

Eight.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

Eight derailments.

I'd say it's high in that short a distance.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Part of it's defining how large an area

of track we're talking about.
curve area.

Is that high?

I'm talking about right around that

We're talking about eight in the last ten years?

MR. OLIVER:

Eight in the last ten years is in the

two-mile stretch.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

If you go into a 20-mile stretch, I

believe that number goes up significantly?
MR. OLIVER:

I doubt if it goes up significantly.

I

think it's concentrated probably in that two-mile stretch.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

In view of that, a high accident rate, a

difficult piece of track, what has the Public Utilities Commission
ordered the railroads to do to increase safety in that area?
MR. OLIVER:

We haven't ordered anything as far as

specifically in that area.
-
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CHAIRMAN KATZ: How come?
MR. OLIVER:

We inspect the track to make sure the track

is brought to the right standards in the area.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

We've got eight trains that fell off that

track in the last ten years.

You said yourself that's a high rate.

I'm taking your work for it, but we don't do anything else?
MR. OLIVER:

We haven't ordered anything in that specific

area or instituted an investigation.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Has the staff recommended changes in

terms of operating practices in those areas?
MR. OLIVER:

No.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

So it's not even a question of the

Commissioner's turning it down.

The staff hasn't even made

recommendations?
MR. OLIVER:

No .

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Can you enlighten me as to why?

The

reason I'm asking--again going back to the legislation that we're
all contemplating and other things, it seems like you've got a
problem, you admit there's a problem there, you acknowledge there
is a problem there, you acknowledge that you have authority, but
you're not doing anything to use that authority to increase the
level of safety.
MR. OLIVER:

Most of those accidents, it was not

equipment or track, it was human failure.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Okay.

Did you recommend more humans on

the train?
MR. OLIVER:

No.
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CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Did you take a position on the issue of

cabooses on trains?
HR. OLIVER:

When it was before the Legislature, we did.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

In support of keeping cabooses on trains?

Yes.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
from here.

And your position was?

In support.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

The Commission did?

Okay.

I'm at a loss as to where to go

I'm shocked at a minimum by what both you gentlemen

have told me.

I am very concerned that those people with the

authority to make a difference aren't doing their job.

What I'm

being told here is that despite a failure rate of upwards of 80
percent -- and again you know the thing that makes this so
incredible is this isn't just knock, knock, surprise inspection,
let's see what you got, and that's an 80 percent failure rate.
This is a surprise inspection where they get to fix everything
before they show it to you and its still got an 80 percent failure
rate.

On top of that happening on four occasions in June of this

year, we find no significant increase in the amount of trains being
put out of service, we find no significant numbers of locomotives
being put out of service, we find no independent action at all by
the Public Utilities Commission's safety staff, we find no activity
by the Public Utilities Commission, which, as I understand, last
week adopted some of your hazmat rules which were first proposed in
1979.
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MR. OLIVER:

We issued a general order, yes.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

This is the result of something that

started in 1979?
MR. OLIVER:

No.

This is a result of something that the

Commission really started three years ago.
things in 1979, including legislation.
None of it was successful.

We started a lot of

That's where we started.

Then, we went into OII, three years

ago, to set up the rules.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I am overwhelmed by what has not been

done, in view of such glaring safety problems.

Is a failure of

government and bureaucracy to protect the public of proportions
that I could not imagine.

I've got a pretty good imagination.

Both the federal level, and I appreciate Mr. Paton taking
responsibility.

That's unusual for people in his position.

We heard a gentlemen say that, "I decided that the
railroad was suffering too much, so we'll put the public at risk,
while the railroad tries to right itself fiscally.

We'll continue

to put the public at risk", knowing what he knew.
The PUC just sits there, and say if the feds don't care,
we don't care.
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:

It seems to me the railroads have

enough lobbyist and advocacy for themselves.
that need to be better protected.
have.

It's the citizens

That's the disappointment that I

Assemblyman Katz and I, and everyone this room want to

emphasize the prevention.
term, he's overwhelmed.

I'm just floored.

Richard uses the

I'm underwhelmed, I think, at the level of

protection, in terms of the prevention that can be taken.
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Maybe you can take me through exactly what the inspection
are again.

It seems to me that my analogy, and maybe you can tell

me if I am wrong, that the trucks that now transport

hazardous

materials are safer today, by talking to the Highway Patrol.

We

have representatives, some spoke persons here today that are on the
agenda.

They will tell you that the trucks are safer today in

carrying these hazardous materials than they were ten years ago.
Maybe they're a result of a couple of spills that we had around the
state.

There was one in Santa Barbara in 1984.

There were others.

Perhaps, we need to have this as bellringer to help the rails
improve their transportation, too.
I am sure that the industry will tell you that they want
to do everything that they can to help prevent these type of
occurrences and incidents.
percent figure.

Maybe you can take me through the 80

When you come, yes, there's surprise inspections,

and you knock on the door at the railroad yard, and say, "We're
coming".

Do the trains then have a chance.

24-hour period to fix their locomotives?
question.

Number two:

That's the first

How about the boxcars?

accident was not a locomotive.
axle.

Do you give them a

The Sea Cliff

It was a boxcar, a problem with the

Can you take me through how those work?

Can you let me

know, do the railroads also pull out 60 boxcars, like they do the
locomotives and say, we think these are our 60 best.

Hope you

don't find 80 percent to put out of commission, because we're going
to let the rest of them roll?

I

understand that even the boxcar at

Sea Cliff wasn't owned by the railroad, but they're responsible
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because they were pulling it.

Can you take me through how that

works?
MR. PATON:

There's been concern about taking locomotives

out of service--insufficient numbers being taken out of service.

I

think that we have to recognize that the Safety Improvement of '88
gave FRA individual liability authority.

Oftentimes, it is not

necessary to issue a Form 8 to take it out of service, because an
individual that would order that locomotive to be used, or
continued in use in defective condition is subject to an individual
fine, or perhaps disqualification from that position, or perhaps
both.

I don't think this is really an issue that we should be to

concerned about, is the number of locomotives that we take out of
service.

When we arrive at a locomotive service area, the

locomotives that are ready at the time of our arrival is a true
monitoring of their meeting of their responsibilities.
ASSEMBLYMAN 0' CONNELL:

So, it's not real surprise,

they know you're coming?
MR. PATON:

Only, those initial ones that are ready.

Following our arrival, those that are inspected and offered for
service after that, they have the opportunity to do a better job, I
presume, if they elect to do so.

That's one reason are a bit more

alarming than what ...
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. PATON:

They're very alarming.

I wanted to assure you, this committee, that

I have had a very active program in locomotive compliance on the
Southern Pacific, probably the most active in the country, or in
the 17 states that SP runs in.

I've allocated more of my resources
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in P&E wise for the Southern Pacific than I have on the rest of the
railroads in my region.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Let me ask you a question?

If we're

getting a whole more protection that the rest of the country, I'm
very concerned for the rest of the country.

Your comment in terms

of allocating a lot more of your resources to SP, is that because
their accident rate is significantly higher?
MR. PATON:

It's because their compliance is worse?

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Because their compliance is worse?

How

much worse is their compliance than other railroads--Santa Fe?

UP?

Whoever?
MR. PATON:

I think it would unprofessional for me to

compare one railroad to another in a public hearing.

I could

better answer that by saying that I have allocated more of my
resources to the Southern Pacific, and I'm not happy with the
improved compliance that we've achieved to date, and I'm not going
to quit.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

What are you going to do to bring them

into compliance if you cancel inspections because you want to give
them breathing room?
MR. PATON:

This was only an isolated occurrence.

been a reasonable director for five-and-a-half years.
first one I've canceled.
to do it then.

I've

It's the

I felt that I was making a good judgment

Perhaps it was bad judgment.

To answer Assemblyman O'Connell's question on freight
cars, the railroad has a responsibility to make a pre-departure
inspection and a brake test when a train is assembled.
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Our

inspection usually occurs after that procedure has been performed.
So, again, we're monitoring after they have inspected.

In the case

of the Sea Cliff accident, we were present at the bearing tear down
at the Sacramento shops.
there.

The manufacturer of that bearing was

He attributed the cause of bearing failure as being a loss

of clamping pressure in the bearing due to rubber seals being
applied behind the cap screw bolts, and backed out 3-32nds of an
inch or so, and rear seal failed.
failure.

Hence, you had a bearing

Since 1988, those rubber seals have not been installed.

This one was rebuilt prior to that.

I'm not sure that had the

railroad or FRA or PUC had inspected that car at LATC yard, that
they would have identified that as a problem bearing.
We had four more bearings in that train that we
inspected.

Those also were taken to Sacramento shops as suspects.

They were showing signs of grease around the outer seal.
four were torn down.

They were fine.

Those

There was nothing wrong with

them at all.
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:

Do you have any requirements

whatsoever in terms of how often locomotives or boxcars should be
inspected?

Pretty much catch as catch can?
MR. PATON:

We try and direct the enforcement activity

and inspection activity based on the degree of compliance we're
achieving at that location.

A mechanical-caused accident can be

due to a problem where a failure was in Chicago and that particular
car failed in California.
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ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:

Are you a little familiar with

the system that the hazardous waste haulers use where they have the
certification, the stickers in the lower left or right hand corner?
Chief Rude, is it in the lower corner of your trucks,
right hand corner of the front windshield, for your hazardous waste
haulers?

It's good for at least three months, and it won't be

inspected again for at least three months.
that work for your locomotives, at least?
if they do get inspected more than ...

Would something like
Or even for the boxcars

Isn't there a scenario where

some trains could be inspected every other month, and others may go
never being inspected?
MR. PATON:

That's entirely possible.

The railroad is

required to make a periodic inspection of a locomotive every 92
days, because that's when it's necessary.

We could inspect a

locomotive in Los Angeles, and again in Roseville the next day.
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:

Similarly, you may not ever

inspect a locomotive, the life of that engineer.
MR. PATON:

There's no practical way to track

, with

two million freight cars in the country.
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:
system.

Truly, a catch as catch can

That jeopardizes public health, in my opinion.
MR. PATON:

We have to remember that the responsibil

for compliance with that freight car, that locomotive, still rests
with the railroad.

The PUC and FRA are there merely to monitor

their meeting that responsibility.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I've got to take issue with that.

have the ability to put them out of service.
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You

MR. PATON:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
found in restaurants.

We shut down restaurants when roaches are

We shut down restaurants.

We close down

terminals if school buses or trucks present a danger to the public,
or because the safety records aren't up to snuff, or the
inspections don't make it.

Yet, for some reason, we're letting the

economic viability of the railroad take precedent over public
safety.

I don't understand that.

I understand your decision.

I

also want to ask the Public Utilities Commission about that.
There's two separate roles in this.

There's the FRA role.

understand what happened there, I think.
you came to the conclusion you did.
no outside influence on you.
you.

I

I'm not quite sure how

What you've told me there was

The railroad didn't try and influence

The shippers didn't try to influence you.

Washington didn't try to influence you.

The people in

You just came to this

decision on your own, even though it was different than everything
you've done for the last five years.
MR. PATON:

That's right.

But you have to remember that

my arrangement in Sparks, in Bakersfield, in Roseville, and Tucson,
was at my own initiative because I was concerned with the problem.
That's an aggressive program.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I agree with you completely, but that's

what your job is.
MR. PATON:

That's right.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
did your job.

In Sparks, in Roseville, in Tucson, you

For some reason, when it came to Colton, you said to

give the railroad a break.
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MR. PATON:

I had problems in Barstow and the Sante Fe,

too, and we're addressing those problems.

The SP is not the only

railroad I have responsibilities for.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I appreciate that.

SP are the only guys

that have dumped stuff off the track in the last month or two, at
least in California.
to that when shot.

In a significant way.

Bob, you can respond

SP are the only people I know of who've

sterilized a river, and shut down a major highway in the last
couple of months, as far as I'm aware.

Let me go back to the PUC.

I'm told there are some very pro-railroad folks on the Public
Utilities Commission.
MR. OLIVER:

Is that your impression?
I don't know.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

You don't know.

Has the Commission ever

communicated with you, anything having to do with inspections or
the safety record, or how aggressive or non-aggressive you're to be
in terms of safety issues with the railroads?
MR. OLIVER:

No .

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLVIER:

There's no correspondence whatsoever.

You mean this present commission?

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
starting in the morning.

Okay.

No.

I'll do a public records search

I won't find anything in your files that

indicate that the Commission has shown an interest, no way or the
other?
MR. OLIVER:

I won't say that they showed an interest.

You asked if they asked me to more aggressive.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
be more aggressive.

The answer is no.

So, the Commission has never asked you to

What kind of information does the Commission
-
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get?

We've got some serious failures in the safety side based on

inspections that you folks have been participating in.
that go?

How does

Is the Commission aware of that?
MR. OLIVER:

They only get information on something that

would probably be of a serious nature that we think they should be
aware of.

They don't get all the routine information.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Would you agree that Roseville and

Bakersfield are of a serious nature?
MR. OLIVER:

You mean the inspections at Roseville?

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

Yes.

I think that it points at that there is a

problem.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Has that been brought to the attention of

the Commission?
MR. OLIVER:

No.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

Not till now, that I'm aware of.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

It has not?

Why not?

When we feel that there is something that we

have to do, we would recommend to them to do something.

We did not

recommend to them to do anything.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

How many spills does it take?

severe did the disaster have to be?

How more

How many more locomotives

would have had to have failed for you to tell the Commission
there's a problem here?
MR. OLIVER:

We told them there was a problem a while

back when we tried to get this Hazardous Material General Orders,
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through.

We got that through.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

It wasn't easy.

You started on that in '88, you said.

Right.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

That took three years to get through,

having to do with hazardous materials.

That seems to me the

Commission is not moving at lighting speed.

Let me separate for

one second the hazardous materials versus the safety problem.

Has

the accident rate for Southern Pacific been going up, in terms of
numbers of accidents or accidents per mile?
MR. OLIVER:

You mean

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

derail~ents?

No, I didn't say derailments.

I said

accidents.
MR. OLIVER:

What kind of accidents?

I can't respond.

Railroad grade crossing accidents where trains run into each other?
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

How do you keep your statistics?

We keep a running list of all the accidents

that are reported to us.

We put out an annual report that shows

trends.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Okay, whats' the trend based on how you

keep your statistics?
MR. OLIVER:

I don't think it shows a large increase in

accidents on SP.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

Does it show an increase?

I can't recall exactly what it shows.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

You're the head of safety?

recall the trend?
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You can

HR. OLIVER:

It didn't point out a trend that would make

us do something.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Okay.

Roseville and Bakersfield didn't

point out a trend. ?
MR. OLIVER:

It pointed out that SP has a problem with

their locomotives.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. OLIVER:

But not enough for you to do anything?

No.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Have you discussed your testimony before

this hearing with any of the commissioners in the last several
days?
CHAIRMAN KATZ :

No .

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

No, discussion at all.

MR. OLIVER:

No.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Even when the Chairwoman said she wasn't

going to come?
MR. OLIVER:

I haven't spoken with her.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Have you spoken with the Executive

Director of the Commission?
MR. OLIVER:

No.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Not in the last few days.
Have you discussed your testimony with

anybody?
MR. OLIVER:

Just with the legal division.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

What did the legal division tell you?

UNIDENTIFIED VOICE:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
him the question.

(inaudible)

I didn't ask you the question.

I'll ask you the question, next.
-
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I asked

MR. OLIVER:

Mostly, what we wanted with the legal

division was to try to spell out where the state role is and the
federal role is, and where we're pre-empted.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Did the legal division give you any

instructions on what you could or could not testify about?
MR. OLIVER:

No.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Who was the person that started to come

forward?
MR. OLIVER:

Her name is Judy Lamson.

She's in our legal

division in San Francisco.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Ms. Lamson, do you want to join us?

MS. JUPY LAMSON:

I would like to clarify a few things

that have been discussed earlier.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Before we get to that, have you had any

discussions with the commissioners about that testimony at this
hearing?
MS. LAMSON:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Would you tell me the nature of those

discussions?
MS. LAMSON:
hearings would be.

Generally discussing what the scope of the

As I as understood it, we would be discussing

the Sea Cliff spill.

Maybe a little bit of the Dunsmuir spill.

Generally, the focus would be on what the state is authorized to
do.

The difference between the federal authority and the state

authority, that sort of thing.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Have you been instructed to limit

testimony in any way?
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MS. LAMSON::

No.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Has the Commission instructed you to make

available all relative to questions from this inquiry?
MS. LAMSON:

I have no instructions of that sort.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MS. LAMSON:

You will make them available, though?

Yes.

Subject to ...

We do have some

information that is confidential under the California Public
Utilities Code pending the investigation.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MS. LAMSON:

What's the nature of that information?

There would be factual matters that were

investigated at the sites of the spills.

We're certainly willing

to work with the Legislature and the staff in developing
legislation.

We're not trying to be uncooperative in any sense of

the word.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

You've got to keep in mind, I'm not

necessarily interested in developing more legislative authority for
the PUC.

If you're not using what you've got.

The failure of the

agency to adequately protect the public raises serious questions
about whether or not undue influence has been brought on
commissioners or by commissioners.

It raises serious questions

about who's looking out for the special interests, as opposed to
who's looking out for the public interest.

Based on the

information I hear today, I'm very much frightened for the public
interest.

I may be rethinking whether or not, at least for my

legislative efforts, I want to give more authority to the PUC, in
view of an appalling lack of use of the authority that you
currently have.
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MS. LAMSON:

Unfortunately, we are also very limited by

the federal scheme.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Excuse me, ma'am.

The limits by the

federal scheme do not prevent you from taking equipment out of
service.

They do not prevent you from doing additional inspections

on your own.

They do not prevent you from exercising your

authority to increase safety procedures on the track at Dunsmuir.
MS. LAMSON:

There are limitations in those areas.

one, we are certified as was discussed earlier.
to work with the FRA and inspect.

For

We are certified

However, our inspection reports

are referred to the FRA where they are prosecuted.

We do not have

independent authority to prosecute beyond the law.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

No, you don't.

You do have authority

under the federal designation of your inspectors to put equipment
out of service.

You may not be able to assess penalties without

the feds, but you can take stuff off the track.

You can take

equipment that poses a threat to the safety of Californians off the
track.

You haven't been doing it!
MS. LAMSON:

As we noted earlier, we have eight

inspectors for the entire state of California.

This is the one

area in California--railroad safety--that is not user-funded.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Because there's an exemption for the

railroads?
MS. LAMSON:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Has the PUC tried to eliminate that

exemption?
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MS. LAMSON:

Yes, we have.

It has not succeeded at the

legislative level.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Passed the legislature, vetoed by the

Governor, or not passed the legislature?
MS. LAMSON:

I believe it did not pass the Legislature.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

The Public Utilities Commission last

requested that legislation, when?
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Probably about five years ago.

During Governor Deukmejian's time.

You

haven't requested it since then?
MS. LAMSON:

Not that we are aware of at this table.

We

could get back with you on that.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Let me give you some information.

I

believe both Senator Thompson's bill and my bill will eliminate
that exemption.
both efforts.

I'll look forward to your letters of support for
In addition, I still have serious concerns about the

role of the Commission.

The fact, that the Commission has not over

time instructed the staff to do more inspections, or raise the
question, or shift the resources which the Commission has the
ability to do.

We've worked with you before on that one, when we

had problems in the tour bus industries, and other industries.
Until such time as the legislation was available for
funding, you have ways of making it work.
here.

It hasn't been the case

What I will do after the hearing, I will look at our options

both legislatively.

But I'm also concerned, and I think the

relationship between the Commission and the railroads needs to be
looked into.

Someone is not protecting the public interests and we
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need to know why.
concerned.

Mr. O'Connell is correct in being suspicious and

I think, people who hear this testimony today, both

from the federal level and what has not been done, but in our role
from the state level, what was has not been done to protect the
public is frightening and unacceptable.
would communicate that to the Commission.

I appreciate it if you
We have gone as far as

we can go without getting more totally frustrated.
We will be in touch.
that I've requested.

I

look forward to the documentation

I'd like it before Monday's hearing.

everyone knows what it is.

I think

My staff will work with your staff in

making sure that happens.
MS. LAMSON:

May I add one other thing, sir?

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

MS. LAMSON:

Yes .

In terms of what the PUC is doing, they will

be considering an order opening an investigation, a formal
investigation at a special meeting on August 22nd, at 10 A.M., in
San Francisco.

That investigation would include looking at the

causes of the derailment, and looking at what needs to be done at
the regulatory level, at the inspection levels, state and federal
levels.

There will be a full investigation.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

clear.

I frankly don't understand why it takes till August 22nd to

come to that point.
already.

Counsel, let me make something very

These accidents have occurred a while ago,

Maybe the PUC was not aware of that.

Don't for a minute

expect me to be snowed by the Commission's own investigation as
being an excuse to not provide documentation.
advance of your notice.

Our request is in

It's in advance of your investigation.
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We

expect the materials to be provided.
Commission to

I do not expect the

behind our on-going investigation as an excuse

not to provide information.
MS. LAMSON:

Sure.

That will not be acceptable.

Clear?

I haven't heard any excuse having

been made.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MS. LAMSON:

We will be cooperative.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. PATON:

I'm just putting you on notice.

Thank you.

One clarification.

On the inspection reports

that you want, is that solely the Southern Pacific?
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. PATON:

At this point, it's Southern Pacific.

If I can produce a computer summary, would

that be acceptable?
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

It'll be for the initial request?

I reserve the right to back and ask the rest of it.

Yes.

I appreciate

your time problem.
MR

PATON:

It's a lot of

I'm not sure I can get

it to by Monday.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. PATON:

The computer summary you can, though?

Yes.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I'll start with the computer summary.

Mr. Oliver?
MR. OLIVER:

If FRA provides you that, you want us to

send you our duplicate copies of those forms?
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I believe I've asked you for more than

I've asked FRA for?
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MR. OLIVER:

You asked for the same form that you asked

FRA, plus, you wanted travel expense claim.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
files, also.

That's right.

I'd like to see your

I want to know how much of you've got, they've got.

Let me ask, Southern Pacific Railroad.

Mr. Starzel,

Vice-Chairman, Michael Ongerth, Assistant Vice-President.

I

believe; we have some other folks.
MR. R. F. STARZEL:

May I proceed with a statement, Mr.

Chairman?
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I'd appreciate it, Mr. Starzel,

would summarize your statement.

if you

You might want to also respond to

some of the questions that have raised.
MR. STARZEL:

First, may I introduce, Mike Ongerth,

Assistant Vice-President of Operations.

I also have with me, Jack

Jenkins, who is the Assistant General Manager for this region and
who has been on site at Sea Cliff, and Herbie Bart, who directs the
Emergency Response Teams which we have at the railroad.
Since you do have the statement, which we have brought
with us today, and since you have raised questions that relate in
part to that statement, but also raise other questions, let me go
right to those.

I can understand listening to what you're focusing

on, some heightened concern about safety.

I want to give you some

assurances that when you look at the broader picture, you'll find
there is a great concern for safety by the railroads.

They have

programs which work, and as a result, you will find that safety on
the railroads, nationally and in California, has measuredly
increased.
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Over the past ten years the rate of accidents has been
cut down to 1/3 of what it was in 1981.

That's good performance.

That's performance that assures the public that they are being
handled safely.

The concern over the public agencies which have

regulatory powers ought to receive further perspective, as well.
In the structure of the complex operations of railroads, the public
agencies have to depend upon the railroads to operate safely, to
institute programs and systems of control, and to be certain that
they do comply with them.

In fact, that is what railroads do.

And

that is why the inspections that are on-going are only on top of
those and are monitoring, as the word was used.

The industry has

been effective.
Let me just point to some Department of Transportation
statistics and give you kind of a Harper's Index.

The number of

fatalities since 1980, which have resulted from, and been
attributed to, the transport of hazardous materials by train.
One, the number of fatalities resulting from, or attributed to, the
transportation of hazardous materials by truck, 318, in the same
period of time.

In 1989, the last reported year for which we can

get Department of Transportation statistics on trucks, the amount
of ton miles of hazardous materials carried by trucks and trains
was just about the same.

A little over, in each case, a billion

ton miles of hazardous materials carried by trucks and trains.
the difference is dramatic.

But

In the period of '82 to '89 actually,

the number of injuries resulting from truck operations with
hazardous materials was 1,356 and for railroads it was 389.
number of incidents where there was a release of hazardous
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The

materials from truck transportation was 40,241 during that period
and only 7,474 from railroads.

It's quite clear that railroads are

four times better than trucks.

Now this goes to a point that you,

Mr. Chairman, raised, "Why should we be worried about cost?"

Well

if costs are imposed upon the railroads we move traffic to the
highway.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Let me interrupt for a second.

Don't for

a second assume that I'm looking to compare trains and trucks.

You

know, as do most people in this room, that if anyone has made a
career the last five years of trying to get trucks to comply, its
been me.

I'm not satisfied with truck rates.

with their accident rates.
business.

I'm not satisfied with the way they do

That's why Senator Seymour and I increased inspections

by 100,000 a year.

It's why we carried BIT the program and a

variety of terminal inspection programs.
I think.

I'm not satisfied

None of that is relevant,

I will grant you that trains are safer than trucks.

That

doesn't mean a whole lot to people in Sea Cliff and Dunsmuir right
now.

Just like it wouldn't if it had been a hazardous materials

incident with a truck.
operates.

I'm interested in how the railroad

That's what I'm interested in.

I'm not interested in

how the trucking industry operates because I could spend an hour
telling you what we've done to hammer them in the last year.
MR. STARZEL:

I only offer that as a factor to the

contrast and safety, railroads are basically safe.

Let me go to

the accidents, but also talk to you a bit about how railroads
operate.
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•

We are in a system that is international in scope, and we
must meet those standards.

We're also in an international

marketplace, and we must compete for business that way.
in the Staggers Act, we are on a commercial basis.
perspective of it, we are unregulated.
market-driven.

Since 1981

In the primary

Therefore, we are

Market-driven means we must be more reliable; we

must assure the shippers that, in fact, there will be no accidents.
We, as other railroads that are operating in California, have very
strong programs that are intensely followed to cut down on
derailments.

We're much more anxious than even you can be to cut

down on accidents, because they mean not only cost, but the loss of
business because people want reliability and we want to give it to
them.
Now, the connection between the inspections that you are
talking about and these accidents that occurred is not even
tenuous.

There is no connection.

Let us go to what the DOT

statistics are for the latest years and discover what the kinds of
problems are that need to be addressed.

There were slightly over

3,000 accidents in '88 which is the last DOT year for which, I
think, we have these statistics.

The train accident causes in

3,051 train accidents only 29 related to locomotives.

Only 483;

that's just slightly over 15 percent related to equipment.

The

problems that you look at as the major problems are always the
track and human problems.
exactly what happened.

Now in the case of Sea Cliff, we know

It was a journal that burned off, it was

not maintainable, it was inspected, and it can be inspected; but
that's all that can be done with a bearing of that sort.
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Keep in

mind that particular bearing came into the industry only some 12
years ago and has been part of the reason that the rate of
accidents has dropped significantly in the railroad industry.
what we have is a bearing that's sealed and they will fail.

So
And we

regret that it failed where it did because that was obviously with
a very serious consequence.
Now in Sea Cliff, we have briefed you, Mr. Chairman, and
we have briefed the press diligently to tell you where our
investigation has taken us.
just briefly summarize.

You can inquire further, but let me

We know that they were a complex set of

factors which led to excessive lateral force that caused the wheels
to pop off to the inside of the curve.

We know that there is a

possibility of certain kinds of engine failures.

One could have

been from a burnt out electronic circuit board ...
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Excuse me, I believe me you mean

Dunsmuir, not Sea Cliff.
MR. STARZEL:

I'm sorry.

Excuse me.

I meant Dunsmuir.

You're right.
There was a possibility of a burnt out circuit board, an
improbable now but possible governor question.

There was a

theoretical question, not an observed question of grease on the
rails.

We know that the relationship of long and unloaded cars

right in front of a tank car by itself create an angularity on the
coupler which meant it twisted and it put greater force upon that
point and could have also contributed to it.
These factors have not been finally ...
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CHAIRMAN KATZ:

One question on that.

Who is testing the

governor?
MR. STARZEL:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. STARZEL:

Who is testing the governor?
Right.
The governor was taken off the locomotive

in Eugene.

Both the FRA and I believe the NTSP were present at

that test.

Their investigation is ongoing.

Taking you back to an

earlier statement you said when you were questioning Mr. Paton,
"Tell me what the governor is doing?"

If that governor was

hunting, that would cause the engine speed to increase and
decrease.

But in terms of what it could have been doing to the

locomotive at the wheels, is that it would have been, if this was
happening, would have been causing the engine to slowly load and
then slowly unload.

Now we had people on the locomotive during the

test run after the derailment, including an FRA inspector, and they
did not take exception to the operation of that locomotive.

The

FRA inspectors rode that locomotive leaving the site going to
Eugene and they did not observe ...
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. STARZEL:

Let me ask you a question.
So this is only a possibility.

The

governor is ...
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Let me ask a question.

tested in Eugene and not in California?

Why is it being

Are there not facilities

here to do that?
MR. STARZEL:

Because that was the closest maintenance

location to the point at which the accident occurred.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Closest SP maintenance location?
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MR. STARZEL:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Yes, that is correct.
So these are tested in your shops not in

federal shop?
MR. STARZEL::
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. STARZEL:

They are in our shops.

Yes sir.

Where is the ...
The NTSP and the FRA were present during

the test.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. STARZEL:

Where is the governor physically, now?
I believe it is still in Eugene under lock

and key.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. STARZEL:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. STARZEL:

Lock and key in whose possession?
I think, ours.
Okay.

Go on.

What we see in that governor is the

possibility that it was hunting because it was losing governor oil,
but that's not conclusive at this point.
May I also say that the question of how much that had to
do with the accident really relates to how much power was then
applied to the rail which is all that has to be tested through
simulation using computers.

Which is to say, we are not finally at

a point where we can tell you with any confidence what actually has
happened.

But we have taken, in the meantime, steps which will

result in more conservative operation of the trains through that
area.

We are also, at this time, designing a bridge that would

have the capacity of, should we not be able to prevent further
derailments there, catching cars and not allowing them to go into
river.
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CHAIRMAN KATZ:

So you're committed to rebuilding the

bridge at Dunsmuir?
MR. STARZEL:
contract.

Well, we have an engineering firm under

They've given us five concepts.

in the press.

One of those was shown

It is a widened bridge with a berm on it and then a

sloping side so that if anything goes off, it's ...
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I understand the difference between

concepts and commitments.

Are you committed to rebuilding the

bridge at Dunsmuir or are we just looking at engineering designs as
an option at this point?
MR. STARZEL:

We're committed to rebuilding the bridge at

Dunsmuir if after the design, we see that we have a significantly
decreased risk as a result.
effective.

We want to do something that is

We don't want to just build a bridge to make cosmetic

changes and make people feel good.

We want to make a real change

if there's one to be made.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
statistics all day.

I appreciate that.

We can trade

For instance, the Federal Railroad

Administration shows that there were 254 accidents involving the
release of hazardous materials between '85 and '89 on rail.

The

Research and Special Projects Administration figures show a steady
increase in rail incidents involving hazardous materials during the
same time up to as many as 1,195 in 1989.

So we can trade stats

back and forth all day and, as most people know, stats do whatever
people want them to do.

I can make them look one way.

make them look one way.

we can all do that stuff.
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You can

What I'm

particularly interested in is your awareness of the inspections at
Roseville and at Bakersfield.
MR. STARZEL:

Well, we didn't come prepared because we

had not been given any advice that, in fact, this was going to be
discussed in any detail.
that.

We'll be prepared at a later time to do

I would like to say, generally, that the FRA focuses on a

number of things that go far beyond and outside of anything that
relates to what we consider to be safety problems and certainly
none that we know to be related in any way to the Sea Cliff or
Dunsmuir accidents.

In fact, I could probably send into the house

of everybody in this auditorium inspectors who could find
unhygienic conditions.

There are white glove inspections that go

on by the FRA .....
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

There's one big difference.

Not everyone

sitting in this room runs a train with hazardous materials through
neighborhoods or on track.

So, I think your analogy off base.

think you can always find things.

I

The difference is, and the

reason I think you ought to be held to a standard, is that you take
hazardous materials as a business and other materials as a business
and run them up and down track that goes through neighborhoods,
goes past sensitive ecological areas, goes by schools, goes by
factories, and that puts you in a different position than folks in
this room who may have left a can of Ajax sitting somewhere they
shouldn't have.
MR. STARZEL:

That's true, but we're required by law to

carry those, Mr. Chairman.

We have no choice.
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CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I understand that.

You're also required

by law to maintain a certain level of safety for your operations.
I'm curious about something.
MR. STARZEL:

... knows whether there's any relationship

that's causation between the defects.
the FRA about that.

There was no inquiry with

Our people contended to me that the kinds of

defects that are turned up and create in your mind a horrendous
situation are the sorts of things that do not change the safety of
the operation, do not change the eveness of the power, do not
change the kinds of things which could be related generally to
accidents.

The statistic I just gave you is very important because

if only 29 out of 3,051 accidents in 1988 were related to
locomotives, we have to focus in on what are those things on
locomotives that can cause a problem.

It certainly isn't a dirty

windshield; it's not grease on the floor which are some of the
things that are cited.

In fact, these are white glove inspections

and they look for defects like that, and they are not directly
safety-related.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
specifically of FRA.

It seems to me, and I asked the question

Are these door knobs out of whack or are they

serious, and the response we got back was they're a combination of
both.

No one's maintaining that all of the 255 defects of Tucson

were of the same severity.

The point that I'm concerned about, and

I'm concerned about your response also, is that you have
locomotives that fail at an 80 percent rate on four inspections.
MR. STARZEL:

We have a different measurement though,

about ...
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CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Excuse me.

setting the standard, not you.

They're responsible for

I mean, you may have a different

measure but it doesn't count because the measure that counts is the
measure that the FRA says is safe and unsafe.
have an FRA?

If not, why would we

I'm wondering already why we have a PUC.

MR. STARZEL:
are the defects?"

The question though is, "Of what severity

I think we will find and we will be happy to

produce people for you who will testify about that, under oath if
you wish, and you will find that the severity of the defects are
not there and they are not accident causal related.

As a result,

you will find that the concern that's been raised by these
horrendous statistical numbers is actually misleading.

The focus

is not going to help us create any more safe railroad operations
than we have now.

We have a measurement which is really very

important and that is what are the availability to us of the
locomotives.

We need to have locomotives that work and run.

can't have them dying out there.
defective.

We

We can't have them become

So we have an inspection every day of our locomotives,

and we examine our cars every thousand miles.

We cannot afford to

have them stopped.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

And all of these locomotives that failed

were cleared by your people before they failed.

All the

locomotives in Roseville, in Tucson, in Sparks, and in Bakersfield,
all of them that failed had already been cleared by your people.
Yet the Federal Railway Administration said that they're not safe.
MR. STARZEL:

That's right because we don't ask our

people to inspect with white gloves and they will be willing to
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send out with some dirt that the FRA may not like.

They're willing

to send out with some door knob problems with ...
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

So in other words, you don't think the

FRA serves a purpose.
MR. STARZEL:
toes.

I think the FRA keeps everybody on their

I think the same reasons that you need to have somebody

watching over you are, in every area, justification for the FRA.
But we do have serious dispute with them whether, in fact, the
defects which they cite are of such a nature as to be a concern for
public safety.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Let me ask you this question.

If they

trucking industry were to take issue with the Highway Patrol
inspections, who do you think I should listen to, the trucking
industry or the Highway Patrol?
MR. STARZEL:

Since the statistics say that 318 people

died as a result of those accidents involving hazardous materials,
I'd say you better listen to the police.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

So at what point, then, how many people

have to die before the railroads acknowledge that the FRA has a
role to play?
MR. STARZEL:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

We had one die in industry ...
That's not what I asked you.

What you're

saying to me is that the reason the Highway Patrol should be
trusted instead of the industry in that case is not that their
competitors of yours but because of their accident rate.

My

questions was, "How many people should die or how many gallons of
hazardous materials should be spilled before you'd acknowledge the
-
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FRA ought to be listened to instead of the industry?

What's the

cut off?"
MR. STARZEL:
question is:

I don't think that's the dichotomy.

The

Are they intelligently assessing public safety

related issues when they cite defects?

In fact, a great number of

the defects will relate simply to things within the cab of an
engine which may relate to the personal safety of the engineer.
You will note that not one engineer has died in the last ten years
in any one of the hazardous materials derailment.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Mr. Starzel, if Sea Cliff had happened in

Northridge, how many people would have died?
MR. STARZEL:

In where?

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. STARZEL:

Northridge.
I'm not familiar with Northridge.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Middle of San Fernando Valley.

Right

where the main line runs.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I don't know.

I understand that the

public authorities of the county handled this one so well from a
public safety standpoint, that I would hope that given that
circumstance in the same place, they would have kept anybody from
dying.

In fact, I hope that our Emergency Response Team

Training--and we have in the last year trained over 10,000 firemen
and over 3,000 policemen--will help them with that kind of problem,
will help them, indeed, and they won't lose anybody.
lose anybody.

We don't to

We desperately don't want anyone to be injured or

killed as a result of any accident.
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CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I think there's sepaate points to this.

Obviously, I think it's commendable that you've trained 10,000
firemen or whatever it is.

I'm more interested in seeing that they

never have to do anything.

It's my view, and I assume it's

probably your view, and the trucking industry's view that emergency
personnel hopefully will never be used.

My goal is to put enough

on the front end to make that happen.
You, in your statement, alluded to the fact that market
forces are much more effective at compliance, than regulators.
That's the essence.
MR. STARZEL:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Yes.
I'm paraphrasing.

Therefore, it's a

logical conclusion that your interest is in keeping trains running
as opposed to taken out of service.
MR. STARZEL:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Running safely and reliably, yes.
Has anyone from your company, to your

knowledge, had any contact with the FRA or the PUC to encourage
them to keep trains running as opposed to keeping them out of
service?
MR. STARZEL:

I don't know.

Of all the contacts we've

had because of the inter-reaction, as I started out saying, the FRA
and the PUC have to rely on the railroads to do their job.
is a constant flow of communication.

There

I don't know everything

that's been said back and forth.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
to work.

would you explain why market forces ought

I have an FRA Regional Administrator, who said in his

comments that he'd had contact with the VP for the railroad.
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Also,

say that, for the first time in five years, he pulled off an
inspection because he thought it was important that the railroad be
allowed to keep running. I'm getting a real strange feeling that
there are economic considerations that are driving safety decisions
and that the public is not as well-protected as they ought to be
because of it.
MR. STARZEL:

I think that's unfair.

I think, in fact,

that what happened there, he referred to a statement that he had
heard that Vice-Chairman Holtman had made, which was that he didn't
believe that the federal law was intended to close down railroads
and bring them to their knees.

In fact, it's intended to bring

about compliance with safety regulations.
We want safety as well.

We believe that, too.

There are not economics driving safety

problems and creating safety problems.
In fact, as you'll see from my statement, despite the
fact that this railroad has produced no operating income, we are
still investing heavily in this railroad to be sure that it is
safe.

Over the past two and a half years, we put in more than

$700 million in capital expenditures.

A great amount of what goes

into tracks, signals, safety devices, ties, ballast, curves, all of
the things that make this railroad operational.

We are not

stinting.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

So we ought to be content, then, with the

sterilization of the Sacramento River, and Sea Cliff, were just
freaks of nature, then.

Accidents happen.

best we can, the market's doing it.
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So, hey we're doing the

We didn't kill anybody, just a

couple of thousand fish.

We came close, but no cigar.

We ought to

be happy with that?
MR. STARZEL:
way.

We would never say it in such a facetious

We are very, very sorry that these accidents happened.

Nobody likes this.

We don't like to have Harvey Barton go in in a

moonsuit and clean up a mess.
risk.

We don't want to put anybody at

We really tried to avoid that.

to accept the notion.

We're trying to tell you exactly what we're

doing that makes the operation safe.
money.

So, no, we're not asking you

We have training programs.

We're putting in a lot of
we have an effort to avoid

derailments and to get at the causes and cut them off so we don't
have derailments.

We are trying to create safety.

We think you

can rely upon that, because that is the basis for our survival.
must be a safe railroad if we are going to survive.
drives us.

We

That's what

It drives us entirely.
I think there's something backwards about the notion that

somehow that regulators can make railroads safe.

I think it's

quite clear that railroads have to make themselves safe, and the
regulators have to help us do that.

I believe that they have

limitations upon them, but they work do that, as well.

The

relationships, while they are adversarial, lead to more safety.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

What actions have you taken at your yards

to increase your compliance rate?

We made reference earlier to a

memo by Misters Moore and Barry, that was over a year old seeking
to reduce by 50 percent, based not on what you think is
appropriate, but based on the FRA Rules and Regs.
come close.
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And they haven't

MR. STARZEL:

Are you talking about the locomotive

compliance program?
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. STARZEL:

Okay.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
Dunsmuir.

Yes.

The little thing that failed up in

Locomotives.
MR. STARZEL:

We generally follow a Parreto principle

rule, which is we put the greatest effort into where we can get the
greatest results.

So we have training programs which are

essential, so that people are trained and do the right thing.

We

have as part of our quality programs, which is to constantly
improve, we are developing process engineering steps which look at
all of the places where we could go wrong.

Just as the Japanese

have done so successfully, we try to straighten out that process,
so we don't make those mistakes.
over and over.

So we don't keep doing it wrong

As to any specifics about what we're doing at

Roseville, Mr. Ongerth, he's not actually the person that's in
charge there.

Perhaps he has something to add.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

What I'm curious about is--I'm looking at

a memo written by a gentlemen by the name of Moore, and a gentlemen
by the name of Barry.

Moore is the VP for Operations, at least he

was in March of 1990 ....
MR. STARZEL:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

He still is
... in which he says that the goals of

this program are to promote a safe and reliable locomotive fleet.
By January 1, 1990, reduce by 50 percent the defect ratio.
January 1, 1991, an additional 25 percent reduction.
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By

To avoid

diverting resources from preventative maintenance to handling FRA
induced service disruptions.
I don't think you're getting there.
percent in Roseville in June of 1991.

I'm looking at 78

I'm looking at Bakersfield,

an average of 80 percent.
Six months after you've achieved a 50 percent reduction,
and a 25 percent reduction on top of that.
MR. STARZEL:

What's the problem?

We can't answer that here, because Mr.

Moore who as you say, is this Vice-President of Operations.
Mr. Barry, who is the Chief Mechanical Officer are not here.

We

did not have notice that this would be the focus of the hearing
today.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

What's your area of expertise for the

company?
MR. STARZEL:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. STARZEL:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

My particular expertise?
What are you in charge of?
I'm a generalist.
You just know a little bit about

everything.
MR. STARZEL:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. STARZEL:

That's what executives are supposed to do.
But nothing about this?
I'm not an expert in this area.

The

gentlemen who are here are involved in the safe operations of the
trains, except
derailments.

Mr. Barton who cleans up after them, if there any
By the way, these two derailments are the first time

he's had to come into California.

We've had a good record in
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California.

These two gentlemen are not mechanical experts.

We

will bring them before you if we have an opportunity.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

What can you tell me that the company has

done, to your knowledge, to try and reverse the trend, without
arguing whether they're white glove inspections or not?

What steps

have you taken to do business differently?
MR. STARZEL:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. STARZEL:
steps are.
that.

With our Locomotive Maintenance Program?
Yes.
I cannot personally testify to what those

I believe we should bring to you the right person to do

That would

be Mr. Barry.

He would be the essential witness

on that.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
coming.

I'd like to know how his programs are

He seems to be a little bit behind in it.
MR. STARZEL:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

We're going to convey to him your thoughts.
I would hope that he has already figured

it out, without my having to bring to his attention.

If he is the

VP of Operations, I would assume that he is aware that his
locomotives are failing at an astronomical rate around the country,
or at least in four inspections.
MR. STARZEL:

They may be failing inspections, Mr.

Chairman, but they are not failing on the road.

We have a very

good rate of availability of our locomotives and they are
performing well.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. STARZEL:

Except we have one in Dunsmuir.
We've been able to decrease the size of our

locomotive fleet, in part, because we're raising the availability,
-
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in other words, the quality of operation of locomotive.

This may

be a situation where statistics are lying to all of us.

We know,

as a fact, that the operations are improved.
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:

I basically, have a comment or

two, I'm not sure you really need to respond.

I've been doing this

going on ten years now, and Richard even longer.
Mr. Katz did you a real favor by not letting you read
this statement.

I am really offended by this statement and the

tone of this statement.

I hope that the operation of Southern

Pacific, through all your folks and the folks that I deal with, do
not reflect the attitude of this statement. I'm just going to read
you one paragraph and I can find three others.

I'm looking at

Page 5.

Our Systems Functions, It Ain't Broke and Should Not Be Fixed.

"We in public agencies will work together to improve
constantly, but we need no new legislation."

You're the first folks that I've ever met that tell me
that they're perfect.
where Northridge is?
through?

That's not the case.

And you don't know

Or San Fernando Valley, where your trains go

Heavily populated, densely populated area.

If this train

at Sea Cliff has spilled three miles north, not only would it have
been in my backyard, it would have been in a community of 11,000
people who would have no access North or South.

I'm not sure that

you understand, for six days, what it meant for the state of
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California, having the major North-South artery closed along the
coast during a very busy time.
I've been saying my prayers every night since late July,
how fortunate we are that they weren't any deaths.

I don't think

you get it, how lucky, you really, really are in this particular
incident.

Your folks haven't been working with the Office of

Emergency Services of Santa Barbara County.
your folks refused to meet.

Until very recently,

I'm not so sure when you stand here

and talk about your 10,000 or 15,000 personnel that you've trained.
I'm pleased you're making the effort.
all that great.

I'm not sure the training is

I'm sorry that eight of your Southern Pacific

employees that you contract had to be hospitalized because you were
using a different level of attendance around the hot spot in the
spill.

I don't think that is sound judgment.

smart, in my opinion.

That's not very

When I was there and observed, I saw all the

public folks at Level B, in the near moonsuits, not like I saw
Herbie on Monday.

I felt sorry that he had to come here after

working I don't know how many hours in Dunsmuir, having to jump on
a charter jet to come down here and make these important decisions,
at risk for him, his family, his personnel, and the folks in the
Sea Cliff area.

You are really putting folks at risk.

The

attitude that is reflective in your statement is outrageous.
MR. STARZEL:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I apologize.
I ask people in the audience not to do

that please.
MR. STARZEL:

I apologize for the tone

way.
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reads that

ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:

Well, it does.

If you think that

we simply have to sit back and allow the federal government to do
it, we're not.

We have higher standards in off-shore oil, in air

emissions, in water emissions, in education in this state.

If

that's what it's going to take, we'll see you in court.
MR. STARZEL:
that you are on this.
according to law.

We are to a degree caught in the same web
As I said earlier, we do have to perform

That law requires us to carry these things.

ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:

That law may need to be changed.

There may be a lot of laws changed.

I expect you folks, to step up

to the plate, step up to the table like your advocates do in
Sacramento.

Fortunately, they're not reflective of the attitude at

this table.

Mr. Katz, did you a big favor, let me tell you, by not

letting you read this.

You should send him a thank you letter.

MR. STARZEL:

I would like to put out that we have

spearheaded a subcommittee that we think, at a national level, can
take the information that California wishes it to have and improve
the system which is an inter-state, an international system.
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:
suggestions.

Like the suggestion from Barbara Boxer's committee?

I heard her testify.
Angeles.

Are you going to support those

I was talking to her on Sunday here in Los

She claims that some of your tank cars are as about as

thick as a dime.

She is going to be looking at double hauling and

some other alternatives.
Statements that you make in this comment, you want to
defer everything to the federal government.
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I am going to forward

this to Congresswoman Boxer.

That's implicit that you're going to

be supporting recommendations like that.
MR. STARZEL:

We are going to make recommendations.

In

fact, we have to the AAR through which we have to work to provide
heavier hulled cars for this purpose.

We don't own the cars that

are used to ship chemicals.
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:
MR. STARZEL:

You're responsible for those.

As long as they meet the Department of

Transportation standard, which is set, we have to accept it.

In

other word these thinner hulled llls, one was involved in Dunsmuir.
We did not have a choice about accepting that.
accepted the way it is.

It has to be

In 1990, we asked the AAR to add chemicals

to the list that would require heavier hulled cars.
able to get that through.
frankly.

We were not

We can only work through the industry,

We hope now that the focus that's been brought here will

allow us to push for much more stringent requirements for
additional chemicals.

Again, I apologize for the tone.

It was

hastily put together, because we didn't know what the subject
matter was going to be until late last night.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
before moving on.

Let me ask you a different question

The drag detector and the hot box that were on

site, those pieces of equipment are currently being tested where?

MR·

QNGERTft:

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. ONGERTH:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

They were tested on the site.
They were tested on the site.
Yes.
By FRA?
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MR. ONGERTH:

SP Signal Maintainers and FRA Signal

Inspectors.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. ONGERTH:

That same equipment is still on the site?
Still on the site.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. ONGERTH:

Has not been removed.
Not been removed.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

It's not defective.

The other thing before we move on to the

next set of witnesses, that you gentlemen ought to understand,
that's implicit in Mr. O'Connell's comments is, I frankly, and I
don't think Jack, most of our constituents, and a lot of the
legislature care much what the feds do or don't do.
As Jack pointed out, in hazardous materials, inhalation
hazardous in trucking, we go beyond what the feds do.
storage and handling, we go beyond what the feds do.

In terms of
We will be

asking for a state agency--! used to think it would be the PUC, but
I've got serious doubts about that now--that exercises the
authority they have and shuts you down when you don't pass
inspections.

I, frankly, don't care if the feds like it or not.

We have the authority to do it under federal law.
vested with the Public Utilities Commission.
job, we will get people who can.

It's right now

If they can't do the

So deferring to Washington, and

hoping that Washington will come up with a solution, is not going
to make this go away.

We will do what we've done in the past,

whether it is a response similar to what Jack and others put
together for oil spills in the ocean that is unmatched in federal
law.

Or it's the trucking laws that are unmatched in federal law.

We will find a way for you to come into compliance.
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I don't care

about the economy of the railroad.

I care about the folks that are

living on either side of the track.

That's where we're going to

come from in trying to put that together.

Thank you for being

here.
I would like to move on now and ask from the United
Transportation Union, J. P. Jones, the State Legislative Director,
who's going to raise some issues that are similar to issues raised
also by Greenpeace, David Chatfield, and Laura Lake, representing a
number of citizens groups.
some chairs.

If they would come forward and grab

Mr. Jones, why don't we start with you, with the same

request for summary as opposed to reading.
good idea to do that today, Jack.
MR. J. P. JONES:

Maybe this wasn't a

Let's start with Mr. Jones.

Thank you, Mr. Chairmen, members.

Jones representing the United Transportation Union.
prepared testimony, which I have.

J.P.

Passing out

With the indulgence of the

Committee I will not read, simply attempt to highlight and scope to
some issues that have been raised here, today.
You heard a statement by the Federal Railroad
Administration, Mr. Paton, about discretionary action that the took
to discontinue an investigation of west Colton.

We feel one of the

items pending before the United States Congress at this present
time will address this particular problem.

It's House

Resolution 2607, which we have outlined in our prepared testimony.
House Resolution 2607 will limit the discretionary
ability of the Federal Railroad Administration to take the type of
actions that Mr. Paton did at West Colton.

It will

the

agency to perform specifically what Congress as directed them to
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do and cease that kind of conduct in the future.

We think that

this committee and the Legislature should look favorably upon some
indication to Congress of the endorsement of contents of HR 2607,
as it currently is written.
We think it is outrageous that the agency can discontinue
the authority to police the railroads which Congress has given
them, and rely upon discretionary language within the current
legislation that Congress has enacted.

We want to tighten that up.

We want to stop that kind of conduct in the future.

We have listed

a few other items which are contained in that particular House
Resolution which we feel we assist in aiding the Federal Railroad
Administration and the application of their authority.

One of

those will be that those who challenge a decision of the Federal
Railroad Administration in relation to the adoption of a regulation
or interpretation, will be able to go immediately to the Federal
Court of Appeals, skipping the District Court level of appeal, and
speed up the questioning and the authenticity, if you will, of the
regulations which they promulgate.
challenge process.

In other words, speed up the

See if the courts agree that the FRA is correct

in what regulations they are, in fact, applying and policing in the
rail industry.
As indicated, there's a variety of other items in
HR 2607 which we feel will be of assistance.

We've included an

analyses of that bill, in addition to a copy of that bill, in our
background material.

We would like to work with this committee and

the Legislature to get legislation passed which would memorialize
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Congress to pass this legislation and indicate the support of the
California Legislature.
We are disturbed by what we hear at this committee today,
as well as other members of this committee.
regulation has been as lax as it is.

It is unfortunate that

We have had a concern for a

long time about the ability of the FRA, both in an aggressive
manner as well as an intents matter, to regulate the railroads.
What we have heard here this morning simply confirms that
particular fact.

We are disturbed.

We share the concern that

economic consideration in relation to safety which the FRA has
testified here today was a factor in their consideration of
discontinuing proceedings.

It's just outrageous.

In the interest of brevity, I will introduce John Easly,
our International Vice-President, who has accompanied me here today
to answer any questions the Committee may have, and having
submitted our written presentation and touched on the one point
which we feel the Committee developed this morning about the lack
of regulation in an area where the Committee and the Legislature
can go to correct that in relation to HR 2607, we will be available
for any questions that you may have.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Do you also represent the folks who would

be doing the work in the maintenance yards at the facilities?
MR. JONES:

No, we do not.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. JONES:

Who would represent that?

That would be the Maintenance (inaudible) and

the Brotherhood of Machinists.

It's a machinist union.
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We only

represent the operating personnel, Mr. Chairman, the people that
physically hands-on operate the train.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Have you been aware in recent months or

years of increased concern from your personnel as to the safety of
the equipment or the status of the equipment that they've been
operating or working on?
MR. JONES:

Yes.

It's the jurisdictional responsibility

of my office under the constitution of our organization of our
union to handle as the primary responsibility the health and safety
matters which are raised by our members, or which come to our
attention.

Yes.

There has been, in the last two years a rather

significant increase in concern raised by our members relative to
the operation of locomotives on Southern Pacific.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Do you have a view of the relationship

between the PUC and the railroads?
MR. JONES:

Between the PUC and the railroads?

Let me

say that we feel the relationship between the PUC and the railroads
is much more oriented towards the enforcement of safety and the
enhancement of safety for the public than is the case between the
FRA and the railroads.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Did you run for office, lately, J. P.?

That was well done.
MR. JONES:

As a matter of fact, in January.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I understand what you're saying, is that

the PUC is better than the FRA.

In adding my own view, that

shouldn't necessarily make anybody sleep any better at night.
Those are my words, not yours.
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MR. JONES:
Chairman.

They spot what I've heard here today, Mr.

My comfort level is not raised at all.

As a matter of

fact, it has decreased quite a bit.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
and the FRA?

Is there any relationship between the UTU

Is there any inter-action between the union and the

FRA?
MR. JONES:

We handle complaints that we receive, or

communications that we receive, about potential violations of
federal law and federal regulation directly from my office to the
FRA.

In that regard, we do deal directly with their Washington

office who in turn contacts the regional office, either in Laguna
Niguel or in San Francisco, as the case may be here in California.
Let me just indicate one thing, Mr. Chairman, in that
area, the area of communication with the FRA.

Up until

approximately three years ago, the process of handling concerns or
complaints which our members raised, or came to our attention,
about federal violations, was done in such a manner that we wrote
directly to Washington, D.C., to the Administrator of FRA, and
supplied copies of the communication to the two regional offices
here in California, one in Los Angels, and one in San Francisco.
We did that at the request of the FRA in an attempt to speed up the
investigation process, and to have their FRA investigators go out
more quickly to the site where the alleged complaint is taking
place.

This, in spite of the fact that they actually can't do any

work or spend any money until a control number comes back from
Washington, D.C., at the FRA.

They can't actually show anything
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being done with their resources at the FRA.

I discontinued that

one reason only.

particular procedure

What the FRA inspectors were doing with the information
they received from the carbon copies of the communications which I
sent to the local offices here in California, they were running out
to the carriers with the letter, say,

"Look here, the union's

complaining", the carrier would fix it.

By the time the control

number comes back from Washington, D.C., to the local offices here
in California, and another inspector goes out to officially see the
problem and corrected it.

The problem doesn't exits.

Based on

that conduct of the local offices here in California of the FRA, I
discontinued the practice of carbon copying the local offices, even
though it takes a longer time frame for the process to get back.
We did it because the FRA was running out to carriers saying
"There's a problem, correct it".

So that when somebody made the

official inspection, the matter would have already been corrected.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

You get the impression that the FRA

sometimes is in the railroad business as opposed to the regulatory
business.
MR. JONES:

Clearly, clearly.

That's the case, Mr.

Chairman.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
representing Greenpeace.

Let me turn to Mr. Chatfield,
Then, Ms. Lake.

MR. DAVID CHATFIELD:

Well, I've been quite amazed at

some of the revelations, here, myself.

I didn't come here to talk

about the regulation, per se, of railroad industry.

Your words at

the very beginning, Mr. Chairman, that this is a toxic time bomb
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waiting to happen, that's something that I should have said.
sounds like that really is the case.

It

I should back up and say that

Greenpeace is part of an alliance of organizations

represent

other environmental groups 1 communities, Native
come together over an issue which is related to this

tion,

which is the establishment of a low-level radioactive waste dump
out in Needles.

The implication of that is twofold.

the traffic of radioactive waste, whether it is by
is going to change in its pattern.

1 or truck,

It is likely, given

this

waste dump, if it is put in, will attract waste from other places.
That's almost certain.

It's likely to greatly increase

amount

of radioactive waste, low level, and possibly other moving around
in the state of California.

That's why I'm here.

That's

brought us to this issue.
The thing that I want to say is, basically, to give a
perspective on an approach that anyone considering legis
this issue has to look at.

ion on

It's very, very tempting,

after hearing what we've heard here today, to get into
of safety and regulat

1

, and double-hulled tankers, and

if this is a safer means of transportation than truck transport,
we're in real trouble.
There are all kinds of things, some of which are outlined
in the statement that your staff put together, the
piece.

I'm surprised there were only 254 accidents.

ional
I

I

must have read about every single one of them in the newspaper.
You're asking good questions.
answer more questions.

You're going to

Do tests of these containers.
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We need

to

conditions.

We know what happens when tomatoes fall off a truck;

they splatter up on

car.

Do we really know what happens when

something like a radioactive waste container falls off a truck?
What if it's in fire?
materials?

What if it's in a fire of highly volatile

The safety of equipment.

dime-thin shells for toxic waste.
response capability.
capability?

Our staff has seen those same

Do communities have access to

Does the government have access to response

What's the problem when proprietary information or the

overwhelming nature of information supplied by shippers, as in the
case of sodium metam in Dunsmuir, which we didn't find out for
weeks that affected pregant women because it was in a stack
somewhere on a shelf and there was not enough staff to look at
that.
All of these issues are going to say something to me,
which is simply reinforced by what I have heard here today.

That

is that there are going to be a number of situations with toxic
wastes, and with radioactive waste, where it is simply not possible
to make railroads safe to transport.

We're simply not safe to have

these kinds of materials in society, at all.

I think that is

particularly true in the case of radioactive waste.

It is going to

be true in all kinds of situations with toxics wastes.
Our view on, let's say on let's say,

'Well, they have to

be shipped', especially these waste products, for nuclear waste,
for low level nuclear waste, our position is these have to be
stored in monitorable, retrievable, above ground on-site storage
until there is some real way to get rid of them.

In the meantime,

which I suppose is a little beyond the purview of your committee,
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out.

our society has to slowly phase

We have to
are carried

reduce and eliminate highly-hazardous substances
all over our state in trucks and
What the gentlemen from SP
shippers present to us".

"We

You know, that's true.

Part of what you

need to deal with in order to make a safe transportation system is
to consider the fact that remedial action, clean-up prevention,
simply isn't going to work in many cases.

You simply have to stop

the shipment of particularly hazardous chemicals and radioactive
waste in areas by trains and trucks.
If that is the solution, and it's self-evident on the
face of it.

If we continue to have statistics like the one that

actually links your debate about statistics--at the beginning of
your statement 65 percent increase in the volume of hazardous waste
carried by rail is what has driven the number of accidents.

That

is simply going to increase unless the Legislature puts a

to

it.

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Appreciate

PROFESSOR LAURA LAKE:

Miss Lake?

Thank you very much.

Professor Laura Lake from UCLA's

I'm

of Public Health.

representing the National Council of Jewish Women
and a number of other organizations.

I'm here

Los Angeles

I'd like to note

our

President is here, Fran Lyons, and members of our Environment
Committee.
We're part of an all

that Mr. Chatf

to

that is very concerned with not just the safe disposal of nuclear
waste, but the safe transport

this material.
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All of

questions so far of this committee have focused on the manifest,
and treatment, and labeling

toxic material.

Imagine if these

accidents with radioactive material.

two
is

This material

transported to disposal sites out of the state, presently.

It

an ongoing problem.

In addition, there is the threat of the

Ward Valley Nuclear Facility bringing it, not just from all over
California but, but from all over the United States.
The record of shipments is something that we need to be
looking at.

It's making more work for this committee, but it's an

important expansion to also look at the regulatory controls for the
management of nuclear accidents.

There have been some.

I'm going

to give you some clippings that we have of statistics of some of
these accidents.

There hasn't been a lot of research done on it.

I also want to call to your attention the washout road
conditions around Needles where the railroad would have to also
being going through.
disposal.

The proposal is to use railroads and trucks

This is a very dangerous proposition for a state to

be engaged in.
Specifically, our group has several questions that we'd
like to ask you to pursue.

One of them is the safety and insurance

record of the firms engaged in hauling radioactive waste.
is the labeling requirements for this cargo.

Another

The status of rail

and road systems leading to the dump at Needles.

The liability for

California and non-California radioactive waste transported to the
site.

The preparedness of first-responders including the Highway

Patrol, and volunteer fire fighters to respond to radioactive
spills.

Finally, the liability for cleanup of contaminated sites.
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In other words, the insurance has to be a spec
called Environmental Impairment Liability.
such policies now, and with a track

insurance

It's

hard to get

1

(pun

intended), it's real bad.
I think that it's important for the Committee to be
asking, not just about property damage, but remediation costs, and
what kind of safeguard can California require?

What kind of

insurance can we impose be carried to protect the public.

Our

concern is for the transportation riding through every community
where these loads are going.

This was never addressed in the

Environmental Impact Report process for the Ward Valley Site.

It

was looking at the site, and not at every community at the tracks
run through.

We believe it is very important to look at the

communities and the whole system.
In addition, we can give you an example of first response
experience in other parts of the country for nuclear accidents.
It's not been a pretty story.

In Wichita, Kansas, a truck spilled

in 1978 with 54 drums of rich uranium yellow cake.
there tried to help out to roll them away.
through the yellow cake.

The motorists

They were

1 walking

The Highway Patrol responded immediately.

The state trooper who was the first to respond died of lung cancer
seven years later.
through.

People had no idea what

were walking

There is no reason to believe that just as they was

confusion with the current wrecks

we've

, there is this

latent response for cancer caused by radioactive exposure

These

people who are first on the site deserve to know what they're
facing, deserve special treatment.
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We real

need to address this,

because primarily it's going to be volunteer fire fighters who are
going to be getting there and the Highway Patrol.
response.

That's our first

They're not trained, not seasoned, and just out of their

depth to have face that kind of nuclear spill.
The idea of remediation is a very dicey proposition.

We

would urge this committee to instruct the Department of Health
Services to have a moratorium on the licensing for the Ward Valley
Site until these issues are addressed.

They are a very important

public safety issue, as an important as the site is the transport
element.

We would urge you to take that action to get the answers

on the transportation risks associated with nuclear shipments in
our state.
We appreciate your holding this hearing.
right thing to do.

This is the

In coming here for our coalition, which

includes Women for Hollywood's Women Political Committee, the SHOW
Coalition, Greenpeace, the Chimawa Indian Support, the Mojave
Tribe, we're a very diverse coalition.

I'm even more pleased that

we're here to be able to know how bad the situation is and how
right we were to be concerned.
questions.

We do hope that you pursue these

I would welcome any questions you have.
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:
PROFESSOR LAKE:

Your background?

I'm on the faculty at UCLA in

Environmental Science and Engineering.

I'm a political scientist

and I've worked on environmental policy implementation for 20
years.
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:

Thank you.

here.
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Thanks for being

CHAIRMAN KATZ:
last panel to come up.

Thank you very much.

I'd like to ask the

While we're specifically focusing on what

happened in Ventura, they may also have some insight in handling of
how a nuclear problem would be handled in that area, a radioactive
waste problem might be handled.

I'd like to ask Assistant Chief

Ken Rude from the Highway Patrol, the Ventura County Fire
Department Assistant Chief Jim Smith who is the Fire Marshal, and
the Santa Barbara County Office of Emergency Management, Mary
Barron to please come forward.
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:
see, as they say.
momentarily.

Good morning, Chief, long time no

Who would like to start?

Mr. Katz will be back

Chief Rude, do you want to start?

You got up early

this morning from Arroyo Grande.
ASSISTANT CHIEF KEN RUDE:

Yes, I did.

Thank you for the

privilege of being able to attend and participate in this most
worthwhile hearing.

In terms of commenting on the roles of the

California Highway Patrol relative to this incident, I would like
to point out that clearly this incident was, in terms of definition
and legal responsibility, outside of the purview of the California
Highway Patrol relative to specific scene management
responsibility.

However, under the current incident command

system, a joint command venture was initiated which involved
agencies that are represented here at the table at this time.

The

role of the California Highway Patrol is immediately to determine,
assess the impact on the local area, and proceed with securing the
scene to protect the public.

That was done immediately through

closure of Highway 101 and surrounding roadways coming into the Sea
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Cliff area.

After accomplishing that scene securement, we then

began to attempt to determine what we had through a command center
which had been immediately set up at the fire station.

It was

apparent very early that because of the nature of the load that we
would be faced with some sort of long-term closure.

At that point

we began a diversion plan which was intended to route traffic
around the scene of the spill which included the use of State
Route 33 to State Route 150 and back into 101 both north and south
bound and clearly that was accomplished.
alternatives available to us.
made.

We had limited

It wasn't much of a decision to be

We had clearly one route to use and that was the decision

that drove our use of that roadway.
When we determined that this was going to be of a
long-term nature, we also immediately implemented the use of
changeable message signs in conjunction with California Department
of Transportation to notify the users of the transportation system
as early as possible that there was a problem and recommending a
mitigation major--use of alternate roadways.

In addition, we began

to look more broadly at what transportation systems, what highways
were available to us.

We saw that at the north end of San Luis

Obispo County, we had State Route 46 which provided the direct
access across to Highway Interstate 5 where we could route traffic
that was destined for the Los Angeles area.
State Route 166 for the same reason.

We also looked at

What we actually instituted

was at Highway 101 and 46 we placed changeable message signs
unattended to advise the motorists what they would be faced with if
they continued further south, that there was a freeway closure
- 93 -

At

south of

a more

166, we
we were

if

to

motorists

was to actual
would be

of Santa

alternate Route 166

so

limited services

, i.e.,

the
were
on

il

Route 166.
We were able to
Incident Command

and

provide media information,

not

the

Off

to

this

our

statewide

also

through our information

Patrol

offices throughout the state.

When we

mitigation measures, we were

at

neighborhood of a six to seven

around

the actual spill incident.

measures

Through

the
last few days down to about an

to an hour

were clearly able to mitigate a

of

f.

a

So we

f

people to either forego unneces

or to use

roadways.
We implemented a

t

to the fire department to discuss
at the incident command center.

I

we

site,

We also set

center in San Luis Obispo which was des
information and provide information to our
throughout the state.
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11

command
to

In terms of other support that was provided at the scene
at the time we began, at the time removal efforts began and they
started off-floating containers onto flat bed rail cars, we
conducted critical item inspections of all of the commercial trucks
that were used to make that transportation prior to their actual
departure.

We also assisted with the inspection and final approval

of the movement of the container of naptholene which was one of the
final hazardous materials containers that we were able to remove
from the area.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Chief, we appreciate your help and

everyone else's help when Jack and I were on site and trying to
understand what was going on.

What would be really helpful to us

from your perspective as a professional--you're the folks who get
to clean up the mess that somebody else made or stabilize, you're
the line between the public and somebody else's accident--if you
could tell us, based on what you learned out there that day from
the standpoint of having (inaudible).

In the staff report there is

a copy of what I would refer to as a manifest but on trains it
would be called something different, a consignment I guess.

I'm

looking at this consignment sheet and I mean I hope somebody can
read it because it would be a long time before this thing meant
anything to me.

It looks like a computer printout where the

computer just went nuts.

It looks like one of those hazmat signs.

Who knows how to read all that stuff but assuming you're not the
first one on site and you get handed this thing, I mean what do
you ...
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ASSISTANT CHIEF JIM SMITH:
Mr. Katz.
Department.

I'm Assistant
I

, Ventura County Fire

f

was the first

chief to take command of the

I'm willing to address that,

f on

ident.

scene as

county duty

Before I could take command

of the incident, I had to determine what we had.

Our initial

attack incident commander was on the north side of the incident and
could not get, because of the accident, to where we had initially
set up the command post.

He was operating in his fire engine

outside the door of his fire station because the accident happened,
or the derailment happened that close to one of our fire stations.
Within 19 minutes--now the information that's provided by the train
I've always been told will be given to us by the conductor or the
engineer of the train--which is not unreasonable because of the
distance the engine stopped from the derailment was about a mile to
a mile and a half, the conductor had come down from the engine and
handed our first-on-scene f

captain the conts list, or the

contents list or whatever you want to call it--the manifest.

As a

first responder, when I arrived and was flown over to that side of
the incident, I met with the conductor and our captain on the
scene.

The conductor was very able to describe to me the contents

of the cars that were involved and he was fairly accurate.

He

missed it by two cars on telling us how many cars were in the
derailment.

He said there were two more than there actual

which was fine.

were,

He identified four cars that were carrying

hazardous materials in the mess and he identified the one name that
I quickly recognized as hazardous, as hydrazine.

So, I knew at

that point we had a major hazardous material incident on our hands.
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Already evacuations had been ordered of the Sea Cliff colony.

The

CHP had been asked to shut down 101 because the vapor cloud was
impacting that roadway above the spill.

We set our initial

evacuation because of the name hydrazine at a larger limit than
what we finally did.

I then took this list and flew back to the

command post side of the incident and handed it to our hazardous
material response team members who were at that time on the scene.
They then had to use this list to determine what was actually
involved and what other consequences we could have besides
hydrazine.
do.

We then allowed the experts to tell us what we had to

we had accomplished and the railroad had accomplished what

they always said they would do and that is give us enough
information as first responders to provide a level of safety for
the public and for the emergency service workers that are
responding.

At that point, then, we were able to accomplish that

and turn the mitigation effort and the determination and the
reconnoitering of what else is involved and what other things may
be happened.

We turned it over to the hazardous material team.

Captain Dysart from our hazardous material response team can talked
to the other information that may have been beneficial.
MR. DEAN DYSART:

First of all, I would like to thank you

for allowing a responder to come and speak to you.

I feel that

there is a lot of information that you need to know that we the
responders have whether it be information that is valuable to us or
information that is lacking and I'm here today to address the
documentation that is valuable and the documentation that is
missing and maybe give you some insight into legislation.
-
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When I arrived, I was handed a conductor's work report.
That is the formal name of the document.

It is not a conts list,

it is not a manifest, it is a conductor's work report.
phases.

It's four

The first phase is the line up of the train from the

engine to the rear end device.

The second phase gives you more

information about the train which is only important to the train
people.

The third phase goes into those hazardous materials that

are carried on the individual cars within the train.

And the

fourth phase of the document says first responder safety
information to deal with those hazardous materials.

I'm not going

to go through my dramatics of showing you this engineer's work
report, but it is a computer printout of approximately 28 pages.
An on-scene commander, a fire engine, is supposed to decipher that
information quickly and make some immediate decisions.
Within this conductor's work report, we identified
Car 23 which was a flat car carrying containers.
was hydrazine in 55-gallon drums.

The one container

The second container was a

single intermodal container carrying, at that time we had the
information, combustible liquid NOS.
specified'.

NOS indicates 'not otherwise

It carries a UM number of 1993.

different products that carry UM-1993.
include perfume.

I have identified 67

It is a catch-all.

We can

We can include certain combustible liquids that

carry pesticides to the plant.

It's a wide spectrum of

UM-1993.
Also, missing on the work report is the size of the
container.

What we have ...
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

The quantity of what you're dealing with.
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MR. DYSART:

the quantity.

site from the railroad--hazmat

The original first officer on
officer--indicated we should

not be too concerned about the combustible liquid in NOS because it
was a single drum.

As it turns out after much more research, we

determined that it was a single drum of between 52,000 and 60,000
gallons.

This information is missing on the work report.

I defy

someone from the railroad to show me, quickly, how I can that
container size off this work report and make a determination how
broad the incident is.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. DYSART:

Is it supposed to be on the work report?

To my knowledge the work report meets all

the requirements of federal law.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MR. DYSART:
response.

Okay.

It doesn't meet the requirements of first

There's two things we have to deal with as first

responsders.

Number one is the product.

Number two is the volume.

A small container of a pesticide is much less hazardous to us than
a 50 to 100 gallon (inaudible).

So that was missing.

was what the NOS--actually what that product was.
incident before we received that information.
work report are codes; it's codified.

Also missing

Very late in the

Contained within the

A railroad officer, through

a knowledge of those codes, would be able to tell us what that
product was, but we do not have privy to that code on a day-to-day
operation.

We're missing, basically, clear text.

We would like to

see clear text information relative to the product, relative to the
container, size, and the makeup of the container.
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Had it been an aluminum container, we would have handled
that differently than if it had been stainless steel, which in fact
i t was stainless steel.

We're missing some clear text information

for the first responders and have these materials response people
be able to deal with that incident in a timely manner.
Another piece of information that was missing was the
shipper.

We do have a shipper, and it was shipped from a codified

shipper to the same codified shipper.

The manufacturer of the

product was not identified on the work report.

Therefore, we had

to go with the process of dialing up KimTrek to make contact with
the shipper.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Was there a problem during the cleanup of

the -- were you able or were the railroad personnel able to get
their hands on enough of what they needed to neutralize or
stabilize what was there or was availability of those products a
problem in this?
MR. DYSART:

I was not made aware of any problem with

availability of the neutralizing products.

In a timely manner,

there was a lot of processes that had to happen before the
neturalizing took place.

Another item that was missing, until

approximately 2 o'clock in the morning, was the Material Data
Safety Sheet from the manufacturer of the hydrazine.

We had to

operate on the premise that we were dealing with hydrazine in an
acreus solution more than 64 percent which is the worst factor of
the two, until approximately 2 o'clock in the morning determined
that it was hydrazine 51.2 percent, which is a lesser of our
concern.
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Another problem that we have to deal with is
containerized freight.
car number.

Within our work report, we have the flat

On that flat car we have containers.

containers were not identified.

To us, the

Whenever the container in the flat

car upset, we actually had the result of the flat car on one side
and a pile of containers on the other side, not even closely
related to the flat car that they were tied to.
need for at least separate lists.

We feel there is a

Redundancies on flat cars,

numbers, and container numbers so that we can track the car once it
leaves the flat car.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Do you have a sense in terms of equipment

and personnel available and the ability to respond that we need to
put something in place, similar to what Jack did and I'm sure some
of you in terms of ocean disasters, that we ought to replicate
that?

What's that, Jack?
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Clean Seas.

That we ought to do something for land

based incidents, that we need some kind of a ... or do we have
everything?

I don't need to work create another layer or another

agency, if it's all there.

I'm curious because we heard from some

of the people in Dunsmuir.

Obviously, the Dunsmuir incident

provided much greater problems in terms of being able to respond
for first people on the scene, because of major holes in federal
law that allowed chemicals to go not properly identified and caused
problems for on-site personnel.

Do we need something more

comprehensive, like Clean Seas?
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MR. SMITH:

Mr. Katz, I believe that due to the

proximity of this incident, of the Sea Cliff incident being in the
urbanized Southern California area, we had more than enough or we
had adequate mitigation teams in and around the vicinity.
Santa Barbara County north of us.

We had

We had two teams along with ours

for a total of three in Ventura County.

We had all of the

resources in the LA Basin.
Such as you reported on Dunsmuir, this same incident, say
in the northern part of the state, you (inaudible) the highways and
the ocean in the same way this one did, would not have the
availability of resources as we did.

We had approximately 60

trained fire department personnel on the scene at various times
throughout that incident.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

To some extent we benefited from the fact

that the oil industry is so much in evidence in the counties, and
you've been prepared to work with those kinds of situations in
advance of this.

In that case, I would assume that you drill more

than a lot of areas do and you work more closely together because
of what you had in the Ventura-Santa Barbara areas having to do
with petro-chemical industry and the potential for problems there.
Something that, obviously, you wouldn't find in Dunsmuir kor
Alturas.

I'm not even sure if you find it in Fontana, for that

matter.
ASSISTANT CHIEF SMITH:

That's exactly correct.

The

urbanized areas have higher-level, on-duty mitigating teams.

I

believe, Ventura County daily staffs approximately, along with our
cities, 15 on-duty Hazardous Material Mitigation personnel.
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CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Not many volunteer fire departments, is

what you're saying, in the urbanized areas.
ASSISTANT CHIEF SMITH:
County there's only two.

That's correct.

In Ventura

Santa Paula and Filmore City, neither one

of which participant in a Hazardous Material Mitigation team.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Up the coast

go up Highway 5, north of

Redding, I'm not sure where tracks are in that area.
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:

Do they contract with hazardous

materials or are they totally dependent upon, like on Herbie's
operation, when they get there?
ASSISTANT CHIEF SMITH:

I can't speak to that.

ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:

Mutual aid?

ASSISTANT CHIEF SMITH:

It could be that they provide

strictly on mutual aid.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

When Jack and I were there, we both

commented from a layman looking in, there seemed to be a lot of
cooperation:it seemed to be running very smoothly.

Still from an

information standpoint, you had a lot, but not everything you
needed.

There were still holes there.

Ms. Barron, do you want to

add; we'll get you into this discussion here.
MS. MARY BARRON:

My name is Mary Barron.

I'm with the

Santa Barbara County Office of Emergency Services.
I think my comments will echo what Mr. O'Connell was
saying earlier this morning.

The main point that I wish to make

is that from a local agency's standpoint, we need to formalize the
Emergency Response Planning and Coordination Process between local
agencies and the railroads.

I speak from two past experiences that
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occurred in Santa Barbara County.

One, obviously, was the Sea

Cliff incident, which was just a few miles from our border.

The

other was another incident which occurred on Vanderberg Air Force
Base in just March of this year.

That was a derailment with

Southern Pacific that involved 20-foot cars and a number of
hazardous materials.

Fortunately, it was in a very remote area of

our county on the Air Force Base, so it didn't receive the
notoriety the last two incidents did.

It did involve two derailed

cars each containing 30,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia, which can
pose a significant hazard to the public.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

If I remember right, anhydrous ammonia is

classified as an inhalation hazard and covered by our AB 2705 of a
couple of years ago.
MS. BARRON:

I believe so.

I don't know it if it's

classified under DOT in the strict sense ...
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

It is under California.

We use the

federal lists under my legislation, and was interested in the
comments going back to the railroad.

There is an example where

shipping something by truck is actually under a stricter
requirement.

To ship that by truck under California law, you need

escort vehicles; you need a breathing apparatus, emergency
response, and notification of local emergency response personnel.
MS. BARRON:

The main points that were evident during

that incident was that the local agencies were not even notified
by the railroad that there had by an incident.

We heard about it

on local radio, and needed to follow up from our end with both the
Southern Pacific Dispatch Center up in Roseville, as well as their
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Monterey Park.

corporate headquarters

local agency's standpoint, while

The response from the

wasn't directly in a county

jurisdiction--it was on federal property on the Air Force Base--we
needed to initiate the process.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

What was the cause of the derailment?

Was that ever determined?
MS. BARRON:

I believe a culvert washed out during the

March rains on Vanderberg Air Force Base.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
MS. BARRON:

This took place, when?

March 19, 1991.

While it didn't have the

off-site impacts that the last two incidents presented, it did

•

present significant planning concerns from our standpoint.

The

main issue that we have as a local agency is that we need some kind
of formal coordination process with the railroads.

It's ironic

that we have very high standards for fixed facilities in this
state, but that the railroads pass through our backyards posing the
same risks and don't have those same standards that they have to
comply with.

That's our main concern from a planning standpoint.

That we need this process formalized.

In an earlier meeting this

week that Assemblyman O'Connell pulled together, Southern Pacific
indicated that they voluntarily coordinate with local agencies
through a program called CARE.

This is a voluntary effort.

While

I wholeheartedly support CARE, which stands for Community Awareness
and Emergency Response, it's borne out of the chemical
manufacturers industry.
h

I

I think that the incidents in the last six months have
pointed that we more than a voluntary effort on the railroad's part
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to coordinate with the agencies who are going to be the ones who
respond to the incidents.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Anything else we ought to know from the

responders standpoint as we try to put this together?
ASSISTANT CHIEF SMITH:

Yes.

One other thing that I

would like to say, Mr. Katz, on Page 7 of your staff report, I'd
like to correct the unified command components that were initially
put into place.

It was the CHP, Ventura County Sheriff's

Department, and Ventura County Fire Protection district personnel
that made up the initial unified command that was in charge of the
Sea Cliff incident.
Unified Command is the state, I guess I could call it the
state-mandated system for handling multi-jurisdictional incidents
where the CHP is involved.

Ventura County has used the incident

command system and unified command for many years.
to put it into effect on this incident.

We were happy

We were also very pleased

with the effect that it had on the eventual outcome of the incident
in bringing it to I believe, as swift a conclusion as could have
occurred in any respect.

Also, I would like to have Lt. Wells from

Ventura County Sheriff's Office --he was one of the unified
commanders on the scene--ask him if he has anything else to say.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:
comment.

Let me ask before Lt. Wells makes his

Because the spill was still contained on SP right-of-

way, does that mean a different response or a different ...

To what

extent does the company involved have control or input, if any,
into what procedures are undertaken, when you decide to move, not
move, and how you decide to treat and not to treat?
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MR. SMITH:

The responsible party, which would be SP, has

every right to come in and affect the cleanup.

We want them to do

that, as we would with any business that has a spill.

We want them

to take the responsibility for the cleanup, as SP has done in this
case.

But they have to coordinate their efforts for cleanup along

with litigation and the public safety efforts that the public
agencies have.

So, that means there must be a coordinated effort

in that cleanup so that mitigation and the cleanup effort are not
in
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

What I want to understand is whether or

not it's on their right of way.

If they say left and you say

right, it goes right?
ASSISTANT CHIEF SMITH:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

It goes right.

... So, what operations I saw SP involved

in was with your unified commands, knowledge, involvement and
agreement that SP would pursue course A, B and

c.

I mean they

couldn't come in and say, we've got this great solution.
just going to go and do it.

We are

We've got your guys all feeling

comfortable that this was the proper way to respond.

That it was

up to your agencies to make that unified command decision that then
allowed SP to go do whatever they were doing.
ASSISTANT CHIEF SMITH:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Okay.

That is exactly correct.
Lieutenant, do you want to give us

some more?
LIEUTENANT WELLS:

Basically, just embellish on what

other personnel have said here today.

This is a system impact and

any part of the system that's deficient is going to create a
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sub-optimazation

terms

I

incident

being an

over seven

and working

with the Highway

unified

command which is a

the ICS

was probably one of the best

ident system--

we can

to manage the

incident.
, we are an

place

throughout the state because in order
you have to have a
itself.

successful resolution

start on

We are able to do

the incident

and I commend everybody at the

scene for working together

We

over 26 other agencies that we

had to deal with and the

allowed us to do

that as best we could.
One area that we've touched on

conversation

with Assemblyman O'Connell that I would like to see, and, I think,
concurrence from the rest

our group

to have the ability and

that we need to be able
to

and be exempt from discovery

of

do that,

f

reasons that we need

that is so we can outline mistakes, be able to identify
deficiencies, and not

1

identification of those deficienc
County Counsel has indicated

now
we

Ventura County,

not discuss these types

of incidences in a debriefing or a
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Because of

LIEUTENANT WELLS:

Because

again, it is part of the system.
the system.

1

's an

That's all the remarks that I have.
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component of

CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I appreciate that, Lieutenant.

ASSISTANT CHIEF SMITH:

Along with the liability lines,

if we could identify these types of incidents the same as a medical
emergency would be protected under the law.

They are allowed to

have a debriefing or a post-incident analysis in a medical
emergency in the hospital.
not allowed in discovery.

All that is confidential information,
If hazmat incidents have that same

protection, we would feel a lot freer to let everybody know what
lessons we learned.

We will do it, but it is going to be under the

table, and the people that worked with us will know the lessons
learned, what successes we had, and what failures we felt we had.
But, it would be a lot better for Californiaand the United States
if these lessons learned could be publicized a little better.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Okay.

The frightening part of what you

are saying is that it almost implies that the
about lawyers.

I really hate to get to that point.

frightening concept.

is right
It is a

Of course, he is one.

I appreciate what you have to go through because part of
what Jack and I are looking at are looking at a couple of aspects.
Obviously, today's hearing, more than others, focused on
maintenance and some regulatory agencies that seem to get the roles
confused with private sector entrepreneurial concepts, or something
like that.
But, we also when we address this, because we've been
looking at the rapid deployment issue.

Your comments, Chief, in

terms of having stuff available in these kinds of areas is real
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important because that will impact on how we're trying to put this
kind of thing together and may cause us to re-think some of that.
Obviously there are areas where we do need it and areas
where you don't.

You may need a response team in Southern

California, but you may not need it at the LA-Ventura-Santa Barbara
area.

You may need it in the San Bernardino high desert area, or

somewhere like that.

So, I appreciate that, and your view in terms

of what is available and what's readable on those things--on the
conscripts.

That's very helpful to us.

If you have more thoughts as you chat, but don't debrief,
and review in your own minds what took place--! know Jack had a
much longer meeting with you earlier in the week--we would be real
interested because we need to approach this from two sides.

One is

obviously what do you do after an incident occurs and how do you
respond and minimize the potential danger and the potential
exposure both to your personnel as well as the public at large.
One of the scariest hearings that I have ever sat through on the
Toxics Committee was listening to somebody in the Orange County
area a couple of years ago, a Fire Chief who told me that this was
two weeks after an explosion of 55-gallon drums.

He still didn't

know what he had sent his men into two weeks later, and he was
scared to death for his men.

It is horrifying to sit and listen to

that kind of testimony, let alone having actually to go through it.
On the other hand, we also want to do whatever we can to
make sure that we are doing enough on the front end to ensure that
you never have to come into play and the laws and the rules are
adequate.

What I'm particularly concerned about today is learning
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that not only are the laws inadequate in some areas which confirms
some suspicion, but I have some real serious doubts about
regulatory agencies--I'm not referring to your emergency response-at the federal and the state level, whether or not they are doing
their job, whether or not they have been subject to political
pressure, or they are making judgments based on things
inappropriate for safety-orientated agencies, or are not just doing
their job at all.

We will look into, as a Committee and working

with Jack, all aspects that we discussed today.
Also, I think that we have to look very seriously at the
implications of some of the testimony from the safety agencies,
whether or not laws have been broken, and whether or not undue
pressure has been brought to bear, and look at what the appropriate
agencies, whether it is the Attorney General, whether it is
something like the Fair Political Practices Commission, or a Grand
Jury, or some members of Congress ought to be investigating it.
have to figure out how we sort out what I heard today.

We

That really

frightens me.
The comforting side is how you are able to respond to
minimize danger.

Our goal, again, is keeping you guys out of

action, as much as possible, which I know is yours as well.

I

appreciate your being here today coming down from Ventura and San
Barbara to help us on this.

Jack, do you want to

ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:

I want to thank you again, Mr.

Chairman, for putting this together on a very short notice.
how busy your schedule is.

I know

Your staff has been very cooperative.

Also, I want to thank all the witnesses.
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Everybody that's been

here has to be part of the solution to this.

It is certainly not

to be the problem.
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

Thank you.

I appreciate Mr. Hope from

Senator Hart's staff, and John Stevens from my staff, and Kate
Riley, and others who put this together.
cooperation of the witnesses.

Thank you.

ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL:
CHAIRMAN KATZ:

I appreciate the

And the Sergeants.

... and the Sergeants, of course.

***
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STATEMENT

THE TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL BY RAIL:
DO WE NEED MORE PROTECTION?

TWO DERAILMENTS IN TWO WEEKS ... ONE STERILIZED A RIVER
THE OTHER SHUT DOWN 101 FOR A WEEK.
ENDANGERED LIVES.

BOTH

THE VOLUME OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL

SHIPPED BY RAIL IS INCREASING -- AS IS THE RISK TO
CALIFORNIANS.

IT'S CLEAR THAT TOXIC TIME BOMBS ARE ON THE TRAINS
ROLLING ALONG NEXT TO OUR HOMES ...

SCHOOLS AND WORK

PLACES.

OUR CONFIDENCE HAS BEEN SHAKEN BY THESE ACCIDENTS.

BUT EVEN MORE DISTURBING ARE REPORTS THAT OVER 90
PERCENT OF SOUTHERN PACIFIC'S LOCOMOTIVES FAILED SAFETY
INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED BY TEAMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL
INSPECTORS AT SP'S ROSEVILLE AND TUSCON MAINTENANCE
FACILITIES EARLIER THIS YEAR.
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2-2-2

IN ADDITION ... ALLEGATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE THAT IN JUNE
... JUST WEEKS BEFORE THE DUNSMUIR AND SEACLIFF
DERAILMENTS ... A TEAM INSPECTION OF SP'S LOCOMOTIVES IN
THEIR TAYLOR YARD MAINTENANCE FACILITIES IN LOS ANGELES
WAS CALLED OFF BY FRA OFFICIALS AND ANY MAJOR ASSESSMENT
OF THE SAFETY OF SP'S TRAINS AND OPERATIONS SUSPENDED
FOR SIX WEEKS PURPORTEDLY TO GIVE THE RAILROAD A CHANCE
TO GET BACK ON THEIR FEET.

WITHIN· THAT PERIOD ••. THE

DUNSMUIR AND VENTURA DERAILMENTS OCCURRED.

WAS THE EQUIPMENT INSPECTION CALLED OFF IN LOS ANGELES?
IF SO ... WHY? ... AND WHO ORDERED IT? AND WHAT IMPACT D
THESE ACTIONS HAVE ON THE DERAILMENTS THAT HAVE
GENERALLY BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO EQUIPMENT FAILURES?

IN ADDITION TO ANSWERING THESE QUESTIONS, WE NEED TO
MAKE SURE THAT THE STATE IS DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO
PROTECT US.
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WHAT WE WILL INVESTIGATE TODAY IS THE FOLLOWING:

*

WHAT IS THE STATE DOING NOW TO REGULATE RAIL

TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL AND WHAT
SHOULD WE BE DOING?

*

WHAT MUST WE DO ADDITIONALLY TO ENSURE THAT

HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES ARE NOT RELEASED INTO OUR
AIR AND WATER?

*

WHAT INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE TO THOSE WHO ARE FIRST

AT THE SCENE OF A DERAILMENT?

*

WHAT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NEEDS TO BE AVAILABLE

SO THAT GOOD DECISIONS CAN BE MADE IN DEALING WITH
HAZARDOUS SPILLS?

IT'S MY INTENTION TO INTRODUCE A BILL NEXT WEEK THAT
WILL ADDRESS THESE ISSUES.

WE HOPE THIS HEARING WILL

GIVE US SOME ANSWERS AND INFORMATION AS WE CRAFT
LEGISLATION TO CORRECT THE PROBLEMS AND PROTECT THE
PEOPLE.
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ASSEMBLY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE
August 15, 1991
Los Angeles, California
STAFF REPORT
THE TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL BY RAIL:
DO WE NEED MORE PROTECTION?
Introduction
Two derailments of trains operated by the Southern Pacific
Railroad which carried hazardous material within a two week period
-- one causing an environmental catastrophe, one a traffic
nightmare and both posing serious human health hazards -- have
created concern about the safety of transporting hazardous
material by rail.

This report provides information about the

accidents, and discusses policy issues raised by those events.

Background:

Transportation of Hazardous Material by Rail

Between 1985 and 1989, the volume of hazardous materials
chemicals, poisons, pesticides, and other dangerous substances -transported by rail in the United States increased by 65% -- to
1.52 million carloads annually.

Federal Railroad Administration

(FRA) statistics record 254 accidents involving the release of
hazardous materials during that period.

Research and Special

Projects Administration (RSPA) figures show a steady increase in
rail incidents involving hazardous materials during the same
period -- up to 1,195 in 1989.
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The Derailments
On Sunday, July 14, a Southern Pacific train over 6,000 feet
long and weighing 4,295 tons derailed at the Cantara Loop, a 2.2%
grade around a 14 degree curve, in the vicinity of eight other
derailments between 1981 and 1989.

A tank car containing metam

sodium fell approximately 25 feet into the Sacramento River,
releasing about 15,000 gallons of its 20,000 gallon load into the
river.

The spill resulted in the effective sterilization of

approximately 45 miles of the river from the derailment site to
Shasta Lake.

Additionally, half a dozen people were hospitalized,

and approximately 300 received medical treatment.

Other long-term

effects on pregnant women for exposure to metam sodium, for
example, are not yet known.
Two weeks later, on July 28, fourteen container cars of a
Southern Pacific train derailed adjacent to State Route
101 near the Santa Barbara/Ventura County line.

Apparently an

equipment failure caused an axle to snap off a car.

Approximately

16 55-gallon drums of diluted hydrazine ruptured in the accident.
SR 101 was closed for five days as a team of experts attempted to
neutralize and remove the toxic substance, prevent the mixing of
other hazardous materials from the train, and evaluate possible
damage to a freeway overpass.

Investigation of the Derailments
Investigations of the derailments are being conducted by the
FRA, the Public Utilities Commission (PUC), and, for the Dunsmuir
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spill, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).

It will

be several weeks or more before these investigations are complete.
While the results of the state and federal investigations are
yet unknown, SP has completed a preliminary investigation of the
Dunsmuir derailment, and concludes as of now that it was due to a
combination of the following factors:
1)

Momentary wheel slip on one or more of the locomotives;

2)

The combination of two empty centerbeam lumber cars

coupled to the car carrying the metam sodium caused excessive
sideway movement at the head end of the train;
3)

Possible faulty electrical panel in the third locomotive;

4)

Curve grease distribution on the rails used along with

sand to provide traction on tight curves;
5)

The governor unit in the second locomotive out of

balance which could have contributed to the wheel slippage.
What role should the state play a role in establishing
stronger rules for local safety hazards such as the Cantara Loop?
Should there be state oversight of changes by the carrier in
operating rules in such situations?
Should railroads' rules be codified by the state in order to
ensure that they are not weakened?
A 1976 SP derailment at the site of the Dunsmuir spill killed
thousands of fish.

Press reports indicate that SP had established

a weight limit of 4,250 tons before requiring a helper engine in
1976.

The train that derailed last month weighed 4,295 tons --

under the current helper limit of 4,500 tons, but over the 1976
limit of 4,250 tons.
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Would a helper engine and/or a differently arranged train
have prevented the Dunsmuir derailment?
Two types of electronic track-side detection devices are in
use:

the "dragging equipment" detector and the "talking hot box"

detector.

These devices read information about a train as it

passes, and communicate that information to the train crew.

An

unanswered question about the Seacliff derailment is whether the
electronic hot box sensor located along the track accurately
reported the status of the wheel assembly equipment prior to the
derailment.
Have electronic sensors along tracks adequately replaced tail
end staff and equipment, as was promised by the railroads in the

early 1980's?

Regulation of Rail Safety -- Is It Sufficient?
The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-458)
provides for federal enforcement of rail safety practices.

FRA's

Region 7 includes the states of Utah, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico,
and California.

Twenty-three non-managerial FRA inspectors work

in the region.
The federal government has generally preempted state
authority to regulate rail safety except when there is no federal
rule covering the subject, and when necessary to deal with an
"essentially local safety hazard".

The proposed reauthorization

of the federal act does not tamper with the existing state
I

authority to regulate local safety hazards.
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The PUC is the state agency responsible for regulating rail
safety.

There are eight federally certified PUC inspectors who

may issue citations for the FRA:

three track inspectors, two

motive power and engine inspectors, and three operating procedure
inspectors.
Do state and federal authorities have sufficient staff to

inspect and enforce rail safety for over 7,000 miles of railroad
track and hundreds of thousands of locomotives and cars that
operate in California?
In 1979, the PUC proposed a package of regulations relating
to the transportation of hazardous material by rail.

Railroads

strongly opposed the package, and the PUC spent the next twelve
years revising the package. In part, the revised rules narrow the
definition of hazardous material covered, remove the incorporation
of federal rules into state rules, and otherwise limit the scope
of the regulations.

On August 7, the PUC adopted the new

regulations.

State Role in the Enforcement of Rail Hazardous Material
Transportation
The 1990 Hazardous Material Transportation Uniform Safety Act
(P.L. 101-615) allows states to participate in enforcement of
federal regulations on hazardous material transportation.
Currently, certified state inspectors can enforce motive power and
equipment, track, and other federal regulations.

The state

participation program for hazardous materials will begin this fall
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in California.

staff to participate in this

The PUC must certi

program.
Are there

hazardous

f to

ficient state

material regulations?

Information:

Do we get enough on toxic shipments?

Trains carry information regarding toxic substances on board
in the form of a "consist" -- a listing of each car and its
contents.

The consist includes information on the weight,

destination, and any restrictions for each car.

For hazardous

materials, as defined by the federal Department of Transportation,
the consist is "enriched" to include placarding requirements, the
UN

number, and brief information on what to do in the case of a

spill.

The consist from the Dunsmuir train is Attachment A.

The consist is held at the head end of the train by the
conductor and, usually, the engineer.

As the composition of a

train changes, the consist is changed.
When a train derails, the cons
information for emergency responders.
to decipher the consist's

provides the first
The responders must be able

in order to

the

appropriate response.
Are consists sufficiently

to

emergency

responders?
It took several hours before emergency responders
came to understand the severity of the situation.
noted that metam sodium •was not required to be
manufacturer of the product

to be
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led to

It

Dunsmuir
be
, and the

information.

Only additional research produced the necessary

information on the toxic effects of metam sodium and its
by-product, methyl isociothionate.
Should more information on substances which might be
hazardous be readily available to first responders?
Consists and other information on toxics carried by trains,
such as material safety data sheets, tend to emphasize effects of
exposure on persons in the occupational environment.

The

environmental effects of pesticides such as metam sodium are not
as well known.
Should information about the environmental effects of
transported chemicals when they interact with water, air, or fire
be available to first responders?

The lead agency at the Dunsmuir spill was the Department of
Fish and Game.

Emergency response was coordinated by the state

Office of Emergency Services.

At the Seacliff spill, emergency

responses were coordinated by a three-way group consisting of the
California Highway Patrol, the Ventura County Office of Emergency
Services, and the Ventura County Environmental Health Department.
Should there be a consistent lead agency to respond to
hazardous material train incidents?
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COMMENTS BY ROBERT STARZEl, VICE CHAIRMAN,
SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION CO. FOR HEARING
HElD BY ASSEMBLYMAN RICHARD KATZ, lOS ANGELES,
AUG. 15, 1991
To achieve legislation which effectively improves safe handling of
hazardous chemicals first requires an understanding of the interrelated events
which collectively produce transportation.

The safety of the system as a

whole cannot be measured by single events, no matter how tragic they may be.
The second fundamental point to consider is that the railroads are a
national system.

At this moment we are moving cars from more than 100

different railroads and car owners, which have been maintained, inspected, and
repaired on more than 50 different railroads around the country.
from a dozen railroads may
powering run-through

trains~

Locomotives

any time be operating on Southern Pacific,
or working off mileage credits earned by our

locomotives working on their lines.
Pacific is dependent, not just on

The safety of operations on Southern
employees of Southern Pacific alone, but

on uniform practices and procedures followed by inspectors and repairmen on
other railroads, in other states, which feed us traffic as part of the
national system.
The basic components of the transportation system are locomotives, cars,
track, signals, communication and information systems, and people.

Management

controls seek to bring these components together to work smoothly to produce
an efficient, safe, reliable, consistent, transportation product.
Railroads require heavy capital investment, but they simultaneously
remain labor intensive.

Of our total of around 23,000 rail employees, the

major ty have first-line positions which significantly affect rail operations.
Our systems of control must be well thought out in advance and they are.
Railroads operate three to four times more safely than trucks because
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Dunsmuir we knew nothing of metam sodium, how it separated into two compounds,
how one could kill fish and other life in the water and how the other was
irritating but not deadly.

The information process is subject to federal

regulation and demands upon the Department of Transportation.

Railroads are

without power to set requirements for information or to police it.

We cannot

be experts in the characteristics of the myriad commodities that modern
industry produces.
Computer printouts carried by train crews do provide information needed
to respond where hazardous materials, designated as such, are involved in an
accident.

That was the case at Seacliff, where our engineer could walk a

short distance to a fire station with up-to-date and useful data on hydrazine,
a very difficult chemical to handle.
The difference between those spills is relevant to you.

Information

provided in advance means no one died, no one was injured, even though the
cleanup at Seacliff meant handling a deadly substance.
Dunsmuir meant a l

Lack of information at

of flailing around before correct action could be taken.

It might have made no difference as to the effect on the people, but advance
information might have meant the compounds could have been broken down and
dispersed close to the spill.
Congress has designated the Department of Transportation as the lead
agency to analyze accident statistics, to review rail safety procedures, and
to institute rulemaking to be followed nationally.

This obviously makes

sense, because cost-effective measures which should be instituted to improve
safety ought to be installed nation-wide, not on some patchwork pattern which
differs from state to state.

Recognizing that opinions may differ as to the

order of priorities to be followed, and that the railroad industry is
3
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essentially national in character, Congress has designated one
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is late

risk

federal laws

by the

pre-

exemption doctrine, but if they become too burdensome the traffic will have to
be priced at such a tariff level that the dangerous chemicals will be forced
on to the highways.

The safety record of

better than that of trucking.

rail industry is four times

The rights-of-way are not

with passenger vehicles and can be controlled.
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certainly is no question

that rail is the preferred mode of transportation for hazardous 1
generally.

It would be ironic if through well-meaning efforts to

for a safe environment you caused a worse problem.
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They will promptly present to the Congress and the

Department of Transportation recommendations to include chemicals not
4
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this

ttee to the

include the CEO's of SP, UP and Conra l together wi
companies.

ion and

would
cal

presently labeled as hazardous under categories requiring the use of strong
tank cars.

We can incorporate the interests of the State of California

that

E

of different or inconsistent laws introduces

confusion and slows response.
let's look at response.

Just so there is no misunderstanding.

the railroads who perform the work to respond to accidents.
have emergency response teams.

Ours is the best.

It is

All railroads

They train emergency

workers in fire stations in hundreds of towns and cities along our line, more
than 11,000 in 1990.
scene.

SP people react immediately and arrive quickly on the

They also work with long-experienced contractors whose special skills

and experience help deal with hazardous materials remediation.
These teams did their work well

both Dunsmuir and Seacliff.

Public

authorities took charge of public safety, and communication and railroad crews
handled most of the physical work.
Our system functions.

It ain't broke and should not be "fixed."

We and

public agencies will work together to improve constantly, but we need no new
legislation.
Do reporting requirements need change? Reports are useful to regulatory
agencies only if they enhance analysis to predict and then prevent possible
accidents.

Just creating new reporting demands without a reasonable basis for

expectation that they will lead to better operations would not be an efficient
nor necessary change.

Potentially unnecessary and burdensome requirements

serve only to raise costs, create distractions and inefficiencies, and
ultimately thereafter affect the jobs of our 10,000 California employees.

It

is, furthermore, the task of the federal DOT to collect and analyze statistics
and reports, and to decide when to move forward.
5
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Much of the publicity and many of the statements in the aftermath of
these accidents have created an imbalance in public perception which needs to
be righted.

Southern Pacific and its employees work

run operations safely.
be less than safe.

and

ively to

Yet simple-minded critics paint SP and its people to

We carry what shippers present to us.

us to accept traffic even if we prefer not to take it.

Regul

ions require

We make no operating

profit to create an insurance fund which can be used to finance amelioration
of all problems resulting from derailments.

We strive to improve safety and

cut risk, and on our mainlines, have a better record than the industry does.
That's a reversal from the years ago when we were worse.

Safety improvement

is a testament to the efforts of our people.
Looking forward, with all that, accidents will happen, as they do for
all of us.

When they do, we cannot be held to pay for all consequences.

Where we could not foresee the causes of consequences, we cannot be expected
to pay all costs arising from the accident.
We always try to meet humanitarian needs without regard to liability.
We will continue to do that.
Costs cannot be passed through to shippers in all cases.

Where they

are, it means higher costs to shippers and consumers and ultimately threatens
thousands of jobs in agriculture and manufacturing.

Or it could mean that

more shipments of hazardous materials end up on the highways.
Our rail operations do not currently produce one dollar for capital
expenditures.

Yet in the last two and a half years we have put more than $700

million cash into capital expenditures.

That is no the performance

someone

who needs further regulation.
In short, we are already more than meeting our responsibilities.
6
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It is

doubtful that additional legislation can do better than the marketplace on
this score.

Shippers demand reliability and that means fewer derailments.

That already motivates the railroads sufficiently.
# # #
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TESTIMONY OF THE UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION

Before the

ASSEMBLY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE

TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS BY RAIL
DO WE NEED MORE PROTECTION?

Hearing Held in Los Angeles, California
Thursday, August 15, 1991

* * *
Submitted
by
James (J.P.) Jones
State Legislative Director
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Good Morning Mr. Chairman and Members:
My name is James (J.P.) Jones.
am the California State
Legislative Director for the United Transportation Union. With me
today is Mr. John Easley, International Vice President of the United
Transportation Union.
The United Transportation Union represents. among others, operating
employees on all major Class 1 railroads in California <Southern
Pacific; Union Pacific; & Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe), as well as
many shortline railroads within the state.
Our organization
represents the conductors, assistant conductors, brakemen. yard
operating personnel <switchmen), firemen, and a large number of
locomotive engineers that are the operating employees of these
railroads.
Our organization appreciates the invitation to comment and
participate in your hearing today, Our organization has an ongoing
and sincere interest in safe rail operations within the State of
California, but especiallY those rail operations where hazardous
mate r i a 1s a re be i ng hand 1ed and t ran s por ted . 0ur organ i zat i on i s
convinced that the information developed at this hearing today will
serve to enhance the preservation of safety on all rai I roads in
California.
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Our

organization

would

take

this

opportunity

to

commend

you

personally, Mr. Chairman, tt1e members of tl1is committee, as well as
your able staff, for the leadership role which has been displayed by
the holding of this hearing today,
11

DO we need more protections in the transportation of hazardous

materials by Rail?"
emphatic 11;S.

The answer to this question is a clear and

Some of the actions which the California Legislature

can take to both support the needed protections, as well as to
enhance existing protections. are as follows:
l.)

Support the enforcement and enl1ancement of General Order
No. 16L wt1icll was recently adopted (08/07/91), by trle
California Put)l ic Utili ties Commission (copy attactled).

An

enhancement our organization would suggest is a requirement
for

additional

copies

of

the

EMERGENCY

R PONSE

INFORMATION, already required by f ede ra l regu 1at ions to be
given to the train crew, for use by representatives of
emergency response agencies at the accident/incident scene.
Additional

copies

of

tf1is

information,

kept

in

U1e

possession of the train crew for the use of emergency
response personnel, vwuld certainly reduce tt1e response
time for corrective action to commence.
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2.)

Support House Resolution No. 2607, currently pending before
the United S tes Cong s. This legis 1at ion is known as
the Rail Safety Reauthorization Act of 1991. A copy of
H.R. 2607, as well as a section-by-section analysis of the
proposal is attached for your information and review.

3.)

Support and encourage a requirement for addi tiona!
safeguards and protections to be placed on all railroad
tank cars in the existing car fleet, as well as those which
may be bu i l t in the future, This wou 1d inc 1ude mandatory
head shields, thermal protection, and shelf couplers. Head
shields are extra thick plating on each end of the car to
protect against punctures of the tank car from objects
Thermal protection reduces the
during a derailment.
possibility of tank car ruptures under fiery accident
con di t i on s . She 1f coup 1e r s a r e de vi ces whi ch reduce t t1 e
potential for the car couplers to punch holes in other cars
during an accident, by keeping the cars attached <coupled)
to each other during derailments.
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4.)

Support and endorse the full and complete implementation of
the 1990 Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety
Act. This federal legislation was enacted by Congress to
attempt to achieve greater uniformitY in the regulations
governing the transportation of Hazardous Materials. Our
organization believes that one of the priority items that
should be immediately implemented is to all ow for full
state participation in the FRA's Hazardous Material
inspection program. This wi 11 allow for the State of
California, through the California Public Utilities
Commission, to enforce current federal regulations dealing
with Hazardous Materials.

5.)

Support and encourage the consolidation of the U.S.
Department of Transportations' Hazardous Materials list
with the Hazardous Materials list of the U.S. Coast Guard.
This consolidation will address the question of safe rail
transportation, near or adjacent to bodies of water, of
commodities such as the material involved in the Dunsmuir
disaster (metam sodium), which is classified as a Hazardous
Material by the U.S. Coast Guard, but not by the U.S.
Department of Transportation.
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Your announcement letter for today's hearing indicated that the
Commi
would examine the circumstances surrounding and the issues
raised by the two <2> recent train derailments and toxic spills near
Dunsmuir and near Santa Barbara. Our organization strongly believes
that both of these unfortunate and costlY derailments could have
been avoided by implementation of ncommon sensen railroad
operational practices. We shall comment on each of the derailments,
pointing out some of the peculiarities in each of these incidents,
which we feel could have avoided both of these unfortunate
incidents.
DUNSMUIR: This derailment could have been avoided had there been
sufficient helper locomotives added to this train. The helper
locomotives would have assisted in the trip up and through this
mountainous territory. The helpers would have allowed for a
reduction of the strain on the cars toward the front of the train,
by the helper locomotives pushing from the rear. With the entire
motive power of the train coming from the lead locomotives, as was
the case in the Dunsmuir situation, the greatest strain is on the
cars t1osest to the lead locomotives; thereby, contributing to the
"Stringlining", which took place.
The only other alternative to avoid the Dunsmuir derailment was to
rearrange the loads and empties in the train to allow for more
equalized distribution of the total weight. This would have
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required a relocation of the loads, which were primarilY towards the
rear of the train, to be redistributed in the middle or front end of
the train.
BARBARA <SEACLIFF>: This particular derailment could have
been avoided. It could have been avoided if either: (1) heatsensitive detectors, located trackside, would have been placed
closer than 35 miles away from the derailment; and/or (2) if an
occupied caboose had been the rear car of this train.
SANTA

(1)

HEAT-SENSITIVE DETECTORS <Hot-Box Detectors):
Our
organization believes that these types of wayside
detectors, as we 11 as dragging equipment detectors, do
serve a useful safety function in rail operations.
However, these detectors, once installed, must be
maintained to function properly.
Our organization
believes there is a grossly insufficient amount of these
wayside detectors currently in place. Clearly, there is
an insufficient number of wayside detectors for operation
of hazardous materials commodities by RAIL, If heatsensitive detectors would have been installed less than 35
miles apart in this area, this tragedy would have been
avoided.
More frequently-spaced dragging equipment
detectors could have detected the derailed train once it
was on the ground.
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A trained ra i I road operating emp Ioyee,
occupying a caboose on the rear of the Seacliff train,
would have also prevented this derailment. This trained
railroad employee in the caboose would have been observing
forward, and to the side of train, looking intentlY for
such things as;

(2 > OCCUPIED CABOOSE:

<I> fires adjacent to the track right-of-way as the
caboose passed;
(2) to see if things such as smoke, fire, sparks, or
dust were coming from any of the cars in the train;
and
(3) any marks or cuts (gouges> in the ties and ballast of
the road bed, or in the pavement of an at-grade street
crossing, which would indicate danger.
Also, a trained operating railroad employee would be very attentive
to any unusual smells they may detect, sucl1 as those associated with
any of the circumstances listed above.
All of the above-listed occurrences are an indication to the trained
railroad operating employee that danger exists and corrective action
needs to be taken.
In the unlikely event that the presence of an occupied caboose could
not have prevented tl1is derailment itself, clearly, tile amount of
damage and destruction which was caused, could have been
significantly reduced by an early detection of the warning signs and
simPlY taking quick decisive action to stop tile train.
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In closing, our organization would again like to restate our
gratitude to the committee for the opportunitY to express our views
on the general subject of HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION BY
RAIL, as well as the specific circumstances and issues surrounding
the derailments at Dunsmuir and Santa Barbara <Seacliff).
This concludes the formal written presentation of our organization
of the hearing today, and both Mr. Easley and myself are available
for any questions you, the committee members, or your staff may
have.
Thank you.
Enclosures 2 - General Order No. 161 <Adopted 8/7/91)
House Resolution No. 2607 <With Analysis}
JPJ:cw
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Decision 91-08-019

Mailed

AUG 91991,

August 7, 1991

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Order Instituting Rulemaking on the
Commission's own Motion to Adopt a
General Order Prescribing Rules and
Regulations for the Transportation
of Hazardous Materials by Rail.

)
)
)
)
)

R.88-07-039
(Filed July 22, 1988)

0 P I N I 0 N
Summary of Decision
Due to the increased transportation of hazardous
materials by rail throughout the state and incidents involving
hazardous materials which pose a threat to public safety and the
environment, the Commission today adopts rules and regulations
governing the transportation of hazardous materials by rail. The
recent tragic spill of toxic liquid from a derailed tank car near
Dunsmuir highlights the need to ensure that this state and its
communities can rely on railroads having solid effective emergency
preparedness plans. The rules we adopt today have been under
development for some time. They address a number of concerns
relating to the transportation of hazardous materials, such as
local emergency response in the event of an incident and the
storage of hazardous materials. We are confident that they fill a
void in the existing state-federal regulatory scheme governing the
regulation of hazardous materials transportation by rail.
While we recognize that federal rules extensively
regulate the transportation of hazardous materials, coordination
between the state, local agencies, and the railroads, particularly
in the area of emergency response, is necessary to enhance safety
in the transportation of hazardous materials. These rules are
intended to complement the federal regulatory framework by, among
other things, encouraging communication between local emergency
response agencies and railroads transporting hazardous materials.

-

1 -
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Many other states have adopted hazardous materials regulations.
Because these rules address safety concerns not addressed by the
federal rules, we conclude that these rules are not preempted by
federal law.
Background
On July 22, 1988, the Commission issued an Order
Instituting Rulemaking (R.) 88-07-039 to adopt a general order (GO)
prescribing rules and regulations for the transportation of
hazardous material by rail.
A copy of the proposed GO was served on all railroad ·
corporations subject to the Commission's jurisdiction
(respondents), and to all police, sheriff, and fire departments
through whose jurisdictions common carrier rail operations occur.
The Commission invited respondents and other parties to comment on
the proposed GO.
Law enforcement agencies and fire departments supported
the GO. However, certain parties opposed the proposed GO on
grounds that the rules were (1} preempted by federal law and
(2) unduly burdensome.
After reviewing the objections to the proposed GO, the
Transportation Division of the Commission filed a motion on
November 10, 1988 requesting suspension of the schedule for filing
reply comments. The Transportation Division also requested
hearings on the proposed GO to resolve factual contentions raised
by parties. On November 16, 1988, the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) extended the deadline for filing reply comments on the
proposed GO indefinitely.
On February 15, 1989, the Commission created the Safety
Division and transferred responsibility for monitoring railroad
safety from the Transportation Division to the Railroad Safety
Branch (Safety Branch) of the Safety Division. Safety Branch
modified the proposed GO. The modified GO prescribed rules and
regulations for the transportation of hazardous material by ~ail
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which,
to
Branch, were not preempted by federal
law and were not
to
On September 28 1989 Safety Branch filed a motion
requesting hearings on the
fied GO. Safety Branch's motion
also requested that a prehearing
be held to schedule
hearings and
exchange
prepared testimony. A copy of the
modified GO was attached to the
The ALJ allowed parties
until November 30, 1989, to
comments on the modified GO as
well as Safety Branch's request to hold hearings.
(ALJ ruling
dated October 4, 1989 )
Various parties
certain fire and police
departments,
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company
(Santa Fe), Southern Pacific Transportation Company (Southern
Pacific), Union
f
Rai
(Union Pacific), and the
California Manufacturers Association (CMA) filed comments on Safety
Branch's motion. The fire
police departments which filed
comments supported the modi
GO. CMA and the railroad companies
pointed out various problems
ambiguities in the modified GO.
To remove ambigu
, parties provided extensive comments on the
proposed rules
requested explanations.
As to Safety Branch's request for hearings, CMA and the
railroads urged that the
hearing be addressed only
after Safety Branch responded to the comments regarding ambiguities
and clarified its proposed rules.
On February 1, 1990, Safety Branch filed a motion to hold
a prehearing conference.
Branch claimed that a prehearing
conference would provide the best means to formulate legal and
factual issues in the case.
Santa Fe and Southern Pacific filed responses to Safety
Branch's February 1, 1990
These railroads reiterated their
claim that Safety Branch's request for a prehearing conference
would not
useful until
questions raised in respondents'
November 30, 1989 filings were answered.

- 3 -
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The ALJ denied Safety Branch's request for a prehearing
conference and directed Safety Branch to file its response to the
issues raised by CMA, Santa Fe, Southern Pacific, and Union
Pacific.
(ALJ ruling dated March 21, 1990.)
On June 22, 1990, Safety Branch filed its response to
questions raised by CMA, Santa Fe, Southern Pacific, and Union
Pacific. Safety Branch explained the modified GO and answered the
question raised by the parties. Safety Branch made additional
revisions to the GO.
Subsequent to June 22, 1990, Safety Branch met informally
with Santa Fe, Southern Pacific, and Union Pacific to resolve any
disagreements about the GO revisions. Based on these discussions,
Safety Branch further revised the GO and filed a motion on March
29, 1991 to adopt the GO. The GO in its final form is designated
as GO 161 and is attached to this order as Appendix A.
In its motion Safety Branch contends that GO 161 is not
preempted by federal law and is not burdensome. Safety Branch
asserts the need for GO 161 as a supplement to other federal and
state requirements to enhance public safety and to protect the
environment.
Cities of Azusa, Downey, El Segundo, and Santa Clarita
filed comments in support of Safety Branch's motion to adopt
GO 161.
Southern Pacific and Union Pacific also filed comments on
Safety Branch's motion to adopt GO 161. Although Southern Pacific
and Union Pacific do not oppose the adoption of GO 161, they
believe that there is a substantial likelihood that GO 161 is
preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) and the
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA).
Safety Branch filed a response to comments filed by
Southern Pacific and Union Pacific.
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of positions of parties.
GO 161, if adopted,
Programs
of Transportation for a
Southern Pacific also
an additional rule (Rule 10)

should be
the
Administration (RSPA) of the
determination of
recommends that GO 161
which should read as fol
"Rule 10
To the extent
General Order con
Federal statutes or
requirements shall

the
ions of this
or are inconsistent with
ations, the Federal
il."
, FRSA provides that states may
law,
, regulation, order or
if the Secretary of
the same subject. Union

not "adopt or
standard
Transportation
Pacific
Ohio, (6th
court
adopted the provisions
of HMTA as state
The court ruled that because the HMTA, and
the implementing
adopted
DOT, were laws "relating to
railroad safety,"
FRSA precluded Ohio from adopting the HMTA as
state law. On
22, 1991, the United states Supreme Court
refused to review the
's ruling.
opines
Union
although Congress amended HMTA
(after the csx case) by adopting the Hazardous Materials
Transportation
Safety
1990 (HMTUSA), which
authorizes the states
the enforcement of HMTA
violations, there
still a
ibility that provisions of GO 161
may be preempted by FRSA and HMTUSA.
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Position of Safety Branch
According to Safety Branch, although csx Transportation
is not binding on this Commission, it has withdrawn its
recommendation to adopt any provisions of HMTA in GO 161. Safety
Branch believes that no other provisions of GO 161 are preempted by
federal law under the provisions of FRSA or HMTA.
Safety Branch also disagrees with Southern Pacific's
recommendations to submit GO 161 to RSPA for a determination of
preemption and to add Rule 10 to GO 161. Safety Branch maintains
that the Commission has the initial authority to determine if its
rules are preempted by federal law. Safety Branch asserts that it
has responded to Southern Pacific's and other railroads' preemption
arguments and that the Commission has adequate information to
determine if GO 161 is preempted by federal law. According to
Safety Branch, a decision to adopt GO 161 will, implicitly if not
explicitly, constitute a determination that the Commission is not
preempted by federal law. Safety Branch opines that the
Commission, having made a determination about federal preemption,
should not apply to RSPA for a ruling.
Discussion
The key provisions of GO 161 will require each railroad
which transports hazardous materials to:
1. Immediately notify by telephone the
appropriate emergency response agency (ERA)
about a release or threatened release of a
hazardous material.
2.

Provide ERAs along each rail line the
railroad's 24-hour emergency telephone
number.

3.

Have in place an emergency preparedness
plan to respond to hazardous material
spills.

4.

Ensure that train crew members have the
ability to communicate via radio
transceivers with each other and with the
train dispatcher.

-
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such specific
ions of GO 161 supplement, rather
than dupl
or
, federal safety requirements; and
they are needed to address
health and safety concerns arising
out of transportation of hazardous material by rail. Adoption of
GO 161 will enable an ERA to mitigate the harmful effects of
accidental release of hazardous material transported through the
agency's jurisdiction. We will adopt GO 161.
Turning to
Pacific's and Union Pacific's federal
preemption concerns, these railroads assert only that there is a
likelihood that GO 161 is preempted by federal law. The railroads
have not cited any specific provision of GO 161 which would be
preempted by federal law nor have they cited any federal statutes
which prevent a state agency from adopting rules which do not
duplicate or conflict with federal law. Besides, we have already
noted that neither FRSA nor HMTA/HMTUSA include the specific
provisions of GO 161. In
final form, proposed GO 161 does not
conflict with federal statutes. We believe that no purpose would
be served by submitting GO 161
RSPA for determination of
preemption.
Finally, we see no need to add Southern Pacific's
proposed Rule 10 to the GO. If a party perceives a conflict
between provisions of the GO and federal statutes, the party can
raise the issue in an appropriate forum.
Findings of Fact
... 1. On July 22, 1988,
Commission issued R. 88-07-039 to
adopt a GO prescribing rules and regulations for transportation of
hazardous material by rail.
2. All railroad corporations subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction were made respondents to this rulemaking.
3. A copy of the proposed GO was served on respondents and
on all police departments, sheriffs, and fire departments through
whose jurisdictions common carrier rail operations are conducted.
FRSA nor
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4. Respondents and other parties were invited to comment on
the proposed GO.
5. Law enforcement agencies and fire departments supported
the proposed GO.
6. Certain parties opposed the proposed GO on grounds that
the rules were (1) preempted by federal law and (2) unduly
burdensome.
7. Safety Branch met informally with railroad companies to
resolve any disagreements regarding the proposed revisions to the
GO.
8. Based on its discussion with the railroad companies
Safety Branch revised the proposed GO.
9. The revised GO, which in its final form is designated as
GO 161, is included in Appendix A.
10. On March 29, 1991, Safety Branch filed a motion to adopt
GO 161.
11. Safety Branch contends that GO 161 is not preempted by
federal law because it has removed all provisions from the GO which
would duplicate federal requirements for railroad safety.
12. Southern Pacific and Union Pacific believe that there is
a possibility that GO 161 is preempted by FRSA and HMTA/HMTUSA.
13. Provisions of GO 161 require railroads which transport
hazardous material to notify the appropriate ERA regarding release
or potential release of hazardous material.
14. Provisions of GO 161 require railroads which transport
hazardous material to have an emergency preparedness plan and to
have other safety devices such as radio communication available to
its crews.
15. Neither FRSA nor HMTA/HMTUSA contain the specific
provisions included in GO 161.
16. No party has requested a hearing in the matter.
Conclusions of Law
1. No hearings are necessary.

- 8 -

150

R.SS-07-039

ALJ/AVG/jft

**

needed to address valid health, safety, and
2. GO 161
environmental concerns arising out of transportation of hazardous
material by rail.
3. GO 161 is not preempted by federal law.
4. GO 161 included in Appendix A should be adopted.
5. Concern for public safety requires that this order be
made effective immediately.
0 R DE R

IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Appendix A is adopted as General Order 161 of the
Commission.
2. The proceeding is closed.
This order is effective today.
Dated August 7, 1991, at San Francisco, California.

PATRICIA M. ECKERT
President
G. MITCHELL WILK
JOHN B. OHANIAN
NORMAN D. SHUMWAY
Commissioners
Commissioner Daniel Wm. Fessler,
being necessarily absent, did
not participate.
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APPENDIX A

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF

~FORNIA

GENERAL ORDER NO. 161

RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS BY RAIL

Adopted

August 7, 1991

Effective

August 7, 1991

IT IS ORDERED that these regulations for the safe
transportation of hazardous materials by railroads shall be
observed in the state on tracks served, leased, owned or operated
by common carrier railroads.
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RULE 1 - PURPOSE
The purpose of this order is to establish safety standards
for the rail transportation of hazardous materials. These rules
and regulations supplement the Hazardous Materials Regulations
prescribed by the United States Department of Transportation,
Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 171-174, 178
and 179 and implement the overall state policy of promoting
railroad safety as set forth in California Public Utilities Code
sections 768 and 7671-7673.

RULE 2 - DEFINITIONS
Unless the context otherwise requires, the following
definitions govern the construction of this Order:
2.1 "Administering agency" means such agency as defined in
Health and Safety Code section 25501(a).
2.2 "Commission" means the California Public Utilities
Commission.
2.3 "Emergency response agency" ("ERA") means the fire
department or district or other public agency with responsibility
for responding to an emergency occurring in the area of an
incident.
2.4 "Hazardous materials" means any material transported by
rail which is designated "hazardous material", "hazardous
substance", or "hazardous waste" under Title 49 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 171.8, as may be revised, amended,
and published in the Federal Register.
2.5 "Identification number" means the identification number
assigned to hazardous materials in Title 49 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, Part 172, Subpart B.
2.6 "Incident" means any condition involving a release or
threatened release of hazardous materials where there is a
reasonable belief that the actual or threatened release poses a
significant present or potential harm to persons, property or the
environment.
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2.7 "Release" means any spilling, leaking, pumping,
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping,
leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment, unless
permitted or authorized by a regulatory agency.
2.8 "STCC" means the first four digits of the Standard
Transportation Commodity Code, as contained in Standard
Transportation commodity Code Tariff STCC 6049 series, as
amended, and all supplements issued thereafter.
2.9 "Threatened release" means a condition creating a
substantial probability of harm, when the probability and
potential extent of harm make it reasonably necessary to take
immediate action to prevent, reduce, or mitigate damages to
persons, property, or the environment.
RULE 3 - EMERGENCY NOTICE OF INCIDENT
3.1 Each railroad shall immediately notify by telephone the
appropriate ERA of any incident, as defined in Rule 2.6 in
addition to any other state or federal reporting requirements.
3.2 To comply with Rule 3.1, each railroad which transports
hazardous materials in California shall provide to each of its
dispatchers procedures for the immediate notification of the
appropriate ERA of any incident. Such procedures shall include
the name and 10-digit (area code and local number), 24-hour
emergency number of each ERA along each rail line.
RULE 4 - NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
4.1
Each railroad shall provide to each ERA along each
rail line the railroad's current 10-digit, 24-hour emergency
telephone number(s). The railroad shall notify each ERA of any
change in the emergency telephone number(s).
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4.2
Within 60 days of a written request by an ERA or an
administering agency, the railroad shall provide to the ERA or
administering agency a list of each type of hazardous material,
by hazard class and by carload or container, transported through
or within the line segment that includes the ERA or administering
agency, for the most recent prior 12-month period available.
4.3
Upon written request by an ERA or an administering
agency, the railroad shall provide to the ERA or administering
agency the following information regarding leases for storage of
hazardous materials within the jurisdiction of the requesting ERA
or administering agency:
a) Name of the commodity, STCC and identification number;
b) Maximum number of cars to be stored at any one time;
and
c)
Location of cars specific to track number and street
address.
RULE 5 -

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLAN

Each railroad which transports hazardous materials in
California shall have an emergency preparedness plan. The plan
shall include, as a minimum, the following:
a) Notification procedures for advising the appropriate ERA
in case of an incident;
b)
Procedures for mitigation of a release or threatened
release to minimize any potential harm or damage to
persons, property or the environment; and
c) Training procedures to instruct railroad personnel on
what actions to take in the event of an incident.
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RULE 6 - RADIO REQUIREMENTS
To ensure that train crew members have the ability to
communicate with each other and with the train dispatcher while
transporting hazardous materials, all trains (including yard and
switch engines) transporting hazardous materials shall be
equipped with at least two (2) radio transceivers in good working
order. The radios shall be able to transmit and receive on the
same frequency.
One radio shall be in the lead locomotive and at
least one radio shall be of the handheld type.
If a radio
becomes inoperable, it shall be repaired or replaced at the
earliest practicable opportunity.
RULE 7 - RULES APPLICABLE TO INDUSTRIAL TRACK
7.1 The Commission adopts as its own standards, and
incorporates by reference, the Track Safety Standards contained
in Part 213 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and
any subsequent revisions thereto, for application to railroad
track outside the general railroad system of transportation.
7.2 Each railroad shall provide its customers with
appropriate standards for static protection for all track over
which the railroad operates which is outside the general railroad
system of transportation and which is used for the transfer of
flammable liquids and flammable gasses.
7.3 When a railroad transporting hazardous materials is
notified or otherwise becomes aware that the standards set forth
in Rules 7.1 and 7.2 are not met, the railroad shall not operate
on an affected track until the standards are met or until
appropriate remedial action is taken.
RULE 8 - INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS BY COMMISSION STAFF
Upon request by a duly authorized representative of this
Commission, each railroad shall provide for inspection, at an
office in California, any documents required by this Order. (See
Public Utilities Code section 314(a).)
-5156
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RULE 9 - EXEMPTIONS

BY WRITTEN REQUEST. If, in a particular case, exemption
from any of these rules and regulations is desired, a written
request may be made to the Commission for such exemption. Such a
request shall be accompanied by a full statement of the
conditions existing and the reasons relied on to justify the
exemption. It is to be understood that any exemption so granted
shall be limited to the particular case covered by the request.

(END OF APPENDIX A)
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(2) in subsection (d), by striking "take sueh ac·
l02DCONGRESS
lST SEssiON

H R 2607
•

2

•

To authome actM!Je!' Wide the NcrallW!road S.Set:~· Act of 1970 f~
fllcaJ yun 1992 ~ 1994, ud for other J>1Ul>081!1$.

eom-
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00
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3

(3) in subsection (g), by striking "sueh ruJes,

4

regulations, orde:-s, and standards as may be neces-

5

sary" and inserting in lieu thereof "ruJes, regula-

6

tions, orde:-s, and standards";

7

11\ THE HOUSE OF R.EPRESE~"'''ATT\'ES
JUNE ll, 1991
14:. Sw1Jior mlrocbaoed the l'ollcJowmc bill; whicb WU nfl!n'ed
em E-.;y lUll!

tion as may bt necessary w••;

(4) in subsection {h)(l)(A)-

8

(A) by striking "sueh init.ia.l rWflli,

9

tions, ordn, ud standards as may be neces-

10

sary'' and Werting in lieu thereof "initial rules,

ll

regulation£, orders, ud st.~:wdards";

\De ~

12

(B) by strik:mg "make sueh revisions in

13

any" and inserting in lieu thereof "revise"; and

14

(C) by striking ••as may be neceswy• ud

15

inserting iii lieu thereof ••, ·based on web addi-

Be it~ by the &mate Gftd House of ~ta-

16

tional safety data as may be pre.seut.ed to the

2. tlves of the United States of~ i• Congrus a.s:se:mbled,

l7

Seeret.ary in such review";

3

18

(5) in subsection (i)(l), by strilcing "such rules,

19

regulations, orders, and standards as may be neces·

S ment and Review Act".

20

wy'' and inserting in lieu thereof "ruJes, regula-

6

21

tions, orders, and standards";

A BILL
To authorize activities unde:- the Federal Railroad Safety
Act of 1970 for fiscal yean 1992 through 1994, and
for othe:- pUrpose&.

1

4

7

SECTION 1. SBORT Tm..E.

This Act may be cited as the "Rail Safety Enforce·

SEC. 2. ISSUANCE OF BEG1JLA.'J10NS.

Section 202 of the Fede:al Railroad Safety Aet of

8 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431) is amended-

9
10

(l) in subsection (a), by striking ··, as neces-

w,·." both places it appears;

22

(6\ in subsection (n)-

23

(A) by striking "sueh ruJes, regulations,

24

orders, and standards as may be necflliSary·"

.

I

•BR

.

rerula·

I
•

liN'I

Dl

4

referred to as the "Hours of Service Act") to undertake

3

2

ano inserting in lieu thereof ';rules, reg'U}auons,

2 remedial action, sbalJ be required by the Secre~· or

ordert., ano stanoards";

3 'Transportation (hereafter in this Act referred tv as the

(B) by striking "including" and inserting

3
~

5

5 action.

mum, the Secretary shall provide";

6

(C) by striking ''s.Jch as" and inserting in

lieu tilereof "including''; and
(D) by striking '·relating t.o instances when

8

(b) REPORT '1"'0 CoNGRESS.-Tbe Secre~· shall,

7 within one yec ah.et the date of enactment of this .Act,

8 submit a report

t.o the

Conrress outlining proeedu.""eS es-

9 tablished t.o ensure that remedial actions descn"bed in sub·

boats shall be used" and inserting in lieu there-

10 section (a) are ueeut.ed.

10

of "for tile use of boats when work is performed

ll

11

on bridges located over bodies of water";

12

(i) in subseetion (o)(1}, by striking "such rules,

13 tion 209(b) of tile Federal .Ra.ilroad Safety .Aet or 1970

regulations, orders, and standards as may be neees·

14 (45 ti.S.C. 438(b}), section 6 of the Act of March 2, 1893

14

sary'' and inse~g in lieu thereof "rules, regula-

15 (4.5 ti.S.C. 6; commonly re!en-ed to as the "Safety Appli-

15

tions, orders, and standards''; and

16 ance .Acts"), seetion 7 of the Act of May 6, 1910 (4.5

9

12
U1
\0

"Secretary") t.o report on the e%eeution of wch remedial

in lieu thereof "on railroad bridges. At a mini-

6

7

~

13

SEC. 4. ENFORCEMENT.

(a) MTh"l)f(J)d A.'\'D MAmmA! Pl::NALTIES.-{1) Sec·

16

(8) in subsection (q), by striking "such rules,

17 tJ.S.C. 43; commonly referred to as the "Accident Reports

17

regulations, orders, and standards as may be neees·

18 Act"), seetion 25(h) of the Act of February 4., lBSi (49

]8

sary'' and inserting in lieu thereof "rules, regula·

19 U.S.C. App. 26; commonly referred t.o as tht "Signa! In·

19

tions, orders, and standards".

20 spection Act"), ancl section 9 of the Act of Februa.o:· li,

20 SEC. 3. REMEDIAL AC'I10NS.

21 1911 (4.5 tJ.S.C. 34.; commonly referred to as the "Looo-

21

22 motive Inspection Act") are each amended by striking

(a) REPORT BY R.Al:LROADS.-Any railroad required,

22 under the authority of the Federal Railroad Safety Act

23 "S250'' and inserting in lieu thereof "Sl,OOO".

23 of 19i0 (45 ti.S.C. 431 et seq.), the Hazardous Materials

24

24 Transpo:rution Act (49 "C.S.C. App. 1801 et seq.), or the

25 "C.S.(:., 64a(a)(l); commonly referred to as the "Hou:s of

(2) Section 5(a)(1) of the .Act of March 4. 1907 (45

25 Act of March 4, J90i (45 l:.S.C. 61 ct seq.; commonly
•RR 2407 Ill

•BJ! lifO? Ill

5

6

'

1 Service Act") is amended by striking "penalty of up to

I

2 $1,000 per violation, as the Seereta.r:r of Transportation
3 deems reasonable," and inserting in lieu thereof "civil pen-

4

gram established under paragraph (1) shall pl'O'IIide

5

for regional directors to be authorized to perform

.

6

initial case review, assess penalties, and settle cues.

!·
',.

7

With respec:t to a violation for which a regional di-

8

rector assesses a penalty in

9

person against whom such penalty is assessed may

10

request that settlement-related a.etions be taken at

11

the headquarters level

I

I

I

7 nent hazard of death or injury to persons, or bas caused

i!

8 death or injury, a penalty of not to exceed $20,000 may

9 be assessed, and".
10

(3) Section 2 of the Act of May 6, 1910 (45 U.S.C.

11 39; commonly referred to as the ".Accident Reports Act")
1-'
Q\

0

Railroad Administration.
(2) ELEMENTS OF PBOGR.Ul.-The pilot pro-

'

6 or a pat.t.em of repeated violations bas r.reated an immi·

to the enforcement responsibilities of the Federal

3

4 alty in an amount oot less than $1,000 oor more than

S $10,000, acept that where a grossly negligent violation

1

.,...

aces&

oi $5,000, the

·-

12 is amended by ltrik:.ing "one hUDdred dollars" and insen.-

12

(3) Qo)(Pl'..ETION .A.ND IW"'BT TO OONGB.&SS.-

13 ing in lieu thereof "$1,000".

13

The pilot program established under paragraph (1)

14

(4) Section 37ll(c)(2) of title 31, United States

I

14

shall be completed within 18 months after the date

IS Code, is amended by striking ••$250" and inserting in lieu

IS

of enactment of this Act, and within 2 years after

16 thereof"$1,000".

16

such date

17

report to the Congress describing the results of such

18

pilot program.

19

(e) CoNSmEB.ATJONS FOB CoMPBOXI&E OF CmL

I

17
18

(b) ENFOBCEJIW.'T DECENT:&.U..IZATJON

Pn..oT PB0-

GR.Ul.-

19

(1) ESTABLlSlnlENT.-Tbe Seereta.r:r shall es-

20

tabl.ish a pilot program, involving more than one re-

ot enactment the Seereta.r:r shall submit a

20 PENALTIES.-(1) Section 209(e)

o(

the Federal Railroad

~

21

gion of the Federal Railroad .Administration, to

22

demonstrate procedures designed to reduce the back·

22 compromising a civil penalty assessed under this section,

23

log of cues, reduce the workload of headquarters

23 the Seereta.r:r shall consider the safety record of the person

24

staff, streamline initial cue review, and strea.mline

24 to whom the penalty applies subsequent to the date of the

2S

transmittal and settlement procedures, with respect

I

21 Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 438(e)) by inserting "In

.

\

..

•HR..., Dl

.
.a:a-m

!~

!~

7
violation with respect to similar violations or the same lo-

8

ll1

•)f the violation with respect to similar violations or the

ill
I

2 cations." after "refemll to the Attorney General.".

3

lI
{

i

2 same locations.".

(2) Seetion 5{e) of the Act of March 4, 190i (45

3

4 U.S.C. 64a(e); commonly referred to as the "Hours of

4 U.S.C. App. 26; commonly referred to as the "Signal In-

5 Serrioe Act") is amended by adding at the end the follow-

S sj,ection Act") is amended by adding at the end the follow-

6 ing sentence: "In compromising a civil penalty assessed
7 under this section, the Secretary sha.ll consider the safety

··I
I

8 record of the penon to whom the penalty applies subse-

(5) Seet.ion 25(h) of the Aet of Febru&lY 4, 188i (49

I
'

6 ing senteDce: "In compromising a civil penalty assessed
7 under this section, the Secretary shall consider the safety

8 record or the person to whom the penalty applies subse-

9 quent to the date of the violation with respect to similar
9 quent to the date of the violation with respect to ;im.ilar

10 violations or the same locations.".

11
.......
0\

......

(3) Seetion 6 of the Act or Mareh 2, 1893 (45

u.s.c.

I

12 6; commonly referred to as the "Safety Appliance Acts")

~

13 is amended by adding at the end the following sentence:

I

tl

14 "In compromising a civil penalty assessed under this sec-

10 violations or the same loeations.".

11

(6) Section 9 of the Act of Febnl&lY 17, 1911 (45

12 U.S.C. 34; commonly referred to as the "Locomotive In-

13 speetion Aet") is amended by adding at the end the follow14 ing sentence: "In compromising a civil penalty asse:ssed

15 tion, the Secretary shall consider the safety record of the

15 under this section, the Seeret&lY shall consider the safety

16 person to whom the penalty applies subsequent to the date

16 record of the person to whom the penalty applies subse-

17 of the violacon with respect to similar violations or the

17 quent to the date of the violation with respect to similar

18 same locations."'.

18 violations or the same locations.".
19

(4) Seetion 7 of the Act of May 6, 1910 (45 U.S.C.

19 SEC. I. .rtJDICIAL BJ:Y'IEW.

20 43; commonly referred to as the "Accident Reports Act")

20

21 is amended by adding at the end the following sentence:
22 "In compromising a civil penalty assessed under this sec23 tion, the

Secretary sW consider the safety record of the

24 person to whom the penalty applies subsequent to the date

oRIIliM'7

I

(a) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided msection 203

21 and 210 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45
22 U.S.C. 432 and 439), a proceeding to enjoin or suspend,

1:·li.

23 in whole or in part-

'I

I

24

II

15

(1)

11.

rule, regulation, or order of the Secretary

'

of Transportation under the Federal Railroad Safety

m
•1Dll!M'7Ill

9

:

!

Act of 1970 (45 'C.S.C. 4,31 et seq.), the Act of

.....

1

(2) Section 2341(3)(B) of title 28, united States

2

March 2, 1893 (45 U.S.C. 1 et seq.; commonly re-

2 Cvde, is amended by inserting "or the Secretary of Trans-

3

Cerred to as the "Safety Appliance Acts"), the Act

3 portation" after "Secretary of .Agrieu.ltu.l:"e".

4

of May 6, 1910 (45 U.S.C. 38 et seq.; commonly re-

4

s

ferred to as the "Accident Reports Act"), section 25

S amended-

6

oC the Act of February 4, 1887 (49 U.S.C. App. 26;

(3) Section 2.342 of t.it.le 2S, United States Code, is

(A) by striking "and" a.t the end of pa.ragraph

6

:
'

7

commonly referred to as the "Signal lnspeet.ion

8

Act"), the Act of February 17, 1911 (45 U.S.C. 22

8

(B) by strik:ing the period at the end of pan·

9

et seq.; commonly referred to as the "LocomotiVe In-

9

graph (6) aDd i.nserti.ng in lieu thereof"; and"; and

10

spect.ion Act"), the Act of March 4, 1907 (45 U.S.C.

10

(C) by adding a.t the end the following new

11

61 et seq.; commonly referred to as the "Hours oC

11

12

Serviee Act"); or

0\
N

10

13

7

II

14

a rule, regulation, or order of the Secretary of

lS

Transportation under any other Act,

I

"(7) all rules, regul&tiona, or final orders de-

13

scribed in section S(a) or the Rail Safety Enforce-

14

ment and Review Act.".

15

16 shall be brought in the eourt of appeals as provided by

16

17 and in the manner prescribed in chapter 158 of t.itle 28,

l7

i

18 United States Code.

19

20 or the Federal Railroad Safety Ad. of 1970 (45 U.S.C.

PERSONNEL.

Section llU of title 18, United. States Code, is

19 era! Railroad .A.dministration assigned to perform investi·
20 gative, inspection., or law enforcement functions.," after

:

21 "any employee or the Coast Guard assigned t.o perform

21 431(f)) is amended by striking "chapter 7 of title 5 of
22 the United States Code" and inserting in lieu thereof "sec·

SEC. e. P110TEC'l10H OF BAJl..BOAD SAFETY ENFOac::E:MEHT

18 amended by inserting "any officer or employee of the Fed·

I

(b) TECIDo1CA.L .AKENDME!'I.'TS.--(1) Section 202(f)

pa.ragraph:

12
I

(2) to the extent applicable solely to railroads,

(5);

I

22 investigative, inspection or law enforcement functions,".

23 tion 5 of the Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act" .

•a:a.., m

·BR- m

11
SEC. '1. POWER BB.AXE SAF!:l'Y.

2

I
I

'

I

Section 202 or the Federal Railroad Safety Act or

4 the ronowmg new mhlection:

4 tbe following new abeection:

s

"(r) Powu. BB.A.D &.n:Ty,-(1) The Secretary
I

1 tion's rules with retl'j:leCt to railroad power brakes, and,

9 aection, shall

i

rmae neb rules based on neb safety data

15

to enaNe a train erew to initiate bralcing from the

16

rear or a tnlin; and

11

I

11 sueh st.aDdards, bued on meb l&.fety data-is may be pn-

I:

12 sented during that J'E!'riew.

II

"(A) whether to require 2-way end of train device~

I

(or device~~ able to per(onn the same functions)

I

I
I

I

"(B) whether to issue ~t.a or stand-

18

a.rda rep.rding dynamic braking equipment.

19

"(3) The Secretary shall, within 2 ~ after the

i

20 date or enactment or th.ia wbaection, report to the Con21 gresa on the reaulta or tbe review eondueted under para-

:

I:

22 graph (1) and any nwisiona of rules or other lld:iona taken
23 in connection therewith.".

aft.e.r

10 shall issue rulea, regulations, ord~ or at.aDd.a:rda to re'9iae

12 shall, at a minimum, oouider-

14

)'1!1111'1

9

"(2) In CII.1Tying oat paragraph (1), tbe Secretary

13

6 in 6 monthJ after tbe date oC enaetment or thia aubeeetion,

8 ata:Ddards relating to track alet;y. Wrtbin 2

10 as may be presented during that review.

11

"(a) TJUCX SAnTY.-{1) The Sec:ret&ry shall, with-

1 initiate a l"e"riew or tbe Depart;meD.t or Transportation'•

8 within 18 monthJ after the date or enactment or this sub-

w

Section 202 or the Federal Railroad Safety Act of

3 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431) is amended by adding at the end

6 shall eonduet a review or the Department or Transporta-

Q\

2

3 1970 (45 t:.S.C. 431) is amentied by adding at tbe end

s

1-'

12
1 SEC. .. TRACZ. &.U'EI'T.

l

r

13

"(2) The reriew ~ ude.r ~ph (1) shall.,

14 at a m.inimwn, addrerl:e"(A) p~ ~ with

15

maintain.inc

16

aDd inatalling ooutinu01111 welded rail and it11 atteDd·

17

ant~

18

"(B) reri.liona to rulea with reapect to tnc.k

19

subject to ~ption from tnc.k aafety lltalldarda;

20

and

21
22

"(C) employee wety.".
DC. 1. APPUCABIUT'f Olf JW'LI:8, DGVIJJIONS. OlmDS.

AND IT~

23

24

(a) Am..'ICAML~Tt.-Seetion 202(a) of tbe Fedenl

2.5 RaiJ.roe,d Safety~ oC 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431(a)) ia amend·

26 ed by adding at the end the following: "Rules, ~tions,
oiD-1111

oiD-1111

13

14

orders, and st.anda.rdJ issued by the Secretary under this

1

2 title shall apply to any owner, manufacturer, lessor, or les-

2

ness

3 see of n.ilroad equipment or facilities, to a.ny contractor

3

anticlimher devices, thiclter boo&, and oooopant re-

4

&traints;

4 providing goods or

&el"VioeS

to a railroad, and to any em-

5 ployet O( sooh owner, manufa.cturer, lessor, lessee, Or

......
(!\

.g:,..

(2) the effectiveness in improving cn.shworth.i-

or

adding features such

li.S

oolli.s:.Wn posts,

OOD·

.5

6 t.raetor, to the same e:xtent u they apply to a railroad with

6

7 respect to the &&me activities. ••.

7

8

(b) PE.'iALTmS.-Section 209(a) of the Federal Rail-

8

or looamotn.

9 road Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 438(a)) is amended

9

corda.nce with the Locomotift Crashwort.hioe.'l& Be-

10 by iDJerting ", an owner, manu.f.acturer, lessor, or lessee

10

quiremenu Standard S-580, adopted by the Asao-

11 of railroad equipment or facilities, a contractor providing

11

ci&tion or~ Rail.roadJ in 198!;

12 goods or se.rvices to a railroad, and any employee of such

12

13 owner, ~. lesaor, leaee, or contractor" after

13

should be 111bject to requirement.l tl:w 111ch toilet.

14 "agent of a railroad".

14

are functioning, aanitary, and m.a.int.l.ined on a regu-

15

IS

larbam;

SEC. 10. LOCOMOTIVJI: CAB 8AFET'f AND WOWIJNG CONDI·

16
17

16

TION&

The Secretary ab.all, within 18 months after the date

~I

18 of enactment of this Aet., aubmit to the Congress a report
19 on the status o( effort~ to impi"'W the safety

I

or employees

17
18

(3) the estimated

and benefits uaociated

t'JOIU

with variooa improvement!; to

cruhwo~

( 4) the advisability of requiring

(5)

the retrofitting

built before Augw;t 1, 1990, in ae-

~

locomotiw:a equipped with toikta

(6) the effect.a on train

Cl'e'llrl

of the presence of

asbestos in locomotive component&; and
(7) the Secreta.ry'a plans for related regulatory

19

action or, i!

20 in locomotive cabs. Snch report shall, at a minimum,

20

planation of why the Secret.a.ry considers such action

21 addres&-

21

unnecessary.

22

22

(1) the cruhworthinesa of existing locomotives

23

o(

24

ent sill heights;

variou! deaigna, including issues raised by differ-

. . _Ill

-

'

23

I
!

DO

regulatory action is planned., a.n e.x·

SEC. 11. AUTBORIZAl"'ON OF APPBOPBIATIONS.

Section 214(a) o( the Federal Railroad Safety Act of

24 1970 ( 45 U.S.C. 444(a)) ia amended by inserting ",

15 $51,524,000 for '.5scal year 1992, $55,022,100 for fiscal

I

. . _Ill

15
year 1993, and $57,933,400 Cor fiscal year 1994" after

2 "fiscal year 1991".

3
4

SEC. U. LOCAL B.AIL F.IU!:IGBT ASSISTANCE PROGR.UL

Section 5(q) of the Depe.rtment of Transportation

5 Act (49

,_.
0'
U1

u.s.c. A:pp. 1654(q)) is a.mended-

6

(1) by inserti.ng "There are authorized to be ap-

7

propriated to the Secret.a.ry Cor the purposes of this

8

aection

9

$22,000,000 Cor fiscal year 1992, $27,000,000 Cor

10

fiscal year 1993, and $30,000,000 for fiseal year

Il

1994." at'te.r SepWnber 30, 1990."; and

$20,000,000

Cor

fiscal

year

1991,

12

(2) by striki.ng "any period after September 30,

13

1990" and inserting in lieu thereof "any period aft.e.r

14

SePtember 30, 1994"'.
0

·~-
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Section-by-Section Analysis
HR

~607

Proposed Laqislation to ReauthoriEe Railroad Safety Proqrama
JU!y·ll, 1991

section 1.

I

I
Provides short title: "Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act
of 1991."

Section 2. Issuance of Regulations.
This section clarifies existinq provisions of law directinq tn•
Secretary of Transportation to issue requlations reqardinq
certain safety ieeuea. It reaffirms the intent of Con9reae that
such regulations were required to be issued by the Rail Safety
Improvement Act ot 1988, and confines the issue of a9ency
discretion to the content of requlations.
section 3. Remedial ·Actions.

'

i

The General Accountinq Office reported to Congress that FRA
currently does not monitor whether railroads taka action to
correct safety defects identified by agency inspectcre. This
section requires railroads to report remedial action• taken, In
a~dition, it requires FRA to monitor thia reportinq to •naure
auch remedial actions are implemented.
Section 4. Enforcement.

This section implements three add
General Aceountinq Office.

ional recommendation• of the

Subsection (a) increases minimum civil penalties for requlatory
violations from $250 to $1000. Maximum penaltiea were increased
from $2500 to $10,000 by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1988;
the section seeks to make ehanqes in minimum penaltiee
commensurate with thoae in maximum penalties. In addition, it
conforms all existin9 railroad safety atatut•• to a single civil
penalty atandard.
;

I

subsection (b) requires the secretary to run an pilot program to
experiment with conducting enforcement activity in regional
offices. The pilot will be ba•ed on a similar pro9ram that has
been run successfully by the Federal Hi9hway Administration.
FHWA regional directors have been permitted to conduet initial
case reviews, assess penalties, and settle casea on a trial
basis. The qoala are to reduce the time la9 between violation
reporting and caae settlement1 confine the caaea settled by
Headquarters attorneys to only the moat serious; and give
headquarters attorneys more time for requlatory and legislative
matters. The pilot program will be followed by a report to
Congress summarizing the reaults.

Subsection (c) amends the proviaion of law that allows the
Secretary to compromise civil penaltiea durin9 settlement. When
exercising the option to compromise penaltie1,
Secretary will
now be required to consi~er the safety
1
or a
railroad subsequent
the asseasment of
settled.
Section 5. Judicial Review.
current law allows parties in dispute with rules, regulations
orders and standards issued by the Secretary in mattera of rail
safety to challenqe the Secretary's actions in DiGtrict Court.
This provision enables such parties to proceed directly to the
court of appeals to challenge any rule, requlation, order, or
standard reqarding rail aafety. This eonforml the rail mode to
judicial review procedures for both the highway and aviation
mode.
·
Section 6. Protection

or Railroad

Safety Enforcement

P~1onne1.

This eection make& it a federal crime for a per1on to aseault an
officer or inspector of the FRA. Similar proteetio~ is accorded
employ•es of other federal agencies involved in inspection and
inveati9attve activities.
Section 7. Brake Safety.
The FRA Power Brake Rules have not been comprehensively reviewed
in over a decade. In the time since, the industry has undergone
significant transition. New technologies have developed, and
continue to evolve. This section requires FRA to reopen its
Power Brake Rul•s and examine the potential safety benefits ot
requiring the use of two~way end of train devicee that enable a
train crew located in a locomotive to apply brakes trom the rear
of the train. In addition, the section asks the a9ency to
evaluate rules, requlatione, or standards on dynamic braking
equipment.
Section 8. Traok Safety.
FRA has not reviewed its track standard• since 1982. However, a
string of accidents related to detects in continuous welded rail
has taken place over the past few years. Theee incidents have
been caused by buckling of welded rail under extreme heat. Known
as "sun-kinks" these instances su99•1t a cornprehene
look at
this technology is warranted. This section requires
secretary to review and revise the traek etandarda. The review
shall include examination of the in1tallation and maintenance of
welded rail, proviaiona tor traek subject to
from
current etandarda, and employee 1afety in qenera •
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August 14, 1991
Assemblyman Richard Katz, Chairman
Assembly Transportation committee
state Capitol
Sacramento, ca. 95814
The unified Command Team of the Seacliff Train Derailment
Incident, on behalf of Ventura County, would like to present
the following areas of concern identified after the recent
seacliff train derailment.
We feel that more protection could be provided to residents of
rail thru-ways and highways intersecting rail areas if the
following information was available to local jurisdictions and
emergency personnel responding to the incident:

::J

1.

Obtain correct off-loading site information.

2.

Achieve enforcement of rules and regulations of incidents.

3.

See that information is available that portrays MSDS
sheets. Need more detailed information on manifests.

4.

Require container identification to relate back to the
manifest or flatcar. Possibly identify cars and
containers.

5.

Obtain access to railway computer information on products.

6.

Allow local jurisdictions to approve railroad's emergency
operations plan and possibly designate critical areas.

7.

Allocate funding of '1 superfund 11 money for railroads.
Explore concept of "clean seas" organization for rail.

8.

Determine the appropriate on-scene responsibility of
responsible party and local jurisdiction.

9.

Require for Cal-OSHA personnel to report and remain at
site for duration of incident.

WEST COUNTV DIVISION

800 South Victoria Avenue
Ven:ura, CA 9JD09
ral\~1

t;t;A_ ''~11
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C CENTRAl COUNTY DIV1SION
67 Palm Drive
Camarillo, CA 93010·7995
(805) 482-9644

CJ

EAST VALLEY DIVISION
2101 Ea5t

Ol;en Road

Tnou1and Oaks. CA 91360
(805) 494-8200

10. Develop legislation to exempt emergency personnel on
hazardous material incidents from liability and to permit
debriefings without disclosure.
ll. Require State personnel presence on scene for haz mat
response.
12. Establish eri~inal penalties tor agencies/persons
deliberately lying at scene.
13. Resupply State Superfund money to existing hazardous
materials teams.
If you have any questions regarding these items, you may
direct them to Karen A. Guidi, Assistant Director, Sheriff's
Office of Emergency Services at (805) 654-2551, BOO so.
Victoria Avenue, Ventura, Ca. 93009.
SS-OES-91•104
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SANTA BARBARA COUNTY
AGENDA REPORT
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., Agenda Number:
Department:
omce of Emergency Services/Fire
Agenda Date:
8/20/91
Placement:
Departmental
Estimated Time: 20 minutes
Contun

Bollm or SUMtMUil"ll

400 105 B. .Mapcmu Smet
Santa Dllrbara, CA 93101
(80S) S68·2240
~m

TO:

FROM:

P.Ol

Board of Supervisors

WJ~o.~

Ken Knight, Interim Director
Office ofEmergency Services

STAFF

CONTAcr:

Bruce Carter, ext. 3429 or Mary Barron, ext. 3416

SUBJECI':

Assessment of Recent Railroad Derailments mSanta Barbara, Siskiyou/Shasta. and
Ventura Counties, 1991

,'1

A. 0. Recommendation:_ _ _ __

RECOM:MENDATIONS:
~

That the Board of Supervisors:

Receive and discuss the attached staff report and findings regarding the recent train derailments in Santa
Barbara, Siskiyou/Shasta, and Ventura Counties and to consider ideas for improving local prepareclness.
This report summarizes the findings of the County Office of Emergency Services for the Southern Pacific
train derailments occurring on Vandenberg Air Force Base in March, 1991 and at Seacliff in July, 1991.
In addition, staff has provided an overview of the Southern Pacific: train derailment at Dunsmuir, which
impacted both Siskiyou and Shasta Counties in July, 1991.
Budr,:et Unit! 4320
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ASSESSMENT OF RECENT RAILRoAD DERAILMENTs

IN SANTA BARBARA, SlSKYOV/SHASTA AND VEN1lJRA COUNTIEs

August 20, 1991
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INIBODUCOON

AI. you know, there have been three major :railroad accidents within the lut six months
involving hazardous materials; the first in Santa Barbara County on Vandenberg Air Force
Baae (VAFB) in March, the second in Siskiyou and Shasta Counties at Dummuir in July and
most recently in Ventura County at Seacliff. AU of these derailments involved the Southern
Pacific (SP) Railroad and resulted in the release, or threatened releue, of hazardous
materials.

This report will briefly summarize the findinp from the derailments in Santa Barbara and
Ventura Counties, from staff assessmentl on site. An account of the Dunsmuir derailment
which affected both Siskiyou and Shasta Counties is also included. However, this synopsis
was compiled from phone conversations and various newspaper articles as staff wu unable
to visit the site of this derailment.

n.

lJNDINGS

A.

VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE DERAILMENT

The VAFB derailment occurred on March 19, 1991 at 4:45 am at milepost 313, about 5
miles north of Jalama Beach. The derailment, which occurred during the March rains,
resulted when a culvert at Canada Ridse save way. The derailment :involved a southbound
SP freiaht train originating from Oakland. Of the train's 31 em, 24 derailed including two
locomotives.
Local agencies were not notified by SP. The County Office of Emergency Services (OES)
unofficially received a report of the incident around 7:30 am on KTMS radio. The County
Sheriff"a Department was notified by VAFB at 7:45 am. OBS spent the first day trying to
establish contact with SP and obtain accurate information. Initial :information wu obtained
through VAFB Command and Control Center and their Public Affairs office.
A key concem was the lack of direct communication with the lite • temporary telephone
lines had to be installed since cellular phones and radios did not reach thia remote area. This
took several days. Consequently, :initial contact with SP wu through their diapatch center
in Roseville (near Sacramento) and the Corporate Headquarters :in Monterey Park.

The main concern was determining whether hazardous materfala were on board. Reports
confirmed that two pressurized tank cars. each containins 30.000 p.llom of anhydrous
ammonia, had derailed along with several other can containing hazardous material&. VAFB
handled initial stabillzation of the incident by constructini a dike around the spilled
lw:ardous materials (diael foul and ~trolewn naphtha). SP hazmat tea.ma a.rrfved around
6:00pm that evening, nearly 14 hours after the :incident occurred. While the tmhytlrou.r
ammonia tanks withstood the derailment, the primary concern wu for a subsequent releaae
of hazardous materials, from either a damaged tank or during tnmsloading (offloading)
procedures.
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2

The jwisdictional authority for this incident wu unique in that it
on
property (the SP right of way), on federal lands (VAFB), and wttl'dn the County
Barbara. In addition, the wreck wu situated on a Native American burial ground.
Because the incident occurred on VAFB, County agencies did not have primary response
authority.
Since the incident could have resulted in offsite impacts, OBS took a lead role and requested
a meeting with the SP incident management team. The following agencies were called
together in a meeting with SP: County OBS, Fire (Lompoc and County), Sheriff,
Environmental Health Services (EHS). Board of Supervisors (4th District office)t the Air
Pollution Control District (APCD) and VAFB. The main objectives of
meeting were
to verify that the situation waa stabilized. obtain the incident plan and
a County
liaison on scene. Through the establishment of an OBS liaison on
with
County response agencies was initiated: APCD provided plume dispersion modelling for
critical transloading operations and the Sheriff's Office was notified in
that an
evacuation was needed. EHS was also prcaent on Bite throughout the response
phases.

The derailed cars of concern were canying:
SUBSTANt:E

VQLYME

Anhydrow ammonia

Z tank can
30,000 gal eachs intact

irritant by
inhalation; inhalation of
may be
concentrated
fatal. Tolerance 2S ppm in air.

Diesel full

2 locomotives
2.,600 sal diesel spilled

oderate fire rhk,
environmental hazard.

Hydtoftuorrilicic acid

1 tank car (rclidual only)
None spilled.

extremely
skin contact and

Petroleum naphtha

1 tank car residual, 200
gallons spilled

Flammable, dangerous fire risk.
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Fortunately, this incident occurred in a remote u~ of VAFB .. the nea1~0Jt residents were
three miles away at Sudden Ranch and five miles away at Jfilimla Death. B9$h locations
were notified by VAFB which had an Air Force )lelicoptcr atandinj by for potential
evacuations. With the exception of disrupted rail ~me~, both freight BL'.ri Amtrak. public
impact was minimal. Had this occurred in a popula~ art.~ an ew.~mtion would have been
likely during the five-day proceu to transload the flnhydroua ammo;'lia.
In addition to ammonia transloading and rePlOVal, the

ate restoratiun inclu·ded huar4ous

materiall removal of diesel fuel and paraffin we.x, inltallatio.u of fibre o;~'' ~.{CI) cable and
reconstruction of the culyert. Final restoration wu expectet'i to be conlplt~~ ~n June, 1991.
B.

DUNSMUIR DER.AILMENT

The next incident, and perhaps the most devastating in terms of off-site impa*', MS the
train derailment and subsequent release of nuuun sodium :into the &tcramen~ .Rfver at
Dunsmuir in Siskiyou County at railroad milepost 327.98. On Sunday, July 14, ~~·It !l:SO
pm, ajx empty cars and one tank car containing the chemica..\ jumped the tracb a;~ ,a sn11all
river crossing along the Sacramento River. The single-walled ,tlmk ~ br()ke epel'l illaev.'eral
places, emptying approximately 19,500 gallons of the toxic ches:uical, metam IOIUum, blto t,'be
river which flowed downstream into Shasta County. The Se'!J'etl dcraileCI cars were part c. 'f
a 97..car, 4-locomotive SP freisht tram.
Bagrd.ous

Matslll•

The nutDm sodium spill flowed doWDStream. into Shuta C:Ou,ty, and evt\ntually reached
Lake Slwta, approximately 40 miles from the train deraiJ.m.ent, at 3:00 am on W~eaday.
July 17, 1991. According to a Material Safety Data Sheet (M'SDS), metmn sodium il a weed
and tree killing compound in the dithiocarbamate family. 19,500 gallons of a chemical
concentrate, containing 32.7% pure m«am aodium (a t~ nanu for sodium Nmethyldithiocarbamate), wu beinJ carried in the tank cu. M11am IOdium il water soluble
and decomposes into m~thylisothiocyaMte. or MJTC, a he&yY gt\1 that is also soluble in water.
AI a heavy gas, the Mrrc remained in or j'Ult above the wt.te.f aurface. MITC il clusified
as a strong lacrimator, an irritant to humans causing sympto~n~ such u nauaca and tearing.
In tum, MITC iJ water soluble and can decompose to mono,_l~lamiM. Hydrog~n Sulfide
(H,S) can alao be created if a high Ph value is encountered.
The hazardous materials of concern were u follows:
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SUIUANCE
Metam

Sodium,

( So d i u m

II/ -

One tank car
(19,500 p.lapilled)

methyldithiocarba-

matt)

:Highly toxic
to
cause low toxicity in humans
(although never tested).
Strong irritant to akin amd
mucous membrames. Potential

chrome earcinosen.
Methyli.Jothiof:yanate

(Mri'C)

Unkl1own quantity of
solu1ion in river

Highly
msestion,
inhalation, and akin ¥Utna... ~.
Strons lacrimator

irritant

akin and
membrane&.

mucoua

to
Monomtfthylamtne
(methylamine)

Unknown quantity of
solution in river

Hydrogen

Ulllknown quantity of
so!1ution in river

(HaS)

SulftdtJ,

Flammable, wu:&ge%'01
(gu or --.--- r
to tiuue, Bxll'l~live
air, 5·20%. Tol:erance.

irritant to

mucous

membranes
flammable. dall~&eroua
Bxpl~ive

46%. ··,-···-air.

lm•dl
190 people sought medical attention with complaints nmging from headaches bumins
mucous membranes and n:ausea. all related to the spill. Of tb01e, only people have had
marked effects presumably from exposure to the MITC and were admitted hospitals. In
addition to impacts on tbe local human population, the liquid chemical devutated the river'•
ecosystem beginning at the spill site and downriver to Lake Shuta; ldl1ing
the entire
fishery and most of the vegetation in and along the river. Long term effects
of the
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08-13-1991 16 06

8055683468

OE~1

P.06

PageS

aquatic food chain organisms and
habitat are expected. Secondary toxicity to birds
and mammals which rely on the river may
be expected. In ahort, the 1pill hal rendered
that lensfh of the Sacramento
almost entirely sterilized. Long term impactl to the
river's ecosystem a.re rmticipatedi however, the desree of impact Is unknown.
Fish and wildlife biologists will continue
monitor impact& rmd have already begun
developing restoration plans. The impacted section of the Sacramento River will remain
cloaed to fishing until mid·September.
C.

SEACLIFF DER.An.MENT

The latest incident occurred at 12:08 pm on Sunday, July 28, 1991 when aSP freight train
derailed and crashed into
H!shway 101/Seacliff overpus in the northern Ventura County
community of Seacliff. Railroad official~ cite the cause of the derailment u due to a loose
ule on one of the freight cars which apparently causht a 1Witch.i.n3 atation. Twelve of the
37 cars on the SP Railroad train were then catapulted off the tracb. The broken ale had
sent off sparks and ignited several small brush fires alons the railroad tracka at least 10 miles
south of the crash site. The derailed can were carrying tractor..trailer• on flatbeds known
as '~iggy-bacb • The
of twisted
and wood wreckage ltretched more than 1,000
feet and dug up
300 feet of
ties and
The train wu traveling
approximately SS mllea per hour
bearing froze. A groove had been created
alons the railroad traw from the broken axle u it was draped underneath the northbound
train. Railroad and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) officials are still
investigating the cause of the broken axle.
11

HaardOUI MaterialS
Roughly 440 pllom of the hiihiY toxic material f.UJU.BOW hydra.zlnt, a jet fuel component,
splashed across the tracks after 12 ca:n of the northbound 39 car SP train detailed. The
train was carrying at least 4,100 gallons of Hydrazme in eventywalx SS-aallon druml. The
aqueous hydrtuine spilled when 8 of the drums were ruptured in the cruh. Cean-up crews
used an 8% solution of calcium hypochl.orite to neuttallze the spilled hydra.zine. When this
chemical wu sprayed over the contaminated area, the reaultant chemical reaction with the
calcium hypochlorite neutralized the~· A aecondary chemical reaction from this
neutralization process caused a cloud of hydrogen sa and ammonia to be released.
Hydmzins wu also siphoned out of 1~ other drums using a stinger (similar to a pnt
hypodermic needle). The "needle11 is jammed Into the drum and the ~ is then
removed by a vacuum hose into a stainless 1teel truck. The remaining drums wore removed
by a process known as "overpacking", which Involves placlng the umuptu.red drums into
oversized containers and sealed.
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The train was uo carrying a cargo container with 6,240 pllcma
solvent which would potentially ignite and/or explode if it came in contact
Another concern was the location of two natural gu pipelines, :rur:IIWlLB ""~""""-"&"A
and buried just 3·4 feet underground.
The derailed can of concern were canying:
SUBSTANCE

VOLUME

Aqusous Hydrazine

One ce.r canying fifty·aix
SS-pllon dnmls;

BAZMlD

eight of which ·-·"A'"' a
total 440 gallons.

toxic

Highly

inhalation,
Strong JI.Ld..l.l,_u
Highly
hazard

or by reac:uon
materials.
carcinogen,
ppm in ah'.
Dichlorodifluoro~

Unknown volume.

methane
Naphthalene

One ce.r canying 6,340
gallons (none spilled).

Calcium hypochlorite

8% solution applied to

neutralize
hydru:ine

aqueous

akin

by

inhalation.
in con·mct
with orpnic materials.
contact~

DqeroUI fire

ImHctJ

Several members of the hazardous material~ cleanup crew were exposed to hydrrmne
they encountered previously unidentified "hot spots" at two different times during the
cleanup. The exposed crew members were taken to the hospital, treated
released.
A 20 mile atretch of Highway 101, between Ventura and Santa Barbara, wu
177
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directions for 6 days. All north and southbound traffic wu detoured onto two-lane Highway
150 through Ojai and to Highway 33. In northern Santa Barbara County, traffic bound for
Ventura and further aouth wu rerouted on Highway 166. All mil service north and south
was also canceled. In addition, more than 350 people were evacuated from the communities
of Seacliff, La Conchita, and Muuel Shoak. The American Red Croas opened shelters both
north and south of the incident for both evacuees and stranded travelers on Sunday night.
In Ventura County, shelters remained open to evacuees until Friday, when residents were
permitted to return to their homes.

m

CONCLUSIONS

Baaed on our own experiences in Santa Barbara County and the information we obtained
from Ventura and Sialdyou/Shuta Counties, OBS lw identified the following issues.
1. ~e containers for shi:gmgt of Hnprdo!JI Materlll .. Although the m~tam ~odium spilled
in the Dunsmuir incident wu being transported in a single-walled tank car per Department
of Transportation regulation, when the car derailed the tank car ruptured and released the
water soluble chemical into the Sacramento River. Exposure to water caused a chemical
reaction in which the metam sodium decomposed into a more hazardol.ll chemical DOT
should investipte more atrlnjent container requirements for highly reactive chemicala. In
addition, DOT ahould also analyze the rlslm of transporting huardoua materials, such as
aqu~ous hydraz.iM in safer, double-walled tank carl u a bulk shipment inltead of amaller,
less protective drums. While the risks involved with the bulk shipment fD tank can may be
amaller, the conaequenccs of an incident would be much larger. Thae riW should be
compared to the relatively smaller conaequenccs and mper riab 111ociated with drum
shipment of hf.Wll'doua materials.

2. Iimetv loc:al 'ienQY notification - Local agencies should be notified immediately of rail
incidents by the railroad to ensure timely emergency response planning and coordination.
Local agencies can and will be the primary response team until railroad respome teams
arrive on scene. Although the County of Santa Barbara did not have primary response
authority on site for the VAFB derailment. the worst case scenario necessitated off lite
planning on our part (e.g., if a large scale ammonia release had occurred which moved off
VAFB). As a rault, OES provided liaison for planning and coordination purposes. In
addition, BHS responded to the scene to monitor cleanup activities, APCD provided plume
dispersion modeJlin& County and Lompoc fire departments provided teclmical information
on hazardoUI materials and the Sheriff's Department notified nearby ruidents prior to
critical operations.
3. Identification of MaterlaJJ On Board In order to ascertain the aeverity of a dcr8.ument
and establish the proper responae strategy, local emergency respond.ers muat to verify all
m

78

08-13-1991 16:07

6055683468

OEM

P.09,

Page 8

Staff Report
Ausust 20, 1991

materials on board the train. This information ill provided on the train'& conailt (see
attachment 1) and should be tran&mitted to responders at the time of notification (via
facsimile). Such information is essential 10 that the local jurildiction can quietly convey
emergency public information, plan for evacuation~ and respond more safely and effectively.
4. Emergency Planning and Coordination .. Increased plannins is needed between rafiroads
and local jurisdictions. Integration of emergency response plans through joint planning and
training efforts would assist with this process. The Office of Emergency Services will review
incident response data from our counterpart& in Ventura County and Northern California
aa it becomes available. Lessons learned from these incidents, u well u the VAFB
derailment, will be incorporated into the County•s Hazardous Materlalfl Emergency
Response Area Plan. Railroad& should coordinate with emergency response Plannina effom
with local jurisdictions. For example, SP should provide trainins for interasency ,..G,"'nftlllil'
personnel at least twice a year. In addition. SP should conduct emersency response
exercises to maintain an adequate level of preparedness.
S. R0utin1 -An three train derailments involved rail car111 canying
Bach derailment involved the release or potential release of hazardous material~ which had
significant offsite impacts to the surrounding area. Routing of trains "-'""MIIm h!Wlt'dO!Ill

materials should be more thoroughly reviewed by DOT and State autJboriltiea
coastal route should be restricted to local shipment~ on a resuJar
,,.,1'\an
needed basis. Otherwiee, the main north-south rail line through San "'..,_"'IIMU
be utilized for shipments between Los Angeles and San Fnmcisco uea aealtmaUOIJII.
com.parilllon should be conducted to determine the effect of this tttullp!:)rta11lo:n propoall
interstate commerce.
6. Community Awareness -The railroadlshould establish an ongoing ·
awareness
campaign regarding the transportation of hazardous material~ by rail. State and federal
legislation already mandates tlUI for fixed facilities (AB 2185, 1985; SARA Title III, 1986).
A case in point is the Seacliff and Dunsmuir derdmenta, where the public impact was
extreme. The public needs to be educated on the types of material~ being tnmaported by
rail. and what to do in the event of a derailment (e.g. education on shcltering..in..pllce for
hazardous materials emergencies and special hotlinu to call for information requests).

179

ATI'ACBMENT 1
TRAIN CONSIST EXAMPLE

This document was obtained from Southern Pacific Transportation Co. and was part of the
consist for the freight train involved in the March 19, 1991 Vandenberg Air Force Base
derailment.
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Attention; LaurA Reyn\)lds!Kate Riley

!5396 JUncon Beach Park Drive
Ventura. CA 9300 l

August 14. 1991
Honorable Richard KatZ
Member of the Assomblv .
9140 Van Nuys Blvd., ~uite 109
Panorama City. CA 91402
O.W Assemblyman Katz.
Subj~-t:

Southern Pacific Train Wreck and Toxic Spill at Seacliff

The. Seacliff Beach Cdcny Homeov~~·ners Association 11t comprised of the cwnen of the 49
houses wruch we.re evacuated as, a result of tile Julv .:;8th Southern Pacific train wreck and
toxic &pill.
•
The attached list summarizes the out<)tanding qu~-stiotJ.S, issues and cc.ncern6: which aTe of
I.Um~t importance to At~sociation members. We hope that tire perspectives c,f tllose most
directly affected by this disaster will be of value to you in your analysis of the need for
more slrinietll ~iulatory measures, monitoring and enforcement procedures.
We strongly support your commitment to improving the level of safety for all who live,
work. or visit areas contiguous to railroad rights of wa]. Your leaderohip in pursuing the
crtncal issues outlined herein woulcl be gratefully appre.::.iated. If your s:atiis a,·ailable to
discuss this matter, or can answer any of the enclosl!'d questions, I can be reac:hw
weekdays at 213-461· 5060.
Sincerely.

W.~st~
Carol OoldsU:in
Chair, Environmental Committee
Seadif! Beach Colony Homeowne~ Association
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StaeiUt Btaeh Colony Homeowners' A~sodaiion
lnues lbganUna the Southern Padf'h.~ Train Derailment
Auauet 14, 1f91
page 1 of 4

1. WHAT CHEMICALS WERE INVOLVED?
It is believed that aqut®S hydra:rine in :1 SO% &f>luticn was the only chemical that spilled.
However, the e:xact idcmtity and quantity of chemleals splUed have aot yet
been ab10lutely connnned. \\'hat chemicals were/are involved and in what amounts?

-le.a.ked, spilled or released from the train
-clouds and (umes relf.ased at the time or the wreck and during cleanup
·breakdown components or each chemical interacting with the air,
ground surfaces, and other chemicals released
-clean up chemicals and their interactions
CLOtDS SET OFF BY

2. WERE PEOPLE EXPOSED
WRECK?

We were told that the wind was !::&owing awa} from Seacliff
towards the
a northerlv direction, so that people at the site or in the vicinity to the southw£st were not
exposed. ·Howe:ve:r, computeliz.ed dam 1
from the Di&itar weather starion alA Seaciiff
home (see below) shows that the wi car·rying the toxie rloud wru; blowina in
a south/southwest dirtc:tlon cUnctly over the Seaclifl' community
bcad1
areas for several hours afttr tht Wrttk oteurrtd.

Helicopters tlying over the wreck and
beach areas caused si~ficant turbulence and
dispersal of tne cloud in
There is a stronger pos~1bility than was
assumed that people at
and adjacent areas were exposed to the

hydraz.ine \'apors,
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SeadU'f Beach
laue& ReaarcUng the
Av;uet 14, l!J9t . pase l

Association

J. DID PEOPLt: SUFFER

EFFECTS FROM TOXIC

Train Derailment

EXPOSURE?

There was no interview or survey
a.r.d others who were evacuated to determine
if they had any syntptoms of hazardoWi exposure. Resident~ who were evacuated
have experienced various respirato
lmenu that indieate po$Jible
hazardoul exposure to the toxtt da micals.
Who is responsible for inve3tiitttine such a public health concern~ conducting a study of the
resid~nts' s)mptoms to dettrmme cau5e and effect? Were special hazards posed to the
elderly, infmn, children, infante;, pr~gnam women. m1d women of child~ng ase? What
data needs to be ccllecmd to detemune t~ neat·, rrud and lona term potenual hea.l.th hu.ards
from exposure to ie:akina or spilled chemicals, fumes 3rtd clouds from the wreck,
chemicals used in the cleanup a.lld their interactive chemical reactions. or dust and ditt
clouds spewini from f>trtet s·.vecpers and other cleanup vehicles.
4. WHO WAS IN CHARGE?
It has been verified tbat no cleanup
substantial delay 1dendfying the

ex:is~.ed

prior to the wreck, and there \)..'as a
involved. We understand that there were
numerous public agencies involved in discreet aspects of the emergency resJX>nse and
cleanup eff·oru. Agencies were frustrated their admirable efforts te respond to thi~
emergency
We commend those involvec! in the emergeri~ response efforts and
deeply app~iate their best attem~ dealini with such pUl.rlin& ctrcumstances.
While recognizing the nee-.d for teamV~-'ork. lt was apparent that there was no slnale
eoof'dlhating aaency dlrectina tnt ~ dfo11. This created a chaocic situation
when residents attempted to find a consistent and reliable source of criticaJ information and
updates. It also prevented residents, once scattered, from locating each otht:·r or
communicating through a central clearinghouse.
5. WERE THE OCEAN AND BEACHFRONT CONTAMINATED?
WIUttutl reporttd obsening the spined ebemieals leaklna Into the stonn
drain that empties under the free,·ay ramp directly Into the ocean. Witnesses
also observed workers hosing down th~ cleanup chemicals into the 'tonn drain. Was the
outflow tested for contamination as !t drained inro tbe ocean?
It was verbally indicated to us and reported in the pr~ that it was advisable (()r

beac:hcombers. swimmers and swfers to stay out of the ocean for ten days after the wreck.
No reasons were gh·en, no si!nage was posted, no monitoring program was in effect and
no enforcement was taken. Therefore, people begnn using the beach and swimming. within
a week of the spilL What data was used to dctennine when the beach and ocean \\'ere safe

for use?
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{Nuti

WAS SOUTHERN
ACCORDING TO

We we.re told that Southern Pacific was""'"'"''.,""
if all
environment and the

on their property.

~Tminini And certifi..cAtion o£cleanup crew:
were hired for rh.is
· on an emergency
hired by
C00tfactCJr !Hf..>ni'l••rl
eluses prior
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SeaeUff Beach Colony Homeowners' AHodatlon

bluu Regardtna the Southern Padflc Train Derailment
Auaurrt 14, 1991

pase 4 of 4

10. WHAT W.tLL PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN?

We are concerned ~ith the immediate questions regarding personal safety. We are equally
concerned about policies and procedures to en.~ure our safety in the future. It Is clear
that .the rules which sovem trains tarrying toxit and huardou• mat~rlals

are In need of eomplete restructuring.

·

We know that there were simple and comparatively inexpensive regulati0118 that could have
prevented this disaster. SOmeone riding in the caboose would have. setn the sparks miles
before the train derailed If individual containers were specifically labelled, the cleanup
approach could have begun earlier. If batrets holding the chemicals were stutdjer or better
iMulated, they might not have ruptuted on impact.
Considering the potential for more devastatine; consequences, there are reasons to be
thankful. There were no hunum death$, a mir~e considering the heavy weekend use of
the Rincon Parkway. Personal vehicles were not occupied when the train can crushed·
them. A bi.cycbst o:n the ParkWay was pedalling alonfside the engine, rather than a fe\v
yanh behind. Sparks along the Rinoon did not grow mto e:t~osive fires. headina for the
adjacent oil fields and trapping residents and beach users. Onlookers were able to put out
the grass fires on the railroad right of way in Ventura and along the Parkway. Napthalene
remained untouched in an adJacent conminer. rather than interacting with the hydruine,
causing a catastrophic disaster and many deaths.

In the near future, comprehensive regularory mea.Nre:s~nust be enlded.. monitored and
enforced to ensure public safety.
·
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MEM:>RANDUM

'IO:

The State Assembly Transportation Corrrnittee

DATE:

August 14, 1991

FROM:

Rex and Norine Fine, Seacliff residents

SUBJECI':

Transportation of hazardous materials and Southern Pacific
train derailments in Ventura (Seacliff) and Shasta Counties

We did not know of the hearing being held in the State Building, 107 So.
Broadway on 8/15/91 until we read it in the Los Angeles Times on 8/13/91.

The

possibility of changing our work schedules to be downtown Los Angeles between
9:00-12:00 on 8/15/91 is unlikely.
It is our hope that the enclosed letter will reach the carmittee by courier
Thursday morning.

We would appreciate you taking a m:::ment to read the letter in

lieu of our public testirnoney participation.
Please notify us of any future hearing dates.

We are very concerned about

the future of train transportation and transferring of toxic chemicals.
you for your time.

sr2:7~/4~<-~~~
Rex and Norine Fine
5510 Rincon Beach Park Drive
Seacliff Beach Colony
Ventura, CA 93001
Residence (805) 648-2872
Business(Day) (818) 881-9493
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Thank

13, 199

Mr. William F. Currier
Su-perintendent, Southern Pacific Transportation Cc:mpany
1200 Corporate Center Drive
~bnterey Park, California 91754

Dear

~1r.

Currier,

I am asking you to please take a mc:rnent to help reduce U1e risk of accidents
and possibly save lives. This letter is prompted by the recent evacuation of my
wife and I from our home in Seacliff Beach Colony (Ventura) due to a Southern
Pacific derailment and subsequent toxic spill (hydrazine) at the accident site.
Presently many Seacliff residents are experiencing uncertainty, fear, anger,
and lack of safety. There is also a great deal of anxiety regarding the short
term and long term effects of the toxic chemical hydrazine. In an effort to
bring some safety and harmony back into the lives of the Seacliff residents I am
asking that you reduce the speed of the Southern Pacific trains to 15-20 m.p.h.
when cc:rning Urrough the Seacliff area. I am sure that the residents of Faria and
Solimar, just south of Seacliff, would appreciate the safer speed as well. Southern Pacific and Amtrak are presently coming through the Seacliff community at the
reduced sr~ of 15-20 m.p.h. while the accident area is being repaired. Under
the circumstances surrounding the train derailment, the request for reduced speed
is not illlreasonable.
I watched the accident happen and was on the scene quickly. It was amazing
that no one on a bicycle, on foot, or in a car was hit by the collasping train.
I had intended to write to Southern Pacific before because high speed trains
coming tltrough the area literally shake the ground and houses. Unfortunately I
didn't. It was the high speed and the "scraping sound" that drew my attention to
this train and how I have come to realize that a slower speed could have prevented
this kind of accident. ~. Currier I am asking for your support and help in
resolving same of the events surrounding the Seacliff accident and helping prevent
further accidents.
This past weekend many Seacliff residents ccmnented on how much safer it felt
with U1e train moving slower. This was a positive feeling felt by many after two
weeks of disruptive feelings. If the request for reduced speed is unreasonable or
too expensive I would like to know how this is concluded. If you have any solutions to help prevent further accidents at Seacliff and help the residents live
safely I would appreciate your thoughts.
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the
through Seacliff,

1•

Signi
reduced
Faria and Solimar.

2.

If the speed will not be reduced then build a wall for safety, noise reduction and ground
The wall would also be protective for beach
walkers, campers, vacationers, bicycle
and vehicles along the much
traveled Pacific Coast Highway.

3.

Label distinctively the container and the particular railroad car that toxic
material is inside. Also identify the chemical.

4.

The conducter or specified person should have on his or her posession an
inventory list of all toxic chemicals being transported. (In the Seacliff
accident 36 hours had gone by and no one was exactly sure what the toxic
chemical was.)

In closing let me say that the lives of all Seacliff residents have been
significantly affected. When my wife and I were evacuated we were able to take
our golden retriever "Spencer" with us. OUr next door neighbors were not hane at
tl1e time of the evacuation and were not allowed back into the area to get their
two dogs. Subsequently when tl1ey were allowed to return to their hane one of
their dogs was dead and traces of hydrazine were found in their hane. Hydrazine
was found in their heme seven days after the accident and now our friends and next
door neighbors have decided to move out of tl1eir home permanently. I ask that you
do your part to help prevent tl1is sort of accident from happening in the future.
I thank you for your time ru1d considerations.
Sincerely,

~~frCR

Rex Fine
5510 Rincon Beach Park Drive
Seacliff Beach Colony
Ventura, CA 93001
Business (818) 881-9493
Home (805) 648-2872
cc:

Patricia Eckert, President, State Public Utilities Commission
Jack O'Connell, Assemblyman (D) Carpenteria
Richard Katz, Assemblyman (D) Panorama City
Bob Campbell, National Transportation Safety Board
Mike Mohan, President, Soutllern Pacific Transportation Company
Penny Newmann, Citizens Clearing House for Hazardous Wastes
Joanna M. Mi.ller, staff writer on the scene of the accident, L.A. Times
Carol Goldstein,
Seacliff Residents Train Accident
Jerry Fine, Esq.
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Testimony of Dr. Laura Lake, NCJW/LA Environment Committee
Before the California Assembly Transportation Committee Hearing
on Toxics Shipment Transportation Safety

Los Angeles, August 15, 1991

Good morning Assemblyman Katz.

On behalf of the NCJW I wish

to commend you for holding this important hearing,

and bring to

your attention key issues of concern to our Environment Committee.
As you know, our organization played a major role in the Rocketdyne
case,

and

we

environmental

are

once

again

organizations

disposal of nuclear waste.

involved

in

committed to

a

vi tal

the safe

alliance

of

handling and

We are here because of our concern for

the transportation accidents attendant with the Ward Valley Low
Level Radioactive Waste Facility.

Included in such transportation

grids is air shipments of radioactive material.
One

of

NCJW's

national

resolutions

on

nuclear

power

specifically concerns the safe transport of nuclear waste and the
safe disposal.
disposal,

and

Almost all attention has focused to date on the
none

on

transportation

safety.

As

the

press

statement of our alliance makes clear, we expect that these issues
be addressed in advance of a license, not afterward.
According to an article by Nancy Leiserowitz in the Feb. 22,
1990

Lansing

State

Journal,

"more

than

2

million

radioactive

packages ... are shipped in the United States each year . . . . Trucks
carrying nuclear waste have accidents at the standard rate of one
accident for every 150,000 miles traveled.
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"From 1971 to 1985 there were 1034 accidents or incidents
involving low-level wastes.
were actual
Kansas
spilled.

bypass,

released.
in

11

1978,

In 90 cases,

radioactive materials

The worst case was on I-235 Wichita,
when

54

drums

of

uranium

yellowcake

Motorists and the Highway Patrol rushed to assist and

walked through the material,

unaware of its danger.

The first

person to respond, a state trooper, died of lung cancer seven years
later.
Every community along a radioactive/toxic haul route faces a
Bhopal situation.

Few are prepared.

We must examine the safety

of transporting these materials rather than safe on-site storage
as practiced in Canada.
Again, NCJW appreciates the opportunity to testify today, and
urges this committee to pursue answers to these critical questions.
###
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FOR RELEASE AUGUST 15, 1991

LAURA LAKE

(213) 470-4522
PRESS RELEASE

Imagine i f you will that the last two California train spills
had been radioactive cargoes rather than highly toxic chemicals.
This committee has the task of asking what can go wrong with toxic
and nuclear waste shipment--before it happens again.
r-:;......,r-, .... ..--:--..~ ...
-._J '-4 .t:.'- -

vias te

4- '"...-. •:_

proposed

t~e

tc

:E~~=~

a

t::C.e

f~::

Ward

Valley

Dt:.rr.p

Low

Assecbly Transportation

Leve2

C:~~ittee

investigation and public hearings on:

safety and

insurance

record

of

the

f i rrr.s

engage-::

hauling rad:oactive waste,
the labeling

req~irements

for this cargo,

the status of rail and road systems leading to the dump (see
at tache:!

r.evJs

washed-c~t

article

December

2 5,

1990,

reads to the Ward Valley site),
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July

2 5,

1990

s~c>·::.

ng

the liability for California for non-California radioactive
waste transported to the site, and
the preparedness of first
and volunteer firefighters,

responders,

including the CHP,

to respond to radioactive spills, and

finally, the liability for cleanup of contaminated sites.
Until

a

full

study

is

conducted,

the

alliance

urges

the

Transportation Committee to support a moratorium on the siting of
the Ward Valley Facility, and to order the Department of Health
Services not to issue a license pending the transportation safety
analysis of this committee ..
These
safety

organizations

impacts

of

the

are
Ward

concerned
Valley

that. the

site

were

transportation
ignored

by

the

Department of Health Services in the Environmental Impact Report
process.
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JOSEPH Q. JArtVI

Dir•ctor

Htealth Ojfk,

ENT OF

UMAN

OUR

HEALTH Dl\'!S!ON
flA<llologlc•l He•lth Section

50S L•:·l

C<>r,on

!{in~

CH~·.

.Str-:<'1, Hoom 203

Nev<>tb

89710

(702) 885-53')4

Dear Mr. Fu

r-son:

acknmvledged.
The lettar
doc1.wnent~d
during
state
inspections of low-level radi.oactive waste shipments received at
Rocky I1ountain Compact Reg.i onal faciLity near Beatty, Nv.

Your letter dated Oc:tcbe:r 1, 1937,
1:equest.s

a

surrunary

of

is

,_.iola.tions

ng categories sumrnnrize the violation types documented
May 1, 1986 - December Jl, 1986.
Documentation-Related
Improper/In~omplete bill of lading
Improper placards or improper display of placards

Radiation Safety-Related
No notification prior to entering state
Bracing not adequate to prevent-. all mo•:ement of
shipment contents
Radiation levels exceeding permissible limits ·
Drive failure to follo\·l exclusive usc instructions
Containers wit~ 1oose locking/closure device

3
19
1

14
1
1
5
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STATE OF NEVADA

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
HEALTH DIVISION
RADIOLOGICAl. HEALTH SECTIOIJ

505 East l<lng Street, Room 202
Carson C'ty, NE-vada

RICHARD H. BRYAN

89710

JERRY GRII!PENTROG

(702) 865-5394

GOViJfllOf

D11telor

April 3, 1987

Eob Fulkerson
Citizen Alert

P.O. Box 5391
Reno, Nevada 89513
Dear Mr. Fulkerson:
Your

letter dated March 4, 1987 is acknowledged.
The- letter
requested information concerning the Beatty low-level radio~ctive
waste di~posal site .
...

Month
1986 January

February
Iv1arch
Apr"il
Hay

June
July
August
September
oct;pber
November
December

.!.O"d

Shipments
0
0
0

3
11
7

21
21

37
31
24
49

Violations
0
0
0
0

Volume(cu.

,....
'

ft.)

0
0
0

1,327.5

5
2

5,200.9

8

8,080.5
8,566.5
15,108.8
16,884.8

10
7
10
2
11

2,952.3

12,696.1
23,403.9

I.

April 3, 1987
Bob Fulkerson
Citizen Alert

Page 2
I>lonth

Shipments

1987 January
February

47
35

Vtolations
9
0

Sincerely,

ct£f!\~~l,

Supervisor

Radiological Health Section
Bureau of Regulatory Health Services

SM:kf;fulkersn.txt/cd2
cc:

Bill Schneider
Larry Matheis

Jerry Griepentrog
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Volume( cu. ft.)

18,905.1
13,216.0

CONSULT ANTS
John R Steve~s
Pnnc>pa

MEMBERS
Deae Alpert
Rusty Are:as
W,il:am Baker
Steve C>ute
J><r Costa
De.a>ne Eastin
Gerald Eaves
Robert Fra!ee
Bev Hansen
9, Lancaster
Baroara Lee
Ted Lempert
Tom McCI,ntOCK
Torn Umberg
Pau: Woodruff

J\ssemhlu
Olal ifnrnia 1fiegislature

L EnK Lange
Katnryn B R11e)
COMMITTEE SECRETARY

ADDRESS
State Cap•to
Sacramento CA 95814
(916) 445-7276

ASSEMBLY COMMITIEE ON
TRANSPORTATION
RICHARD KATZ
Chairman

July 29, 1991
R. F. Starzel
Vice Chairman
Southern Pacific Transportation Company
One Market Plaza
San Francisco, CA 94105
Dear Mr. Starzel:
Yesterday, a Southern Pacific train derailed on the main line
between Los Angeles and Oakland, spilling hydrazine on the rails
near Ventura. In the wake of the Dunsmuir tragedy earlier this
month, this incident raises serious concerns about Southern
Pacific's ability to safely transport hazardous materials on
California's rails.
Should either of these accidents have occurred in the densely
populated areas through which these trains traveled, the
consequences would have been even more devastating.
For that reason, I am requesting that Southern Pacific immediately
take the following voluntary steps:
1) Perform an immediate inspection of all equipment (including
rail cars owned by other entities) and track used for the
transportation of hazardous material.
2) Implement enhanced safe operating procedures at locations on
any Southern Pacific line with a pattern or history of
derailments. Such procedures could include instituting the use of
helper locomotives at lower weight thresholds than is currently
the case in areas such as the Dunsmuir derailment site.
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I believe these actions are necessary in order to ensure the
safety of California's citizens and to restore the confidence of
the public in the safety of our rail system.
I look forward to
your immediate response to this request.

~0'1
KA~

RICHARD

Chair, Assembly Transportation
Committee
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Southem Pacific
Transportation Company

Mr. Richard Katz
Chair, Assembly Transportation Committee
State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Chairman Katz:
Please refer to your letter of July 29 expressing your
concerns about the movement of hazardous materials on railroads in
California, and specifically requesting that Southern Pacific take
voluntary steps to enhance safety.
Your letter makes two specific requests, and
them in turn.

I

shall address

First, inspection of all equipment and track used for the
transportation of hazardous material:
The rail industry is
governed by the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, which sets
forth the standards of operation, inspection, maintenance, and
safety for both equipment and track. Adherence to these standards
is monitored by Federal Railroad Administration inspectors who are
constantly visiting our property.
These regulations require
regular foot-by-foot inspections of track by qualified inspectors
(generally twice weekly on our main-line routes) and we follow
these schedules scrupulously.
In fact, our track maintenance,
inspection, and safety standards, and speed of trains restrictions
equal or are more stringent than those specified by the Federal
Railroad Administration.
We also inspect rail cars on our property (including cars
owned by others) before they are moved in a train, and repeat the
inspection process as the train moves through each major terminal.
In addition, crew members must inspect their own and other trains
at each opportunity.
All employees working on line are also
required to observe each passing train.
Second, you also ask about institution of new operating
procedures whenever clusters of accidents are found.
we are
concerned when accident clusters are found, and the Engineering,
Operating, and Mechanical groups within the Company cooperatively
tackle the problem to find the right answer. Sometimes revised
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operating procedures will reduce accidents; other times track
changes, or mechanical responses, will be needed.
We do stand
ready to implement operating procedure changes that will help.
In addition to these corrective measures which respond to
accidents or accident patterns, it should be noted that Southern
Pacific is regarded in the industry as a leader in promoting
measures which will help prevent accidents.
Southern Pacific, for many years, has been an active leader in
the Inter-industry Task Force on the safe transportation of
hazardous materials by rail. This Task Force is sponsored by the
Association of .American Railroads (AAR), the Chemical Manufacturers
Association (CMA) and the Railway Progress Institute (RPI). This
Task Force has been instrumental in instituting safe work practices
for the Chemical and Railroad industry, and as example, attached is
a copy of .AAR Circular No. OT-SSA, which recornmands operating
practices for the transportation of hazardous materials. Southern
Pacific has not only adopted these operating practices but, in
addition, has established even more stringent practices, namely:
Any train on Southern Pacific containing a s~ngle car placarded
Explosive A, poison gas,. radioactive, or a tank car containing a
product classified as flammable gas or any of 21 other specific
commodities (including 15 environmentally sensitive commodities) is
given the recommended handling.
Additionally, we have been very active within the Task Force
to encourage the use of a stronger vehicle (steel pressure
specification car with a working pressure of 500 PSI, head shields,
no bottom outlets, etc.) for the transportation of selected
environmentally sensitive commodities.
I assure you we are making every effort to maintain and
increase margins of safety so we can quickly restore, through
results, yours and the public's full confidence in our rail system.
The railroads are a much safer conduit for hazardous materials
commerce than the highways, and we want to make our system even
safer.
Your

/
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truly,

H. H. Bradley
\'in· President

December ll, 1990

CIRCULAR No. OT-55-A
RECOMMENDED RAILROAD OPERATING PRACTICES
FOR TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
TO THE MEMBERS:
Based on recorumendations of the Inter-Industry Task Force en
the safe transportation of hazardous waterials by rail, the o-T
General Com."'ni t:tee and the AAR Board of Directors approved for
im.mediat~ publication the following recommended operating practices
for the transportation of hazardous materials.
Road operating Practices
I. Industry-wide Implementation of "Key Trains"
A. Definition: Any train with five tank car loads of poison
inhalation hazard (packing group I, as defined in HM-181) or 20 car
loads or interrnodal portable tank loads of a combination of PIH
(PGI}, flammable gas, Class A explosives, and environmentally
sensitive chemicals shall be called a "Key Train".
Attached as
Appendix A is a list of PIH (PGI) and environmentally sensitive
chemicals with 49 STCCs.
B. Restrictions:
1. Maximum speed -- "Key Train" - 50 MPH.
2. Unless siding or auxiliary track meets FRA Class 2
standards, a Key Train will hold main track at meeting or passing
points, when practicable.
3. After 12/31/93 no cars with friction bearings will be
perwitted in any 11 Key Train 11 • The A.AR will initiate the process of
amending the lnterchange Rules to require that all cars with
friction bearings be eliminated from interchange service by
12/31/93 rather than the current date of 12/31/94.
200
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4. When a moving "Key Tra
is stopped by any emergency
brake application, or by some unknown cause, the train must be
inspected for derailed or defective cars. If the train is stopped
at a place where it cannot be safely inspected (e.g. bridge), the
train may be moved if conditions permit to the nearest place where
it can be safely inspected.
5. If a defect in a "Key Traintt journal is reported by a
wayside detector, but a visual inspection fails to confirm evidence
of a defect, the train will not exceed 30 MPH until it has passed
over the next wayside detector. If the same car again sets off the
next detector, it must be set out from the train.
11.

Industrywide Designation of ' 1 Key Routes"

A. Definition: Any track with a combination of 10, ooo car
loads or intermodal portable tank loads of hazardous materials, or
a combination of 4,000 car loadings of PIH (PGI), flammable gas,
Class A explosives, and environmentally sensitive chemicals, over
a period of one year.
B. Requirements:
l. Wayside defective bearing detectors shall be placed a
maximum of 40 miles apart on "Key Routesn, or equivalent level of
protection may he installed based on improvement in technology.
2. Main Track on "Key Routesn must be inspected by rail
defect detection and track geometry inspection cars or any
equivalent level of inspection no less than two times each year;
and sidings must be similarly inspected no less than one time each
year.
3. Any track used for meeting and passing "Key Trains" must
be Class 2 or better. If a meet or pass must occur on less than
Class 2 track due to an emergency, one of the trains must be
stopped before the other train passes.
III.

Yard Operating Practices

A. Maximum reasonable efforts will be made to achieve coupling
of loaded placarded tank cars at speeds not to exceed 4 MPH.
B. Loaded placarded tank cars of PIH (PGI) or fla~able gas
which are cut off in motion for coupling must be handled in not
more than 2-car cuts; and cars cut off in motion to be coupled
directly to a loaded placarded tank car of PIH (PGI) or flammable
gas must also be handled in not more than 2-car car cuts.
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IV. STORAGE
Proposed Separation Distance (In Feet)
Loaded Tank Cars and storage Tanks from Mainline
Class II Track or Better
PIH (PGI), Flammable

Activity

Combustible Liquid,
Corrosive Material
and ORM's

Liquid,

Gas,
and
All Other Hazard Classes
Flamma~le
Non-fla~able Gas

Loading or unloading
if conditions permit
not less than

50

25

100
50

Storage of loaded tank cars

25

50

Storage in tanks
If conditions permit
not less than

50

25

100
50

With regard to existing facilities, maximum reasonable effort
should be made to conform to this standard taking into
consideration cost, physical and legal constraints.
The proposals apply to storage on railroad property and on
company property located close to railroad mainline.

che~ical

V. TRAINING OF TRANSPORTATION EMPLOYEES
Imple~entation
of Railroad
Railroad Operating Employees

Industry

Training

Objectives

for

The following obiectives should be met in everv railroad's
for training operating employees (non-emergency resRonders)
Who handle hazardous materials in transpQitation:
~rogram

A. Employees (including supervisors) who handle shipments of
hazardous materials in rail transportation should learn to perform
the following tasks as they apply to their assigned duties:
1. Comply with the requirements for hazardous materials
shipping data in rail transportation of hazardous materials;
2. Recognize markings and
presence of hazardous materials;
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placards

that

indicate

the
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3. When required by regulation, inspect the external
conditions of placarded hazardous materials shipments to assure
that they are properly prepared for transportation;
4.
switch placarded hazardous material shipments
compliance with applicable rules and regulations; and

in

5. Place placarded hazardous material shipments in a train
in compliance with applicable rules and regulations.
B. Employees (including supervisors) who handle shipments of
hazardous materials in rail transportation should learn to perform
the following tasks in hazardous materials incidents:
1. Make the appropriate identifications and notifications and
provide the appropriate information as required by railroad
operating rules and instructions for handling hazardous materials;
2. Take appropriate action to protect self and others on the
scene; and
3. Provide assistance to the local emergency response agencies
in the form of identification of the hazardous materials and their
location(s) on the train.

c. The training objectives set out in paragraphs A and B
(above) should apply to and meet the specific requirelnents of
particular crafts, for example: train crews, inspectors, and clerks
who prepare consist information.
D. The objectives set out in paragraphs A and B (above) cover
a basic training program for employees (including supervisors).
Frequency of training in this category should be consistent with
the timing of existing railroad re-examination programs.
E. Training of employees {including supervisors) who handle
shipments of hazardous materials on a "Key Route" (as defined in
Part II above) should be conducted on an annual basis.
This
training should meet the objectives set out in paragraphs A and B
{above}, but should also cover additional subject matter, including
special hazardous material operating requirements for the route,
yard emergency plans and practices in those plans, and basic
chemical characteristics.
Each of these employees should
demonstrate proficiency by passing a written examination or by
other means such as a successful work practices audit.
F. All training should be recorded.
It will suffice if the
individual carries a card indicating that he meets certain
requirements or if his personnel record indicates the date and
level of training received.

..
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EIH

(PGI) Liquids as proposed in HM-181

4921401
4906410
4906420
4907425
4907607
4907404
4923209
49:36110
4918505
4918507
4920101
4907415
4907485

Acetone cyanohydrin
Acrolein, inhibited
Acrylonitrile
Ally alcohol
Allyl chloroformate
Allylamine 1
Arsenic trichloride
Bromine or bromine solutions
Bromine pentafluoride
Bromine trifluoride
Bromoacetone
n-Butyl isocyanate
tert-Butyl isocyanate 1
n-Butylchloroformate 2
sec-Butylchloroformate2
Chloroacetic acid, liquid
Chloroacetone, mono, stabilized
Chloroacetonitrile 1
Chloroacetophenone (CN) liquid
Chloropicrin*
Chloropicrin mixtures, N.o.s.·
Chloropivaloylchloride2
Crotonaldehyde, stabilized
Cyanogen bromide (solid)
Cyclohexyl isocyanate 1
3, 5 Dichloro-2, 4, 6 trifluoropyridine 2
Oiketene, inhibited 1
Dimethyhydrazine, symmetrical 2
Dimethyhydrazine, unsymmetrical
Dimethyl thiophosphoryl chloride 2
Dimethyldichlorosilane
Dimethylphosphorochloridothioate
Diphenylchloroarsine (solid) 1*
Ethyl chloroformate
Ethyl chlorothioformate
Ethyl isocyanate 1
Ethyl phosphonothioic dichloride, anhydrous
Ethyldichloroarsine 1
Ethylene chlorohydrin
Ethylene dibromide
Ethyleneimine, inhibited
Hexachlorocyclopentadiene
Hydrocyanic acid aqueous solution (HCN 5-20%) 1
Hydrogen cyanide, anhydrous·
Iron pentacarbony1 1
Isopropylchloroformate 1
Methoxymethyl isocyanate 2
Methyl chloroformate
Methyl
~socy~nate and
M.e..+-"''F, , __ ......
..L._, solutions
l.... _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

'J

n ;,

-

4931444
4925250/4921558
4921009
4925220
4921414/4921415
4920105/4921416/4921015/
4920505/4921514
4909137
4923229
4921010
4915333
4906210
4907610
4933319
4925240/4921570
4907617
4933327
4907434
4933355

4921404
4921420

4921497
4906220
4933015
4920136
4920125/4920127/4920130
4921033

4907628
4907429
4907448

(Page
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December 10, 1990
PIH (PG!) Liquids as proposed in HM-181

Methyl orthosilicate 1
Methyl phosphonic dichloride
Methyl phosphonousdichloride, pyrophoric liquid
Methyl bromide and ethylene dibromide mirture, liquid
Methylchloromethyl ether
Methyldichlorosilane*
Methylene isocyanate 2
Methylhydrazine
Methyltrichlorosilane
Nitric acid (over 70%) 3
Nitric acid, red fuming
tert-octylmercaptan2
Pentaborane
Perchloromethylmercaptan
Phenyl isocyanate 2
Phenyl mercaptan
Phenylcarbylamine chloride 1
Phenyldichloroarsine
Phenyltrichlorosilane
Phosphorus oxychloride
Phosphorus trichloride
Poisonous liquid, N.o.s. 1
Poisonous liquids, flammable, N.o.s. 1
Poisonous liquids, corrosive, N.o.s. 2
n-Propyl chloroformate 1
Sulfur chloride (mono)
Sulfur trioxide, inhibited or uninhibited
Tetranitromethane
Thionyl chloride
Thiophosgene
Titanium tetrachloride
Trimethylchorosilane
Xylyl bromide

4907452
4936020
4906067
4921438
4907430
4907625
4906230
4907630
4918529
4906060
4921473
4921413
4921587
4921474
4934275
4932352
4932359
4920910
4920170
4907656
4932380
4930050/4930051
4918180
4930060
4923298
4932385
4907680
4925260

Materials that are not in 49 CFR 172.101 Table by name but have been
assigned a 49 STCC under an appropriate N.o.s. proper shipping name.
2

Materials that are not in 49 CFR 172.101 Table by name and which do
not have an assigned 49 STCC code. Since no one has requested a 49
STCC number, it is unlikely that the material is moved by tank car.

3

There is no proper shipping name for Nitric Acid (over 70%).
Acid (over 40%/ is the D.o.T. proper shipping name.
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(PGI} Gases as proposed in HM-lSl

Arsine

Sromine chloride 1
Carbonyl fluoride 1
Chlorine
Chlorine pentafluoride 1
Chlorine trifluoride
Chloropicrin and methylbromide mixtures·
Chloropicrin and methylchloride mixtures
Compressed or liquified gases; flammable, toxic,
N.o.s., LC50 less than or equal to 1,000 ppm2
Compressed or liquified gases, toxic, N.o.s.,
LCSO less than or equal to 200 ppm2
Cyanogen Chloride
cyanogen, liquified
Diborane
Diborane mixtures
Fluorine, compressed
Germane
Hexaethyl tetraphosphate & compressed gas mix.
Hexafluoroacetone 1
Hydrogen selenide, anhydrous
Hydrogen sulfide, liquefied
Insecticide gases, toxic, N.o.s. 2
.Methyl bromide*
Methyl chlorosilane 2
Methyl mercaptan
Nitric oxide
Nitric oxide and nitrogen tetroxide mixtures 1
Nitrogen dioxide
Nitrogen trioxide 1
Organic Phosphate or compounds mixed with
compressed gas
Oxygen difluoride 1
Parathion and compressed gas mixtures
Phosg-ene
Phosphine
Phosphorus pentafluoride 1
Selenium hexafluoride 1
Stibine 1
Sulfur tetrafluoride 1
Tungsten hexafluoride

4920135
4920715
4920559
4904120
4920720
4918210

4921507
4920105

4920506
4920115
4905420
4905425
4904030
4920120
4920515

4921697
4920122
4905410

4921440/4921650
4905520
4920330
4920370
4920340
4920374

4920530
4920235
4920535

4920540
4920160
4920533
4920915
4920167
4920555

4932387

Materials that are not in 49 CFR 172.101 Table by name but have been
assigned a 49 STCC under an appropriate N.O.S. proper shipping name.
Materials that are not in 49 CFR 172.101 Table by name and which do
not have an assigned 49 STCC code. Since no one has requested a 49
STCC number, it is unlikely that the material is moved by tank car.
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Environmentally Sensitive Chemicals
Allyl Chloride*
Carbon Tetrachloride*
Chloro:benzene·
Chloroform*
Dichlorobenzene'"

Dichloropropane*
Oichloropropane(Dichloropropene mixture*

4907412
49403.20
4909153
4940310/4940311
4941127
4909269
4907640
4909255
4908162

Oichloropropene
Ethyl Chloride*
Ethylene Dibromide* (alreadly listed as PIH)
Ethylene Dibromide and Methyl Bromide Mixtures• (already listed as PIH)
Ethylene Dichloride·
4909166
4907420
Epiehlorohydrin*
4941176
Methyl Chloroform*
Methylene Chloride*
4941132
4940355
Perchloroethylene·
Perchloroethylene{Trichloroethylene mixture*
4940373
Trichloroethylene
4941171
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August 13, 1991

Mr. Richard Rat~
Chairman
Assembly Committee on Transportation
Assembly California Legislature
State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Please refer to your letter of July 23, 1991 concerning the
J'uly 14 Southern Pacific Transportation Company ( "SPT") derailment
near Dunsmuir. Following up on my July 29, 1991 response to you,
SPT has developed the following further information in response to
your requests:
1.

In response to the second request in your letter, the
rail, tie, and surfacing maintenance performed on the
line within a mile in each direction of the derailment
for the past three years is set forth in Attachment A.
The information is broken down by date, location, and the
amount of work performed. Please note that heavy tie and
surfacing maintenance on Southern Pacific is scheduled on
a 4-year cycle.
The last heavy tie and surfacing
maintenance occurred on the line in 1987 and was
scheduled again for later this year.

2.

In response to your third request, we are reviewing the
privacy considerations involved in disclosing the safety
record of the engineer and conductor involved and will
further respond to you concerning this request shortly.

3.

In response to the seventh request in your letter, the
total number of placarded rail cars, trailers and
containers transported over the line by year from 1986
through the first six months of 1991 are set forth in
Attachment B.

If SPT can be of further assistance, please let me know.

RFS/LPW/tg
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·· C ··· L 1 N C Mr:· :;: 2 6 • 9 8 071:::1/91

WORV
[lATE:

:::2 8 • 9 8

FROM
MILEPOST

MILEF·OST

S27.20

S27.15

TO

-----------------·-----10/09/87
:::2!:,. 50
:::27.40
12/27/89
12/28/89

12/29/89
10/04/90
02/26/87

10/07/87
09/25/90
10/08/90
09/24/90

09/21/90
10/02/90
10/01/90
10/06/87
07/29/87

0l/Z9/89
07/29/87
o:::/Ob/90

10/05/E::?
07/12/89
06/14/91

:!!27. 20
;::27. 20
;:;27. 50
327.70
:::27.70
827.80
:::~... 7.

80

=::::.?. 15

:::27.15
327.50

327.70
:::28. 00
::;:27. 80
:::27.80

M OF
TIES

600
::;7

59
~

......

~:· L..

36
6

504
1 ....
L.

48
11
7
47

:~27.

~:27.

:::28.01

:::27.90
:::27.95
:=:27. 98
:?!28 .. 20

:;:22

:::28.02

-::·
.,.

:;:28. 05
;~::28. 08

15

90
:::27.90
:::z7. 95
~:327. 98

::;28 .. 02
::::;:>8. 05
:::~'8.

08

:::28.20
:::~'ft. "'i 0
:::28. 60
:.:;28. 7:':·

90

:::28-20
:::;;:·9. 20
~:zt-;. 60
:::28. 75

28

......

12
::; 2 J
6
1"'

..
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'

... ,. .,

!rt::.lAJI_

OF SURFAC.:JNG MAINTENANCE 1987 TO DATE.
~c~

LINE MP 326.98 - 328.98
07/:::1/91

WOf::~~

F f.;; OM

IrATE

M:CLE.F·OST

--------------10/22/87
325.00
05/22/87
10/19/87
10/21/87
O:J/09/90

05/21/87
10/12/90
10/11/90
07/20/91
06/:::0/87
10/09/9G'
05/21/87
06/01/88
07/19/91
l.0/04/90
10/08/90
04/25/87
1 Q/l~~/87
06/04/91
07/26/91
10/14/87

S26.90
:'£!27. 00
::::7.00
:';~27 .15

TCJ
MILEF·OST

-------

327.40
327. ll.

2112
580

:!:27. :::o
~=27.

:;:27 .. ?.G
327.64
:::27.70
827.70
:::27,.80

:;:26. 90

90
2:28.00
:;:28. 00
~:27.

45

:::27.:::2
:::27. 90
=;:~··7. 60
:::27. :;4
328. 10

:::ze. C>5
:::za. 10
328.20
827.80

oo

::::za. 2c~

:?:28.00

:;:28. 10

:::;.;~e.

:::2:8.

j

0

:::~·8

..

~;0

:;::;;;:8. 10

::;.zc:. 20

~~::~8.

10

10/02/99

:::28"

:~6

10/13/87
10/0l/90
0?/29/89
06/05/91.
10/0::;:/89
10/16/90

:;:z:c. 40

:::28. ,C:(-)
:~!28. 4:::
:::28.60

:::28. 60
::::?8. 7 4
:::~8. 80
:::28.85
3£~S).

5(J

FEET

-------:::;:? .00
:::z;r. 1 o

SZ7.25

:?.27. 8~~
:-:::27.85

SURF" ACE

~:,:8.

:~:~S.

4:::
69

10584
1056

600
1E>56
2112
1160
l.036
lt::=l
1~:68

1:;:zc
10~;6

1056
1056
1056
1056
444
2120
C" ... \0

... •t..-..J

1640
390
1140
;!:90

1050

:::28. 70

528

:.'0

1848
1.056

~::28.

:::2G. 8~;
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ATTACHMENT B

PLACARDED LOADS OVER SHASTA ROUTE

Inte.rmodal
Containers

Year

~rloads

1986
1987

5118
4883

100

1988
1989
1990

4854

104

5141
5727

1991

2486

262

233

135

142

Intermodal

t,railers
361

175
397
530
3446
2113

Southam Pacific
Transportation Company
Southern Pacific Building • One Market Plaza • San Francisco, California 94105
K. A

MOORE

,.ICE PRESIOENT·Of"'!:qA Tl0f'.l5

From: K.A. Moore, Vice President -Operations
R.H. Berry, Chief Mechanical Officer
To:

General Managers
Assistant Chief Mechanical Officers
All Locomotive Plant Managers

Date: March 23, 1990
RE:

Policy Memo -- FRA Enforcement Activities

Southern Pacific Transportation Company has adopted the attached policy
document to address the stepped-up Federal Railway Administration inspection
activity and defect discovery rate during the past year.
This policy will also further the railroad's commitment to a safe and reliable
locomotive fleet, reduce fines, and stem the costly service interruptions that
FRA discovered violations have created.
Nothing short of the highest level of commitment by each and every Southern
Pacific employee involved will give us the focus and attention to detail that is
necessary to successfully implement this policy.
Please read the objectives and assignments carefully. Questions concerning the
specific requirements of this policy should be addressed to R.H. Berry.

K. A. Moore
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BACKGROLJNI?

ISSUES~

o

Significantly increased Congressional oversight activity.

o

Changes in the Federal Railway Administration's legislative
authority and administrative procedures brought about by the
1988 Rail Safety lmprovement Act have dramatically affected
SPTCo.

o

Inspection activity is up; there is a higher proportion of
violations to inspections; there are higher fines per
violation. The impacts of this increased FRA activity are

unacceptable.
0

In February 1989, the FRA effectively closed down our

Tucson facility for over 48 hours. The resultant service
disruptions jeopardized over $225,000,000 in SPTCo.
revenues and even more importantly, threatened a loss of
goodwill by thousands of our customers.

o

By effectively responding to these mounting FRA challenges,
SPTCo. will also support its overall goal of operating a safe

and reliable locomotive fleet.

GOALS OF TinS PROGBAM:
1.

To promote a safe and reliable locomotive fleet

2.

By July 1, 1990, reduce by 50% the defect ratio (found
through random sampling) and by January 1) 1991 achieve
an additional 25% reduction.

3.

To avoid diverting resources (both shop time and money)
from preventative maintenance to handling FRA induced
service disruptions.

2
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FRA Locomotive Defect Discovery Rate
' of lnepeoted Unite Found Defective

100\ ---------------··--------·-------

80\ -·---------·------------------------/

20\ ----··---------------·--

------------------

0\~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

J F MA M J J A S 0 N D J F MA M J J A S 0 N D J F
Month (Jan 88 • Feb SO)
pNpartcl by W..ttrn PoWir AIIOCiatea
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The FRA Shutdown of SP's Tucson Yard Put
$225,000,000 of Annual Revenue at Risk!
o

7 stack and UPS trains significantly delayed

o

Thousands of valued customers representing
annual revenue of $225,000,000 to SP were
impacted with delayed shipments.

o

The shutdown tied up 38 locomotives for
approximately 400 hours of additional
maintenance and repairs. It cost the railroad
tens of thousands of dollars.

How Many More Shutdowns Can
Southern Pacific Afford ?

NONE!!!

4
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OVERVIEW

FRA COMPUANCE PLAN
This plan requires a high level of commitment on the part of all involved parties to

aggressively pursue continual improvement in the quality and safety-related conditions
of the SP/SSW locomotive fleet. Plan Implementation is a multi-faceted strategy to
improve: the quality of locomotives released from major plants and service facilities
through employee involvement and self-monitoring, and the routine servicing of
locomotives (including those from outlying areas) at these facilities on a periodic
basis, at an increased frequency.
Critical to the success of this plan is to clearly identify those facilities capable of
performing high quality service levels (SLS, SLT, SLF and cleaning) as opposed to
those qualified to perform run-through type, mainline servicing (SLN). ln this regard,
most SPT facilities have been evaluated and certified as capable of performing levels
of service/overhaul from SLN through M30. (See Facility Matrix -- Page 6.)
FACILITIES CERTIFIED TO SERVICE ALL CLASSES OF POWER:
Eugene, Roseville (service track), West Colton, I.A Taylor, El Paso,
Houston (Hardy Street), Pine Bluff (service track), Alton & Southern,
Denver and Salt Lake City.
FACILITIES CERTIFIED TO SERVICE LOCAL AND SWITCH LOCOMOTIVES ONLY:
Oakland, San Antonio, Kansas City, Tucson, Avondale, Lafayette, East St.
Louis, Grand Junction and Pueblo. (Some additional remote locations
may, from time to time, be certified to service switch engines.)
Each of these locations is equipped to satisfactorily dispatch all classes of locomotives,
of the category described above, in compliance with existing safety regulations and
policies or take appropriate action to handle as a "non-complying'' locomotive.

5
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FACILmES CERTIFIED FOR SERVlNG ALL LOCOMOTIVES

-----------------------------------...-----------------------------------------------------SLS
SLT
SLF
M03 M06 M12
M50
M30
---------------------------...·-·---------------------------------------------......... -......

Service Level
...............

Eugene " .........
Rose..ille ......
LA Taylor .....
W. Colton .....
El Paso .......
Hardy Street ...
Pine Bluff . " " ".
Denver .........
Salt Lake City ..
Sacramento
A&S . . ...

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

FACILITIES CERTIFIED FOR LOCAL AND SWITCH SERVICING

------------------·--..-------------------..............................._...________________________________ ______..._______________.................... -- ... -----·
Service Level
SLS
M03 M06 M12
M50 ...____________
M30
SLT
SLF
_____ .........-............._____
__ ............... _......__________________________________________________
....._... _................. .
.,....,

..,.,...,.,._..,

Oakland .. ,. ...
Bakersfield ....
San Antonio ...
Kansas City ., ....
Tucson 1 ......
Pueblo .........
Avondale ......
Lafayette ......
East St. Louis ..•
Grand Junction .

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
:X:

:X:

X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

GP35's working out of Tucson will receive SLS at Tucson Service Track.

6
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KEY CONCEPTS:

o

Plant Managers and Division Mechanical Officers are responsible to attest
that locomotives released from their respective facilities comply with
existing regulations and policies.

o

Plant Managers and Division Mechanical Officers, will coordinate the
rotation of units with Regional Transportation Center Officers as follows:
Don Marson in the Western Region, Assistant Chief Dispatchers in the
Central Region, and Torn Williams in the Eastern Region.
Locomotives will be routed to the appropriate facility for SLS, SLT, SLF or
maintenance at least every:

o

-- 7 days for road freight locomotives
-- 15 days for local or switch locomotives.

1

OVERALL APPROACH:
To make a significant improvement in FRA compliance of our locomotive fleet by:
1) quantifying the degree of our problem; 2) measuring improvement; and 3)
communicating the results back to our employees. To better accomplish this,
management team involvement at the locomotive facilities will be significantly
increased. Officers will randomly check the quality of repaired locomotives using
standard formats. Supervisors will be required to inspect outbound consists, and
lastly, in-house audit teams will periodically visit locomotive facilities to verify the
quality of the product.
Obviously, a critical element is employee involvement, and that improved involvement
is a function of better two-way communication. A significant effort has begun to
communicate to SPTCo. employees the severity of our problem and the need for more
consistent attention to detail.
1

• A separate study C\IJTently under way will address locations currendy usa:! for locomotive fueling with the intent of
reducing the number of locations fueling locomotives. Mainline fueling locations such as Tucson, Dalhart. Liberal, Kirby,
Herington, Hoisington, .Klamath Falls, Spatia, will do SLN only, whlc::h does not satisfy the 7 or 15 day periodic: lei'Vicing
requirement.

7
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MAIN OBJECITVE:

The main objective of this plan is to complete more high quality repairs and to
measure the results of efforts at the major locomotive repair and service facilities.
With increased discipline in routing locomotives on a timely basis to repair facilities
which have adequate machinery, materials and trained personnel, our ability to
produce safer locomotives with improved FRA compliance is certain.

8
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INITIATIVES
FRA COMPUANCE

I.

BACKGROUND/COMMUNICATION
A.

Meeting with General Managers -- February 23, 1990
(1)

Review of aggressive FRA Activity

(2)

Conceptualize Plan

B.

Meeting with Plant Managers - February 26, 1990

C.

Meetings with Division Mechanical Officers - March and April 1990
(1)

FRA Activity

(2)

Impact of 1988 Rail Safety Improvement Act
(a)
(b)

(c)

II.

Implication of Daily Inspection
Increased fine level
Personal liability

IN-PLANT INITIATIVES
A.

Improve In-Plant Quality/Reliability
(1)

Plants must provide high quality locomotives
(a)
(b)

Supervisors inspect each consist prior to departure
Officers will spot check consists each tour of duty

9
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(2)

Provide training on specific defects
(a)

Develop checklists of most common FRA defects

(3)

Major repairs to be done while unit is in shop -- minor on
service track

( 4)

Emphasis on FRA clean transcontinental power

(5)

Consider relocating locomotive supplies if other locations
are available and satisfactory

(6)

Develop wheel match data document when locomotive
comes off drop pit or peeler

(7)

Hostler inspection at locations where hostlers put outbound
consists on train
(a)
(b)

(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

(h)

General cab condition
Speedometer
Heater
lights
Radio
Auto-brake valve
Dynamic brake
Sanders

(8)

Feedback by engineer directly to plant manager via special letter

(9)

Use employee involvement techniques to promote quality
improvement

(10)

Use internal measure of quality
(a)
(b)

(11)

Mean days between failures
Number of FRA defects during audits

Increase quantity and quality of heavy overhaul
10
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(12)

High potential test units with "nothing found" reports and
second time failures for ground relay

(13)

Perform FRA daily inspections where possible
at locations where mechanical craft forces are available

III. OUTLYING POINTS

A.

Control of Power
(1)

Run-through power back to SP for 92-day inspections

(2)

Trade out local power for service and fuel.
(a)

B.

Plant Managers will work with Regional Transportation
Center to accomplish within respective regions

Training
(1)

Develop and distribute engineer training film

(2)

Distribute information to Regional
Transportation Centers on mechanical
requirements

(3)

Increase shop craft and supervisor technical training
by EMD/GE

(4)

Training of training officers
(a)
(b)

(5)

Refresher training on FRA regulations
Improve employee attitude
toward FRA inspections

Increase Officer interaction with all FRA
Regional Directors

11
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C.

(6)

Create and publish in-house manual:
'What Every fnspector Should Know'

(7)

Complete DC hi-pot safety training

Daily Inspection Locations
(1)

Perform daily inspection with mechanical forces
when possible

(2)

Enginemen to inspect where mechanical forces are
not available. Specify outbound inspection on
specific routes

(3)

When FRA defects are identified, unit to be repaired or
traded out

(4)

Produce specially prepared units for dedicated outside
locations
(a)

D.

Weekly follow-up inspections by Division
Mechanical Officers

Fuel and Sand Locations
(1)

Sand to capacity policy

(2)

System fuel study to consider sanding locations
(a)

(3)

System fuel study to specify and limit number
of locations for fueling

Redefine 'SLN' as 'fuel but not complete service'.
Only locations listed on page 6 can report 'SLS' on
appropriate class of locomotives. All other fueling is
reported as 'SLN'. Turns without fuel are not to be
reported as 'SLN'.

12
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IV.

QUALI1Y ASSURANCE PLAN
(1)

Road freight locomotives released from Eugene, Roseville Service
Track, LA Taylor, West Colton, E1 Paso, Houston Hardy Street,
Pine Bluff (service track), Alton & Southern, Denver and Salt Lake
City will be in condition to reliably operate for a period of not
less than seven (7) days with only 'SLN' fueling required.

This will be accomplished by executing action items including, but not
limited to, the following:
(a)

Measure progress by Mean Time Between Failure and by
random sampling inspection of a selected list of items
(Appendix A).

(b)

Outbound inspection to be performed by Mechanical
Department officers. Sampling to be a minimum of 10% of
daily production at each location. A summary report will
be made monthly to the CMO.

(c)

Train officers and inspectors as to appropriate locomotive
safety regulations and policies.
(1)

(2)
(3)

Create instruction videos
Complete and publish manual 'What Every Inspector Should Know'
Complete DC hi-pot training

(d)

100% supervisor walk-through of outbound consists

(e)

lmplement a modified wheel match data document
for use at peelers and drop pits (Appendix B).

CO

Eliminate FARR. expansion joints and re-torque exhaust base
bolts on M24's.

13
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(2)

(g)

Provide needed high pressure
washers for cleaning

(h)

Initiate the use of DC hi-pot for
repeat offenders and for
"nothing found" cases

(i)

Institute use of locomotive engineer feedback letter
(Appendix C)

(j)

Institute employee involvement in developing quality
improvement programs

(k)

Utilize resources where possible in heavy overhaul program.
This includes truck and turbo programs. (See Appendix D Five Year Plan). Reinforce that quality must be built in
from the start; it cannot be added on later.

(I)

Improve material supply. A primary function in the
improvement of locomotive performance lies in replacement
of components. Obviously, parts can only be replaced if
made available.

Local and switch locomotives released from Eugene,
Roseville Service Track, LA Taylor, West Colton, El Paso,
Houston Hardy Street, Pine Bluff, Denver, Salt Lake City,
Oakland, Bakersfield, Tucson, San Antonio, Kansas City,
Avondale, Lafayette, East St. Louis, Grand Junction, and
Pueblo will be in such condition to reliably operate for a
period of not less than 15 days with only 'SLN' fueling
required. (Some additional remote locations may, from time
to time, be certified to service switch engines.)

14
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This will be accomplished by executing action times including, but
not limited to, the following:
(a)

(b)

Measure progress by random sampling inspection of a selected list
of items (Appendix A). Inspections to be performed by
Mechanical Department officers. Sampling to be a minimum of
10% of the daily production by an officer at each location. A
monthly summary report will be made to CMO.
Train officer and inspectors as to safety
regulation and policies appropriate to
locomotives:
(1)

Create and distribute video for inspectors

(2)

Complete and publish in-house manual:
'What Every Inspector Should Know"

(c)

Supervisor walk-through of locals and switch engines

(d)

Provide needed high pressure washers for cleaning

(e)

Send all local and switch power to a certified road-freight service
location for M06 and higher maintenance

(f)

Institute use of locomotive engineer feedback letter (Appendix C)

(g)

Institute employee involvement in developing quality improvement
programs

15

227

Southern Pacific Transportation Company
Policy Memo -- Response to FRA Enforcement Activities
March 23, 1990

V. LEGISLATIVE EFFORT
(A)

Develop high profile with AAR to minimize cost of FRA
compliance. Regulations should be more specifically concerned
with safe train operation

(B)

Develop Railroad and AAR support for a proposal to FRA to
extend daily inspection of through freight operations.

(C)

Develop a "locomotive safety inspection" similar to Appendix D of
the Freight Car Safety Standards.

VI. OUTSTANDING ACITON ITEMS

A

Complete operating plan changes - A L. Marzano

B.

Complete fuel location plan - G. L. Pollitt

C.

Reestablish where and by whom dailies will be performed General Managers and K. R.. Schaeffer, After Items A & B Above

D.

Finish Hi-pot Training- G. L. Putman, 4/1/90

E.

Distribute Engineer training video - J. B. Harstad, 4/1/90

F.

Distribute inspector and supervisor training manual
''What Every Inspector Should Know" - J. B. Harstad, 4/1/90
(Mo<>l'te)

G.

Formalize Plan for I<.A.t;<- K. R.. Schaeffer, 4/1/90

H.

Distribute updated inspector video - J. B. Harstad, 5/1/90

1.

Complete supervisor and inspector refresher classes - G. L.
Putman, 6/1/90

16
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APPENDICES
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C.S. 232G·A
REV. 7-80

lt

APPENDIX A-1
lOCOMOTIVE INSPECTION/ DISCREPANCY REPORT

! THIS FORM SERVES TWO PURPOSES:
~

l

This fomaupplements, but Is not to be used In !leu of, FAA Form No. 2·A. C.S.·2326. Each locomotive unit ahall be inspected In
accordance with Rule 203 of the Ia~. rules, and Instructions for Inspection and testing of locomotives other than steam.

This form Is to be used to log discrepancies or defects found on locomotives and to list the COff'ttetlve actions taken. This form
Is to be used for all defects and actions taken not covered by a scheduled malnteMnce procedurlll•
.- Upon eompletlon., the form must be separated and OfigiMI sent to Production Planning l Control, Office of CMO, San Francisco.
L

. tNSURE THAT BOTH THE ORIGINAL AND COPY ARE lEGIBLE
c

EAC: - - - - - - - - - - - - -

LOCOMOT1VE Ut>IIT

'LOCATION _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ DATE ________ TIME _ _ _ _-:-:.INmAL ANO NUMBER:::----•

. UNIT ARRIVED· WORKING

DEAD

FAILURE CODE

ASSOCIATED SCMEOULEO
MAIN.,.ENIIt-lCE
(IF ANYi
'

1-iif'!+i;liilit•):l•lJ•:&iOJ;i:~iCWfi'lt;!:=;fj!;l'j:!§§•)§ . . :eo:• · "l:tttU'H1BOUtl.:llr~~:
SERVICE TRACK
YES NO

1

Daily inspection card 229.21

2

Blue card (Periodic inspection)

l

Controller

'

Motor C/0 (all in or DIC

!;

S11-.ders (all workinsz)

6

Oil on walkwav

7

Wheel defects (Visual)

8

MR Securement (Visual)

9

Safety Appliances (Clearances)

lO

,_

,,.::::11;\'

Couuler Lock Lift (Clevis Clearance)

_ll

Decals (hi Volt

_12

Flv Wheel

emz brake valv

Fuel Cutoff

at:x 2en covers

:)

!M covers

11

G~~;ar

14

Sen:n:·ation of tornedos and f1.1sees

.1.3

Trash in sumn

J.6

Fuel tank bolts (Visual)

ll

MlJ

1B

Walkwavs chains (cont Barriers)

.ll

Pilot: clearance 3-6"

_20

Brake ri22in2

-"

~ ~raiY'I!!:

..2?

Vimu11

~1

T-ftrht'!t -

.:l!

,.., .... '"' '· ,..,,

cases

cables misPlaced (Q_ e:1d free)

shoes. & travel

fin .a:~t.omat:ic

@Vidf'!n<"P

Cah

of

oosit:ion)

P"<h::~,~t

lPIIkt:~

walkvav t. Fni:l Room

'""'"'~"

Form is to be filled out below If supplementing FRA Form No. 2·A. C.S.·2326.
MAIN RESERVOIR PRESSURE

LBS. __ BRAKE PIPE PRESSURE

LBS.

CONDmON OF BRAKES AND BRAKE R I G G I N G - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Signatl.lfe o1 Employee Making lnspeclion
Occupation---------ihe above work has been performed. exceot as noted. ano the report 15 aoproved.
Cc::;catlon - - . - - - - - - - - - - -

~~

== ..l \

:
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APPENDIX A-2

LOCOMOTIVE INSPECTION I DISCREPANCY REPORT
S FORM SERVES TWO PURPOSES:
~

This form supplements, but Is not to be used in lieu of, FRA Form No. 2·A. C.S.·2'326. Each locomotive unit shall be Inspected In
accordance with Rule 203 of the laws, rules, and Instructions for lnlpectlon and testing of Jocomotl-..a other than Iteam.
L This formls to be used to log discrapancles or defects found on locomotives and to list the corrective actions taken. This form
Ill to be used for all defects and actions taken not coverltd by a acheduled maintenance procedura.
m completion, the form must be aeparated and original sent to Produc:Uon Pfannlng & Control, Office of CMO, San Francisco.

SURE THAT BOTH THE ORIGINAL AND COPY ARE LEGIBLE

....
I.OCOWOTIVE UNIT
~·-------------------------:AnON-------------- DATE _______nME----~~t~mAL
AND Nu-..ae1t:::----uscct~<TEo SC~-tEDULED
IT ARRIVED· WORKING

DEAD

-l.•i~"11!; l:..tl•t.:-.•::~~•J!-.'itj'

:::.r,,..'ft4"

FAILURE CODE

• ::I' ·• :lo."'iii~ :I :ltj;::U

SHOP l.ELEASES

1.

Oil Leaks & Sump

YES

•L:•r,, ;•

1-

·.r~HI:::III:\'

NO

cleanin~

'1

~f' .. nct

J.

Floors, Windows, Cabs. Seats

A.._

5.

Safetv Ban2ers
Check Exhaust Chambers for leaks
and/or loose bolts

6.

Rese.al doors

('!Z'.f.-},

MAINTENANCE OF ANY)

• • 'l::lrrotH'l::lf: 1011

i>lAf'"'c)(f't'll"'f'r:tc!f'irH•

r,.,,f'\.,.C:'

-

I

I
j

:Inn is to be filled out below if supplementing FRA Form No. 2·A, C.S.·2326.

~I'N ~ERVOIR PRESSURE

lBS._ BRAKE PIP£ PRESSURE

l.SS.

:-tiOmON OF BRAKES ANO BRAKE R I G G I N G - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

9'-~ture of Em~ro:'" MakmQ lnspee:lon
:-,. l:cve

•1c:n<

~a: :Hn ;le~crr:;ed. ~t:-:cept as

--

Cccupatlon - - - - - - - - - ncted. ar:c: ::- J ·eecr: :s ac::re·teC:.

----------------------------23
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APPENDIX B-1

~§

f ~\;

WITH

LOCATION

...
CORRECTED
....·~:By
,,.
~'

\:
,

:'·.\

'·

L1
L2
L3
L4

~

.
:.;.:

:;

. ·.: ::::-. /'

... ..

:

'··

L5

l6
R1

..... ',.,

... ..

R2
R3

R4
R5
R6
WHEEL RADIUS MEASUREMENTS
WHEEL ~L~E~FT~RA_D~I_US
__~·R_IG~H_T~R~A_D~I~WS~
No.
in.
Fraction
l
Fraction

EXISTING

ACTION

Shim

Reqd.

2

3

'

..

4

I

AVERAGE
(B_iQht + Left)

"

·~

~~

.

.. .

'

..

.

-

....

.

CORRECTED '
By

•.

:

.-.

5

. e.
SP CONDE.MNlNG RIM THICKNESS l:1i 1"
& SWITCHER
SP CONDEMNING FLANGE TH
ESS : 15/18" FREIGHT & SWITCHER
SP CQNDEMNING FLANGE H
1 1/2"' FREIGHT & SWITCHER
.MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE MISMATCH WITHIN LOCOMOTIVE 11111 5/8' RADIUS (4 & 6 axle units)
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE MISMAT-CH WITHIN 3
TRUCK = 3/8" except; IF PROPERLY

=

·.~ '~:;;

·. ·~ .~',
REFER. r_o·bMP 403 ~oR WEAR UM
~

'

...

·: "-\.. ··.,
ACTION.CODES: ,

5
;~ :' .
;,: .
"'

WH

MMEO MAXIMUM

~.

•

-...
;;,

..

..

:

:~;; ~

;

:

.~

e

= 5/8"" WlTH SHIMS

~

·-·

:

"

~~

•:

LOCOMOTIVE IS ON DROP PIT OR PEELER
•

::. =!

'<#

•m•

•

•

.~.

> •

~,.

•

• :

'.; '"•" c:.,..
-

..

.,

••

·: :. -:;. :5 :
-

~

~~

0 ..._..No actidn required
, ..

,.

'.,

."

, ...0

~

..

PAGE.002

..

.......

a•:

METHODS OF APPLYING AAR STEEL WHEEl GAGe'
I

•

.
I
. . ,,
Measuring potnt • :
'
AAR Wheel. Gauge Readh'!l
to ~odell GIIOOW!I '"''1 113"!

·•· CONVERSION TABLE
; !~..

.

~

1111 -~-1118"

..

21118 -

30116 •
31116 -

·'-

"lnue

:1..

,

1 i J'UJ"
1 15118"

33/11 .. 2·1118"'
2 ·ua~
WUI l.. 2 Sl1t..
: ; 31111 011 2 !14w
37111 ... 2 1111'"
31118 ... 2 318"

• ·'.

·"

.~

i

!

:: le'
. .. ,:
·I

L

3!HH~..;. t:7111~·

. .

-.:

1111"' .. : • : • •,
118* • .
!i
31t3" :·~ .
114";
5111"'

~

40111 .. !'11:! •
.-sne "' 2 1116"
42111 :.. 2 '511"
4311111 ... :tl11t1111"'
44/11 ... 2 314*,
45/11 IIIII ~ 1Sf"fl*

wte ... 2'na·

:ua· .

--.....L-.....;..;...__.....;......;..;...__t'

4tUI •

(

,....

:wHEEl RADHJS. MEASUREMENT~
:

~

.

4111111 ... 2 !11111111"

I

.,

I

s•

ana .. s;ma•
10111 "" 3 11I.IJI",

.,

(

:r

t.

t

i .

•

6

. .....
.

! .......

:r:

1 i314-

:uns ..

23111 •J1- 7111" . . "'
24111 ... ; 1 112" • • ·. ~ .,
21111 lilt • 'f t/111"
.

..

.I;..·~
'

m11 -... r

·:14/UJ -:":.111• • ·:
·''1'5111 .._ 15118"'. .

.... 1
.... 1
• .;1
• ~1
... 1
"" 1

:

29118 - 1 '13118.

1111• .. 1111r . .
--12'111 81314"'
-.'11118 "">! .13118"' ;; ·;

..11111
11111
. 18HI
·'at"'C
''21111

• f --,

. . . . . . 1!118"
271Ul ·.,. 1 11118"

~·· ,., 111"
3111 .. 3118.
4111 ... 114.. x.
5111 .. 61f1•.·.
II'MI • !18"
1116 ... 7ttfJ•·
8111 ... 112'" ...
Silt8 .,. 8114!1"'
1011'1 ... 518.. ,. • .

.··13/fiJ ..

I

.. ,

,,·'

....

~

.

L

""'

;""""

'

~.

c
'i

.A.

·,

<I

I

f.
I ~•"' ~

'

NOTE: use 15111.. ~ ••~
gage to condemn wheel
for tin ft111nge

.

. ;

.

_____ ,ng point
MR wheel gage tread
Thickness Nading ""' 1 118"'

..

.... - · t

I
i

•

'§

... ~..
... ,

I

~

-

.... .

l

('1

:··; .

~·

'
·;

.

:--FLANGE HE&Gt;fT';~E~SU_RE~EN1
. 1
;
c• ..•. ~
1 !

.J

·

.,

·I' .• ,, 4"!,...

.

•.I

f i .•..

.'.'.

.r

>tl
tTl

S

·J H

.•

><I

.,.

t73
I
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APPENDIX C

Survey
locomotive Cab Environment
TO:

OPERATL~G

FROM:

DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES

MECHA.~~'lCAL

DEPARTMENT El'¥1PLOYEES

As operating department employees are the users of the product provided by the mechanical department,
we at the ramp and sef'ltice track would like to know what is most important to you as our customers. We
know that the locomotives must meet certain F.RA guidelines and we know that if we provide you with
trash containers you will return a clean cab to us. But beyond trash bags and the F.R.A, how do you feel
a locomotive should be equipped or prepared to make your tour of duty more pleasant? If we were to
prepare a FH'IAL CHECK LIST, what do you feel should be on that check list?

Make your comments below, fold this pre-addressed form and place in company mail receptacle. Signing
your name and occupation is optional, but encouraged.

NA.\fE

OCClTPATION

LOCATION

DATE

-

~!

OP JlPFU.DtCU . . , . _
IU 4 I'W ~1ft UGORI1 fUll Cit M!JG~ft lie ltU

tu 5 ftAl ftU1'11C1C

Our aev , Tear

retealc

~oaotiva

ft,.M Of .J&I

APPENDIX D-1

llo ltlt

floe

•rheD ":
0

•

•

Vle~t r ..u!reaerate ._. •• .a aroet tee a!la fe~ta.
to% loc~t~~-- •••llabllttr aael ., .., ., lttJ.
~ucad
t•rM&li S..,rond pede~ (utsdd I b1Por).

ute••••

~jot taprove~e~t proaraas were •••1rae6 over a JO pear terlod to assure
continued per!or•anee of our fleet past the S Jllf plara.

The fol1owln& ts lilt of dtffereneee .. t~~~ the two (2) plaras:
J

!U~

S'TUTtctC PUN

N.a -1m

• tocoeotive Aftllabllttr

•

Plett Prof Ue

•rejected

19, to, tl, 12. ,,

so so so so so

50600000

!4 14 14 14 14

14 14 14 M

208 200 160 145 :UI

109 100 ltO Ut
136 133 140 141

ItO lt4 229 240 142

• The 5 fear Plan u1ee aft alternatln& cycle of heavy aa1ntenanee
based on alles for blah horsep~tr frei&ht loco•otlves aod
toeludet an MSO Prosr•• for twltch eD&iDtl.
View ... .UO - HlO ... KSO ... CliP • KSO ... HlO .... lBO ...

lethe

IU0/30 cotateat ku '-•t~ HYhed to illl)ro'fe nUa'blUtp ad
drl'ft dOWD exeettl'fe eoo-echedu1ad npalr expea1a1.

23'1

